Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics by Richard H. Thaler (PDF)

Description

RICHARD H. THALER: WINNER OF THE 2017 NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICSShortlisted for the Financial Times and McKinsey Business Book of the Year AwardECONOMIST, FINANCIAL TIMES and EVENING STANDARD books of the yearFrom the renowned and entertaining behavioural economist and co-author of the seminal work Nudge, Misbehaving is an irreverent and enlightening look into human foibles. Traditional economics assumes that rational forces shape everything. Behavioural economics knows better. Richard Thaler has spent his career studying the notion that humans are central to the economy – and that we’re error-prone individuals, not Spock-like automatons. Now behavioural economics is hugely influential, changing the way we think not just about money, but about ourselves, our world and all kinds of everyday decisions.Whether buying an alarm clock, selling football tickets, or applying for a mortgage, we all succumb to biases and make decisions that deviate from the standards of rationality assumed by economists. In other words, we misbehave. Dismissed at first by economists as an amusing sideshow, the study of human miscalculations and their effects on markets now drives efforts to make better decisions in our lives, our businesses, and our governments.Coupling recent discoveries in human psychology with a practical understanding of incentives and market behaviour, Thaler enlightens readers about how to make smarter decisions in an increasingly mystifying world. He reveals how behavioural economic analysis opens up new ways to look at everything from household finance to assigning faculty offices in a new building, to TV quiz shows, sports transfer seasons, and businesses like Uber.When economics meets psychology, the implications for individuals, managers and policy makers are both profound and entertaining.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐Misbehaving is one of several stand-out books on behavioral theory in the past decade or so. Richard Thaler succeeds at both providing a conceptual understanding of behavioral biases and explaining how these biases are present in everything from going to the store to economic research.He starts with his crown jewel, the endowment bias, which is strongly demonstrated using the wine example, wherein an owner of a fine wine worth $100 would not consider selling the wine because they want to drink it, but would not actually buy the same wine for $100 to drink if they didn’t already own it. This inconsistent logic extends beyond wine drinking. Consider also a person who would be willing to make a minimal payment to eliminate an already low risk of death, but would require significantly more if asked to accept that risk when it were not already present is also demonstrating this bias. There is a clear nonlinearity in subjective value that can be found frequently in consumer decision-making.Thereafter, Thaler continues to cover a series of interesting behavioral concepts.Hindsight bias, where individuals reviewing past performance believe that outcomes were predictable, causes mid-level managers to receive too much blame for project failures. Individual projects with sizeable payoff and sizeable risk of loss may not be favored by project managers individually due to capped upside and potential termination on the downside, even though from an aggregate perspective doing all projects may be the best choice for the company.Bounded rationality, a decision-making framework that incorporates behavioral biases, when applied to the theory of the firm, leads firms to maximize size (revenue) instead of value/profits (with minimal profit constraints). CEO pay seems to increase with both size and profits. Managers try to increase sales and match their workforce to meet sales, as opposed to performing marginal analysis for hiring decisions.The Weber Fechner law (also referred to as range-effects) describes a relationship between magnitude and intensity. Going from 2 headlights to 1 in a lit city is not a noticeable difference, but 1 to 0 is. Similarly, losing $1,300 instead of $1,290 is less noticeable than losing $20 instead of $10. In the latter example there is a diminishing marginal utility impact, so people are loss averse for the same reason they’re risk averse for gains…the loss of the second hundred hurts less than the first hundred. However, loss aversion (risk seeking when faced with losses) may only apply if the risk can generate enough gains to break even. If simply minimizing losses, loss aversion may not be exhibited. Accordingly, loss aversion could explain rogue trader issues and outsized losses/risk.Thaler goes on to explain the house money fallacy, wherein gamblers or investors will take more risk when playing with gains/investing with profits. He suggests this is a subsidiary behavior of mental accounting, implying that individuals should treat all gains the same as money initially invested. This concept has received appropriate challenge by opponents like Nassim Taleb, who highlight the importance of time probability and the use of thresholds to manage path-dependent financial decisions. While average returns over long-periods of time may be positive, intermediate volatility causing positions to be wiped out could prevent participation in recoveries, making thresholds important.An extension of this discussion includes myopic loss aversion, where people will turn down a single bet with a favorable payoff because the small loss would hurt more than the large gain, but would be willing to accept the same bet if run 100 times (because of the law of large numbers). Samuelson used backward induction to say this is irrational because there’s still a risk (albeit lower) of larger loss over 100 trials. Thaler disagrees, saying it’s actually the refusal to take the first bet that is irrational. Thaler then applies this to markets, saying investors over-invest in bonds because of similar short-term concern for potential losses (volatility). This may explain why the equity risk premium is so high, people are just looking at their portfolio too often!There is also dissent regarding how individuals respond to potential gains. In an experiment, Thaler notes that higher fares resulted in some inexperienced cab drivers hitting a target income and going home early, while staying out longer when fares are low. This is due to viewing income day by day instead of as a whole (though more experienced drivers didn’t make this mistake). This has far-reaching implications, as standard practice assumes that higher gains encourage individuals to intensify competition for those gains. To the extent investors operate with income targets in mind, higher rates of return may not induce investment.Thaler then introduces the first common argument against the relevance of behavioral biases: when stakes are high, individuals will make the right choice. However, research suggests individuals make irrational decisions whether stakes are high or low. In fact, high stakes purchases (i.e. a house) are less frequent than low stakes purchases, so consumers should really be better at making rational low stakes decisions as opposed to high stakes decisions.Another common argument against the relevance of behavioral biases: markets correct for behavioral irrationality. Thaler calls this the invisible hand wave, since its proponents often speak vociferously with their hands when explaining. However, if market participants are too unsophisticated to make rational decisions, how can they rationally select an expert? Also, experts likely have a conflict of interest. Both of these are reasonable objections, but not sufficient. It may not be about whether markets can make agents fully rational, but about how many layers of rational encouragement there are. For example, if sick, you could dance around a fire, but marketing and education help one reject this option in favor of medicine. You could just take any medicine, but you see a doctors to indicate which medicine or treatment is best. You could just see any doctor, or you could see those that have signaled competence via accreditation. At some point, the consumer has no choice but to use experience and judgment when making repeat purchases, even if more layers of assurance are added. Competition of private quality assurance adds checks to the process via liability and alternative options when dissatisfied. Overall, I don’t think Thaler is right to completely reject the invisible hand wave, though he does point out clear limitations.The last noteworthy general argument against the relevance of behavioral biases is from Gary Becker, who states that in competitive labor markets it doesn’t matter if most people suffer from behavioral biases, as the people who don’t will “win” the positions that require strong rational thinking. This argument is never really theoretically addressed, instead empirically challenged looking at football draft strategies (Thaler shows that team management tends to exhibit present bias and overpay for early picks).Thaler then moves on to explain the difference between transaction utility (the difference between price paid and usual price) and acquisition utility (general happiness attained via consumption). Homo economicus (the rational individual assumed in many economic theories) is never fooled by transaction utility, though normal people may be. Research suggests that poor individuals tend to assign more emphasis to opportunity costs, making them closest to homo economicus. Along similar lines, he explains the sunk cost fallacy, wherein individuals make decisions based on money already spent, potentially leading them to do something they would rather not just because of the money spent (going to a concert you bought tickets for when you’d rather just watch a movie when the night of the concert comes). This has both micro and macro effects, as Thaler argues it may cause governments to extent wars when they shouldn’t (there’s evidence this was the case during the Vietnam War). Fortunately, there is evidence that sunk cost inertia tends to be strong shortly after expenditure but wear off over time.Another popular bias, the self-control bias, has been a cornerstone of Thaler’s career. The self-control bias is exhibited when individuals admit that they’d be happier if the cashew bowl at a dinner party is taken away as to prevent them from getting full before dinner. The implication is that consumers may actually be better off when consumption options are limited instead of expanded, which directly opposes older economic frameworks that assume an increased possible consumption bundle is always better. This bias is ultimately a time preference issue. A one day difference matters more if it’s today versus tomorrow than if it’s one year from now versus one day before a year from now. Irving fisher argued that poor individuals have a more short-term preference because their desires apply to more urgent necessities. Samuelson pointed out that time preference is comparable to discounting future consumption. An exponential function is present if the year-over-year discount rate is constant. As conditions change over time and utility discount rates are adjusted, people may not act consistently (i.e. they may choose satisfaction in 2 years now, but prefer immediate satisfaction in a year). In other words, people may discount back from 1 year at 30% and back from 2 years at only 10%. This is called quasi-hyperbolic discounting when an individual starts high then declines, also known as present bias.This leads into an important discussion on consumption functions: how much will people spend after a tax cut? Keynes attempted to answer this question by noting that the marginal propensity to consumer is higher for poor people than for rich. Friedman argued that people will smooth the windfall over the short-run, but would spend more if they thought the income was permanent. Modigliani argued that it’s not income, but lifetime wealth that determines people’s marginal propensity to consume (the life cycle hypothesis). Barro took it even farther, extending the wealth time horizon to infinity to consider continued bequests (so Ricardian equivalence would exist). Thaler ultimately states that the marginal propensity to consume is higher or lower depending on the mental bucket new income is placed in, calling this the behavioral life cycle theory. He notes that lump sum tax breaks are more likely to be saved or used to pay off debt, while spreading tax breaks out will increase spending.Thaler then looks to other theories through a behavioral lens, particularly the Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance theorem, which states that if there are no taxes or transaction costs, companies should be indifferent whether money is paid in dividends, to repay debt, or in what bucket it is stored. Thaler says that mental accounting may cause investors to prefer dividends despite unfavorable taxes. Miller disagreed, saying Lintner’s explanation that firms only raise dividends when earnings are such that the firm will not have to lower dividends in the future is likely correct, although Thaler points out that this is itself a behavioral explanation similar to loss aversion.Thaler also delves into theories of market returns. He starts by introducing Keynes’ beauty contest and the guess the number game. The guess the number game dictates that everyone pick a number between 0 and 100, with the winner the individual who picks the number closest to two-thirds of the average number everyone else picks. Depending on the number of degrees of thought, the expected guess should keep getting lower until reaching 0, which is the Nash Equilibrium solution. These games demonstrate a different way of viewing secondary markets, with a focus on the actions of others instead of fundamentals.The first psychological explanation of market inefficiencies (value versus growth) was over-extrapolation of past performance onto future (so if growth stocks are too high and value stocks too low, outperformance of value is just reversion to mean). Fama argued it’s a risk difference, not a mispricing. In other words, higher returns may simply be due to value firms being more risky. Note, however, that this is not consistent with early users of the CAPM, which assumed these risks could be eliminated in diversified portfolios. Thaler notes that beta alone cannot explain these return differences.Thaler further argues that closed-end fund discounts from NAV refute the law of one price, though he seems to miss a large argument against such a claim. Closed-end funds are publicly traded holding companies that typically invest in portfolios of publicly traded securities. Unlike conventional mutual funds, closed-end funds do not redeem shares once they are issued; therefore, investors must buy and sell shares in the open market. Closed-end funds tend to trade at a discount relative to the value of their underlying assets in the open market, while conventional mutual funds trade at NAV (because conventional mutual funds will redeem shares from any shareholder at NAV). Although there are many possible explanations for the discount associated with closed-end funds (i.e. shareholders have no control over distribution policies of the fund, they cannot effect the level of management fees, they cannot control the timing of capital gain tax liabilities, they cannot control the issuance of new dilutive shares, etc.), most principally relate to a shareholder’s lack of control of the underlying assets of the fund. Thaler notes that closed-end funds are initially sold by brokers along with an approximate 7% commission. The fees don’t change but the discounts do, so the fees alone can’t be a sole explanation. Thus, Thaler blames investor sentiment and small firm effect (discount rises as difference between small and large stock returns increases) for the closed-end fund discount, without any reference to control issues. Control discounts at this level are further supported by control premium studies of acquisitions of publicly traded companies (which are admittedly influenced by synergies, not just control).Nonetheless, Thaler goes on to describe Fisher Black’s explanation of noise traders as simply “stupid” traders who ignore the law of one price, allowing for arbitrage-like opportunities. For example, when one public company owns another and the stub + subsidiary value doesn’t equal current value. He states that restrictions on shorts, a shortage of share inventory for shorts, and redemption requests from investors may prevent smart money from closing these anomalies.Thaler then takes on the Coase theorem, which states that if transaction costs are low and if dealing with small amounts of wealth, judges won’t be able to impact what kind of activity ends up occurring, they will only rule on who owns what or has what rights. The parties will end up negotiating according to their own preferences thereafter, so resources will still flow to the best use. Thaler argues that the endowment effect, sunk cost fallacy, and fairness consideration (preference to harm other side even at cost to self) will prevent the Coase theorem from working out. This is surprisingly reminiscent of Murray Rothbard’s criticism of the Coase theorem, which focuses on fairness and non-monetary (subjective) costs. Thaler then uses this reasoning to attack the perfection of consumer sovereignty, though he acknowledges bureaucratic behavioral limitations as well.Thaler then introduces asymmetric paternalism, where regulation benefits those who make errors without harming those who do not. This is the basis of the “nudge” solution. The role of government within such a framework is to enact laws that encourage individuals to make rational decisions without taking away their ability to make irrational (or just different) decisions if desired. A nudge does not involve reducing possible consumption or action bundles, instead simply selecting starting default decisions that can be changed if desired.Overall, while the ability of behavioral theory to explain certain identified phenomena is still up for debate, Thaler’s work is likely to be the core of macro-economic policy discussion for years to come. Great read.

⭐Behavioral economics has gone from a backwater discipline to the forefront of economic research over the last four decades and Richard Thaler has been one of the pioneers to take the field forward. Misbehaving: the making of behavioral economics is both the personal story of Richard Thaler as well as a strong overview of many of the experimental findings that have propelled the field forward and highlighted the relevance of experimental economics. With the financial crisis leading to much soul-searching among macro-economists behavioral finance has seen much renewed interest and representative agent models have been questioned more thoroughly. Misbehaving gives the reader a comprehensive overview of the value of psychology within economics and how our irrational behavioral failings don’t get averaged out by the law of large numbers.Misbehaving is developed chronologically and is split into 8 sections. The author starts with his beginnings as a graduate student and early professor in the 70s. He starts by describing how when he first was constructing his exams he had a series of questions of increasing difficulty that would be a good measure of the depth of understanding of the student and how the average of his test was in the low 70s. Despite the grade curve being a normal one, the student’s disdain for such a low mean led to an outcry and so he changed the denominator to a much larger number such that the numerator mean was much closer to 100. The proportion of correct answers was the same but the psychology of the results was totally different to the students. With this irrationality the author got caught in the growing interest in what economists consider supposedly irrelevant factors. The author starts to describe how early studies noticed endowment effects where people valued objects more as soon as they became their possessions which imply large transactional frictions. The author also highlights the work of Tversky and Khaneman on prospect theory and how declining marginal utility was insufficient to describe our economic decisions. The author gets into how people frame bargains and ripoffs and how the mental accounting that people have for acquisitions is based on transactional utility as well as consumption utility. In particular the value of getting a deal in and of itself leads people to buy unnecessary goods. This doesn’t make sense if we were only focused on utility from the use of a good. The author discusses how people anchor on sunk costs and overuse goods for which they don’t want to waste due to historic cost. The author also discusses how in peoples mental accounting they budget for categories and don’t let those budgets spillover from one another leading to inefficient usage of capita. The author notes for example that when the price of gas collapsed people bought premium gas rather than other goods or services which should have been their preference. The author also highlights how people treat their winnings with different level of care than their initial endowments as they consider themselves playing with ‘house money’. The author then tackles how people recognize they don’t have self control and as a consequence sometimes remove temptation. Such a strategy would be irrational if people were trying to maximize their welfare but its obvious to people that we are often of more than one mind. Given results from brain science and split brain research results, for economists to actually belief people are of one mind and can optimize their behavior would be remarkable.The author then moves on to his work with Khaneman in the mid 80s. He documents the results of the ultimatum and dictator games. These are basic game theory games in which there is a game with first mover advantage that should result in heavily skewed outcomes in favor of the first mover. With no repetitions the outcomes should be that the winner takes all but people don’t act like the rational actors of game theory calculating their Nash equilibrium and use rules of thumb based on perceptions of fairness. The results of these experiments have let to similar results on how to divide a pie across varying cultures reinforcing that fairness is a property people care about deeply. The author discusses fairness and market clearing mechanisms discussing concepts like outcomes that people think are repugnant – like hiking prices during a crisis. The author also highlights how in real business losing your customer base is far more detrimental than securing higher short term profits are beneficial.The author moves from experimental results to the academic debates around their relevance which picked up in the mid 80s and continued to the mid 90s. The author describes some of the early debates that occurred with Arrow on the behaviorist side against Chicago School with Merton Miller a staunch opponent. One of the debated points was the Modigliani-Miller theorem in which the capital structure should be irrelevant to the value of equities but is clearly not in practice. The author discusses the growth of journals which started to focus on behavioral economics and some of the puzzles posted. He includes a great puzzle which highlights confirmation bias for the reader. The author gets into the mission of building an economics team as well as discusses how people can get caught in the trap of forecasting time horizons with very narrow frames of reference instead of trying to step outside the project and reflect on past experiences. The author highlights how completing a book takes much longer than the author usually assumes it will take and repeating that time miscalculation time and time again despite realizing the result when advising others.The author then starts to cover finance which is where a lot of focus is for behavioral finance these days. The author gives some simple puzzles to note how investing requires thinking in the shoes of other people and how it resembles a beauty contest in which you are trying to pick the choices you believe others will make- a reference to Keynes. The author discusses episodes like the 87 crash and how volatility of dividends is a fraction of that of markets implying that noise is potentially a large component of volatility. The author brings up examples of irrational behavior like closed end fund premiums and discounts and highlights the mispricing of the stub investment of 3M vs pal during the internet bubble.The author then moves in to some interesting case studies he worked on where he discusses the NFL draft and the time inconsistency of people’s decisions as well as their over emphasis of trying to pick superstars. He goes into the humorous example of office assignment for economics and business school professors- an area in which homo economicus should reign supreme; unsurprisingly he did not. He also discussed some of the risk taking behavior of people on game shows in which playing with house money led to risk loving behavior that would be totally contrary to behavior based on gambling with one’s own capital. The author then moves into how this field can be useful and discusses his book Nudge and some policy reform in which better guiding policies can lead to more self enhancing outcomes for the population. The decisions by people to opt in to a program vs opt out are quite different and framing and laziness can have large impacts on how people make decisions.Misbehaving gives an informative overview of behavioral economics as it evolved. One learns about the field itself and the intertwining of disciplines with psychology as well as the internal conflicts faced by the economics profession. It presents a readable overview of the author’s personal and professional life and is highly educational as well. Definitely worth reading.

⭐Economics is about choices. Most of us with limited incomes try and exercise prudent choices to Optimise our budgets. In free markets, prices move up and down till supply and demand meet, reaching Equilibrium. Voila! We have a perfect equation on hand: Optimization + Equilibrium = Economics.What if this simple equation is not a perfect ‘Science’ and has ‘Anomalies’ that defy the rigid laws of science? The basis of such thought is that People, and not Science, are at the core of all human interactions including our decisions on personal life, or in balancing our budgets. Hence Economics in real life reflects our not so rational behavior which in turn is influenced by the vagaries of our Psychology. Just as the ‘Invisible Hand’ tries to discipline markets, our invisible minds individually and collectively at times does just the opposite. Hence Economics in practice means ‘Behavioral’ Economics, which is a combination of Economics and Psychology. This is my simple understanding of this complex field and this book is about the saga of integrating the two, in a fiercely guarded domain of pure Economic science.The cases and concepts are rich and insightful.It is well proven that in market economies, equities as a class of asset handsomely outperforms debt and bond markets and generate ‘premium’ returns. In fact, over any twenty-year period in the history of stock markets, equity returns have always been consistently higher. Yet, we allocate most of our retirement savings in ‘safe’ debt and bond funds, if at all. I understood this fallacy through a simple game illustrated in the book, that I am modifying slightly.Consider the following choices:Choice A: Flip a coin. If you get heads, you get $ 10; If you get tails, you lose nothing.Choice B: Flip a coin. If you get heads, you get $ 100. If you get tails, you lose $ 50.If the game must be played only ONCE, most of us would perhaps play choice A since there is a chance of winning a $ 10, while there is no risk of losing.On the other hand, if the game is to be played a Hundred times and results added, it is a no-brainer to jump to Choice B. (This is like saying that Newton would perfectly predict, that an apple from the tree would certainly fall to the ground, but when it comes to a Hundred, he might bet on their journey in the opposite direction!). Hence, to me the key learning is to invest as much in equities, early, retire early and find time to read books like these!!There is also a great example on how innovation can be nurtured in companies. If there are about 25 projects, each with equal chance of generating $ 10 million in revenues and losing $ 5 million, chances are that, these projects in individual corporate silos, managed by individual managers are bound to be shelved. On the other hand, if the corporate innovation culture aggregates all these projects with no punishment for failure, it would be a great success. Corporate Innovation Strategy for the CEO.Our telescopic vision is myopic, and mental accounting is flawed argues Prof Thaler.One Anomaly comes to my mind after reading this wonderful book. The author would be delighted to hear on ‘anomaly’ from a common man like me. It is this. Cultures vary vastly across countries, communities and continents. (Hofstede dimensions for example). Hence if the Cooperation game is played in two different countries with vast cultural differences, say India and Germany, would the results be same, or significantly different? If similar economic policies are adopted in these countries, it succeeds in one and fails miserably in another. (My reference to the books ‘Culture and Prosperity: Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor’ by John Kay, and ‘The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere’’ by Hernando De Soto). (I have published my reviews on Amazon.com.)If so, can Culture be added as a Third dimension? Would this explain more of the Macro part of Economics? Pardon me if I am dead wrong. I am a Human and not an Econ.Thank you, Prof Thaler for this outstanding book. This book took lots of time for me to read. It involves deep thought and gradual assimilation, and the risk of being branded lazy. Yet it pays, even to be a lazy common man!

⭐A long read, and not a book to take lightly, but it contains a lot of passages and insights that lead to an “of course”. A lot of what Thaler says is obvious after the fact – but a proverb including wood and trees springs to mind. I’m not an economist nor psychologist, though my own profession includes a lot that crosses over into those fields – and would probably do better is there was greater cross-over.Specialists often get blinkered, or even blinded, by their own field’s theories that they fail to see the real world. I recall a sign I once saw “That’s all very well in practice but it will never work in theory!” We need to remain open to ideas that contradict our own comfortable world and be prepared to accept change. Thaler’s book isn’t just for economists – it’s for anyone who needs to deal with real world behaviour and decision making.

⭐Everything Thaler writes is interesting, and this is too…but it’s also a bit self-congratulatory and masquerades as educational/instructional but actually leaves you feeling like you’ve seen some headlines of the news, but have been handed no tools with which to employ similar thinking – or even work out ways to start.

⭐Richard H. Thaler traces in this book the origin and the making of ‘Behavioural Economics’, where core premises of the classical economic theory and generally accepted hypotheses in matter of finance and markets, are questioned.Core premisesCore premises of economic theory are that people choose by optimizing (rational choices) and that supply equals demand (price equilibrium). These premises assume that economic decisions are taken by a selfish and rational agent: the homo economicus, the ‘Econ’. But, the models based on those premises can generate flawed results and a lot of bad predictions. Econs exist only in a fictional world, not in the real world inhabited by Humans.The economists guild should earnestly reckon with human psychology and the social sciences. They should not exclude supposedly irrelevant factors (SIFs) in their analyses, like ‘sunk costs’ (money already spent) or ‘loss aversion’. Other generally accepted axioms, like the precept that buying and selling prices should be about the same or that more choices are always preferred to fewer, belong to a virtual, not a real world. People have well-defined preferences and self-control problems, while professional economists are misled by theory-induced blindness.FinanceR. H. Thaler tries to clarify the notion of ‘smart’ investor, and comes to the strange conclusion that a ‘smart’ investor is somebody who is trying to buy stocks, of which he thinks that other ‘smart’ investors will later decide that those stocks are worth more. He also mentions J. M. Keynes’ remark that people are willing to make extreme forecasts based on flimsy data, on ‘ephemeral and non-significant’ day-to-day information.The author attacks the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, with its two components: you can’t beat the market and prices are right. But, prices are often wrong (the October 1987 crash, close-end funds) and value stocks beat the market (B. Graham). One should read this book for the overall evaluation of these hypotheses by the author.Ultimately, the goal of the author is not to tell people what to do, but to help them achieve their own goals.These trenchant comments (‘wickonomics’ – wicked for the economic profession – not ‘wackonomics’) are a must read for all those who don’t want to live and work in the imaginary world of Econs.N. B. Thomas Kuhn’s vision on science (the consensus model and paradigm shifts) has been criticized by Karl Popper and his own vision (the conflict model and challenging hypotheses).

⭐I probably came to this later than ideal. As a first foray into the field it would work better. But having read a number of other books on behavioural economics I found this to be a little unoriginal. I found the style too narrative focused and a little self indulgent, but I am willing to chalk that up to personal preference.

Keywords

Free Download Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics in PDF format
Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics PDF Free Download
Download Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics 2015 PDF Free
Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics 2015 PDF Free Download
Download Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics PDF
Free Download Ebook Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics