Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000 by Stephen Kotkin (PDF)

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In 1991, the world looked in amazement at the collapse of the Soviet Union. But as Stephen Kotkin asserts in his concise, uncompromising history, this downfall was neither sudden nor unexpected but rather inevitable. Combining historical and geopolitical analysis with an absorbing narrative, Kotkin draws upon extensive research, including memoirs of dozens of insiders and senior figures. He illuminates the factors that led to the demise of Communism and the USSR, putting the collapse in the context of theglobal economic changes from the 1970s to the present day, examining for example why the advent of Siberian oil had profound effects on the Soviet Union’s raison d’etre. Kotkin also provides vivid portraits of key personalities. Using recently released archive materials, for example, he paints a newpicture of Gorbachev’s rise to General Secretary. Further, we see Gorbachev, the virtuoso tactician and resolutely committed reformer, “flabbergasted by the fact that his socialist renewal was leading to the system’s liquidation”–and more or less going along with it. Here, too, is Boris Yeltsin,full of the theatrics and “ham-handed populism” that especially aggravated Gorbachev. Finally, Kotkin creates a compelling profile of the “stable mess” that is post-Soviet Russia and he reminds us, with chilling immediacy, of what could not have been predicted–that the world’s largest police state,with several million troops, a doomsday arsenal, and an appalling record of violence, would liquidate itself with barely a whimper. At once authoritative and provocative, Armageddon Averted illuminates the collapse of the Soviet Union, revealing how “principled restraint and scheming self-interest brought a deadly system to meek dissolution.”

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: From Library Journal The director of Russian studies at Princeton and a published scholar in the field of Soviet studies, Kotkin has written a lively and provocative work on a subject that has already attracted much scholarly attention. His central question is, however, his own: why didn’t Soviet elites defend their Union, using their vast military arsenal to bring about a cataclysmic super-Yugoslavia in the dying USSR? How could such a massive police state have died so quietly? He points in response to those same elites who, for over 30 years, constituted themselves as vast “loot chains,” preferring to plunder their country of its wealth than risk losing everything in large-scale war. Through the medium of the Union republics, local elites led the charge for their own aggrandizement, thus “cashier[ing] the Union.” As he delivers telling jabs, Kotkin spares no one neither Soviet politician-gangsters nor arrogant U.S. administrators and academics. This is a much more readable and lively monograph on the Soviet collapse than others, such as Michael McFaul’s Russia’s Unfinished Revolution (Cornell Univ., 2001), which has a more purely academic appeal. Kotkin’s book should attract both the academic and the informed general reader. Robert Johnston, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont. The director of Russian studies at Princeton and a published scholar in the field of Soviet studies, Kotkin has written a lively and provocative work on a subject that has already attracted much scholarly attention. His central question is, however, his own: why didn’t Soviet elites defend their Union, using their vast military arsenal to bring about a cataclysmic super-Yugoslavia in the dying U.S.S.R.? How could such a massive police state have died so quietly? He points in response to those same elites who, for over 30 years, constituted themselves as vast “loot chains,” preferring to plunder their country of its wealth than risk losing everything in large-scale war. Through the medium of the Union republics, local elites led the charge for their own aggrandizement, thus “cashier[ing] the Union.” As he delivers telling jabs, Kotkin spares no one neither Soviet politician-gangsters nor arrogant U.S. administrators and academics. This is a much more readable and lively monograph on the Soviet collapse than others, such as Michael McFaul’s Russia’s Unfinished Revolution (Cornell Univ., 2001), which has a more purely academic appeal. Kotkin’s book should attract both the academic and the informed general reader. Robert Johnston, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont. Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc. From The New Yorker In 1995, Kotkin, a professor of history at Princeton, published “Magnetic Mountain,” a groundbreaking study of Stalinist socialism as it developed in the gargantuan steel town of Magnitogorsk, in central Russia. In his portrayal of that perverse utopia, the author displayed the skills of a dogged reporter and a meticulous archivist. The same strengths are evident in this brief, lucid study, which draws upon dozens of obscure Kremlin memoirs, provincial records, and interviews with top-level officials and oligarchs to provide us with the clearest picture we have to date of the post-Soviet landscape. Kotkin effectively describes how what was called “reform” was actually a continuing freefall collapse; he also expertly depicts the lingering networks and habits of the Soviet era, and how they have formed a post-imperial world in all its corrupt splendor. Copyright © 2005 The New Yorker Review “The clearest picture we have to date of the post-Soviet landscape. Kotkin effectively describes how what was called ‘reform’ was actually a continuing freefall collapse; he also expertly depicts the lingering networks and habits of the Soviet era, and how they have formed a post-imperial world inall its corrupt splendor…. Displays the skill of a dogged reporter and a meticulous archivist…in this brief, lucid study, which draws upon dozens of obscure Kremlin memoirs, provincial records, and interviews with top-level officials and oligarchs.”–The New Yorker”This briskly written, elegantly argued book is a triumph of the art of contemporary history…. Eschewing the fashionable academic focus on social movements, and the related notion that the Soviet downfall was owing to an uncontrollable wave of popular support for democracy–and also countering theself-congratulatory idea that unrelenting ideological and military pressure from the West led to the USSR’s demise, Kotkin concentrates instead on Soviet elites, persuasively arguing that the collapse was the outcome of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘pursuit of a romantic dream’ of socialistreform.”–Benjamin Schwarz, The Atlantic Monthly”Kotkin has recaptured the mood and feel of the end of the Soviet superpower with provocative profiles of not only Gorbachev but of Yeltsin and other Soviet and Russian leaders. Kotkin’s brief but powerful book should be added to any list of ‘must reads’ on one of the most dramatic events–the fallof the Soviet Union–of the last century.”–Robert J. Guttman, Europe”Among the quantities of chaff produced about Russia over the past decade, there was after all some wheat, especially memoir literature, and Kotkin has gathered it together in what is now our most comprehensive analysis of the Leninist endgame.”–Martin Malia, Washington Post Book World”Concise and persuasive…. The mystery, for Kotkin, is not so much why the Soviet Union collapsed as why it did so with so little collateral damage.”–Robert Cottrell, New York Review of Books About the Author Stephen Kotkin is Director of Russian Studies at Princeton University has written an acclaimed two-volume case study on the rise and fall of Soviet socialism: Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization and Steeltown, USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era. Read more

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐As someone who grew up and lived in the USSR I am not sure author is any expert in the subject. Large part of the book is dedicated to why Gorbachev didn’t use its vast KGB and military and prop up the Soviet system. Yet all you need to know is to read page 29 and be done – Soviet system was kleptocracy by then, with elites spoiled by Western goods, elite clinics, Beryozka stores and job positions abroad for their offspring.Then author spends pages and pages on 90s and Russian struggles with economics. Hey, again – page 29 of your own book – the goal of the elite was to steal and enrich themselves as much as possible. No need to write mounds of text.Funniest of all is the final chapter which describes ‘progressive’ change from Putin to Medvedev and ‘peaceful’ transition of power despite the fact that Putin was still young. How does that ‘peaceful transition’ look today, after February 2022, dear professor and expert?In summary, way too much unnecessary details and all the wrong conclusions.

⭐I have read the first two of Kotkin’s volumes on Stalin, and I eagerly look forward to the third. I bought this book because I thought he would help me understand the collapse of the Soviet Union. His understanding of the collapse revolves around three concepts: (1) Gorbachev’s “romantic idealism,” errantly hoping that through perestroika and glasnost the Soviet Union could be reframed around “humanistic socialism,” which was said to be Lenin’s initial ideal; (2) how this “romantic idealism” undercut the entire power structure of the Soviet Union, because free thought and press challenged the underpinnings of the Soviet Union; and (3) how the former apparatchiks of the Communist party, and others in the social elite, pillaged the State’s entire (but outdated and antiquated) economy in the “privatization” of the country’s assets. In this historical process, the Soviet Union splintered completely, and Russia, an agglomeration of fifty-some nationalities, emerged from the ashes. Kotkin does a great job describing the economic implosion and catastrophic GDP shrinkage, which was stopped only by a re-collection of legal power by the presidency and prime minister of Russia, our favorite guy, Vladimir Putin.Kotkin is amazed that during the implosion the Russian “power structure” of military, internal police (KGB), and regular police did not also blow inward. While the Army was shattered, Kotkin believes that the command structure remained relatively intact, so that no nuclear armageddon occurred.I enjoyed this book. I also agree with the reviewer that it was harder to read than Kotkin’s other books. The concepts of macroeconomic theory and the specifics of the political structures–I found this hard to understand, so I read these sections twice Also, I was not clear where all the newly enriched apparatchiks came from other than a fuzzy “educated elite.”

⭐As you rad this book you will find that it provides an excellent analysis of two of the most surprising events of the 20th Century. I began reading it primarily to understand the reason for one of those events, the collapse of the USSR. Yet it also delves into something just as significant and perhaps even more surprising, that the collapse led not to wholesale death and destruction, not to the vicious civil war that often emerges from the collision of powerful forces of an old regime’s effort to survive against those of dramatic change. Instead, as this book vividly explains that from the singular USSR emerged several independent republics and among them a new Russian Republic of considerable power shot through with awesome challenges. That this happened in a generally peaceful manner is as astounding. I deduct one star only because I believe the author portrayed Mikhail Gorbachev as more politically astute than events proved him to be. He also failed to give some of the darker elements of Vladimir Putin. Still, his pictures of both men may be more accurate than our currently generally accepted view. We need some more history to understand these men, particularly Putin. On one point the book may even deserve a sixth star, the debunking of the myth that Ronald Reagan brought down the USSR. On this, the book is in agreement with practically every historians analysis. Clearly even Ronald Reagan’s most ardent devotees cannot argue that he had anything to do with the peaceful resolution by various internal Soviet political players and blind luck of what could have been Armageddon.

⭐A good book but I felt it was only half the length it should have been. The discussion of the collapse of the Soviet Union was quite brief and felt like a summary. Funnily enough, the best part of the book was the post collapse chapter, while the last chapter felt unnecessary.

⭐Peerless. Buy.

⭐Having tried to wade through Gorbachev’s autobiography and having abandoned the attempt – too self-justificatory and serious – I turned to this book for enlightenment. The end of the Soviet Union and the causes of that end are lucidly explained. I hope the author soon writes another volume bringing us up to date on developments in Russia which still seems not to have embraced the concept of the rule of law.

⭐Der Untergang der Sowjetunion ist einer der erstaunlichsten Vorgänge der Weltgeschichte. Der Herrscher eines totalitären Staates verzichtete innerhalb weniger Jahre auf seine gesamte Macht. Die größte Armee aller Zeiten verschwand fast widerstandslos von der Landkarte. Nicht weniger erstaunlich ist, dass diese Ereignisse nur zwei Jahrzehnte später für selbstverständlich gehalten werden. Wie der amerikanische Historiker Stephen Kotkin in einem aufschlussreichen Essay demonstriert, waren sie in Wirklichkeit höchst unwahrscheinlich.Als Michail Gorbatschow 1985 Generalsekretär der KPdSU wurde, befand sich die Sowjetunion in einer strukturellen Krise. Seit den siebziger Jahren war die Wirtschaft des Landes kaum gewachsen. Der Abstand zu den kapitalistischen Gesellschaften des Westens, der sich zeitweise verringert hatte, wurde wieder größer.Die Erklärung für diese Situation liegt Kotkin zufolge in dem Umstand, dass die Sowjetunion dem Wirtschaftsmodell der dreißiger Jahre folgte. In der Zwischenkriegszeit schien die ökonomische Leistungskraft eines Landes von dem Ausmaß seiner Kohle- und Stahlproduktion sowie von der Zahl seiner Fabriken abzuhängen. Dementsprechend habe sich die sowjetische Wirtschaftspolitik auf diese Indikatoren konzentriert und ihre Orientierung auch beibehalten, als die kapitalistischen Staaten sich nach 1945 zu Dienstleistungs- und Informationsgesellschaften entwickelten. Mitte der achtziger Jahre seien 70 Prozent des sowjetischen Bruttosozialproduktes von der Industrie erwirtschaftet worden. „No other country ever had such a high percentage of its economy in big factories and mines“ (S. 17).In gewisser Weise hatte das Land den Westen damit tatsächlich überholt, wie es Chruschtschow vorausgesagt hatte, allerdings den Westen der dreißiger Jahre, der schon lange nicht mehr existierte.Hinzu kam, dass die sowjetische Industrie zum großen Teil veraltet war. „ … much of Soviet industry had been built during the 1930s, or rebuilt after the destruction of the Second World War according to 1930s specifications“ (S. 17).Indessen dürfe man nicht meinen, die Sowjetunion habe vor dem Zusammenbruch gestanden. Bei allen Schwächen sei die Planwirtschaft in der Lage gewesen für Vollbeschäftigung zu sorgen und einen Lebensstandard sicherzustellen, der den meisten Menschen erträglich schien (S. 27). „A strong allegiance to socialism … remained very much a part of ordinary peopleʾs worldview …“ (S. 44). Die Nationalitätenfrage habe kein akutes Problem dargestellt (S. 47). „The Soviet Union was not in turmoil. National separatism … did not remotely threaten the Soviet order … Soviet patriotism was very strong“ (S. 27). Die Finanzen seien in guter Verfassung gewesen. „The country had low foreign debt and an exellent credit rating“ (S. 171). Militärisch habe das kommunistische Reich nichts befürchten müssen. Mit einer Friedensstreitmacht von über fünf Millionen Mann sei es der NATO konventionell weit überlegen gewesen, während es in nuklearer Hinsicht die Parität mit den Vereinigten Staaten erreicht hatte (S. 5). Nicht einmal der von Ronald Reagan initiierte Rüstungswettlauf habe es vor unlösbare Probleme gestellt (S. 2; S. 170). Selbst ohne Reformen hätte die Sowjetunion noch viele Jahrzehnte überleben können (S. 2).Andererseits würde ein Kurswechsel gute Erfolgsaussichten gehabt haben. Wäre 1985 ein russischer Deng-Xiaoping zum Generalsekretär gewählt worden, könnte die Sowjetunion heute wohlhabender und mächtiger sein denn je.Um zu verstehen, warum es anders kam, müsse man sich die geistige Entwicklung Gorbatschows vergegenwärtigen. Unter dem Eindruck der Entstalinisierung habe der spätere Generalsekretär die Überzeugung gewonnen, dass die Sowjetunion nach dem Tode Lenins einen Irrweg eingeschlagen hatte. Während das sozialistische Ideal die Formel für die bestmögliche Gesellschaft enthalte, hätten Stalin und seine Nachfolger es missbraucht, um ein wirtschaftlich ineffizientes Unterdrückungssystem aufzubauen. Nach seinem Amtsantritt sei es Gorbatschows vorrangiges Ziel gewesen, den Leninschen Sozialismus wiederherzustellen, der, wie er meinte, nicht nur wirtschaftlich leistungsfähig, sondern auch mit Meinungsfreiheit, Demokratie und einer friedlichen Außenpolitik vereinbar war (S. 3). „What proved to be the partyʾs final mobilization, perestroika, was driven not by cold calculation … but by the pursuit of a romantic dream“ (S. 30).Geleitet von seinem Ideal habe Gorbatschow die Planwirtschaft geringfügig liberalisiert, gleichzeitig mehr Meinungsfreiheit und Demokratie zugelassen und dem Westen die Bereitschaft zu einseitigen Abrüstungsmaßnahmen signalisiert.Schon nach kurzer Zeit habe sich herausgestellt, dass die Reformen kontraproduktiv waren. Die wirtschaftliche Lage verschlechterte sich, die machtpolitische Stellung des Landes erodierte, der sowjetische Staat begann sich aufzulösen. Ein nüchterner Pragmatiker hätte zu diesem Zeitpunkt innegehalten, die Reformen rückgängig gemacht und die Sowjetunion gerettet. Doch Gorbatschow sei ein romantischer Idealist gewesen. Vor die Wahl zwischen Macht und Ideal gestellt, habe er sich für das Ideal entschieden. „For him … to have returned to Stalinist methods to preserve the system would have … made a lie of his whole inner life“ (S. 175).So habe Gorbatschow den Untergang seines Landes mit zunehmender Verzweiflung verfolgt, ohne den gewaltigen, ihm immer noch zur Verfügung stehenden Militärapparat einzusetzen. „Flabbergasted by the fact that his socialist renewal was leading to the systemʾs liquidation, Gorbachev more or less went along“ (S. 112).Mit dieser Geisteshaltung habe er auch Osteuropa gehen lassen und Berlin, das Kronjuwel der Sowjetunion, für dessen Eroberung mehr als dreizehn Millionen sowjetische Soldaten gefallen waren, widerstandslos preisgegeben. „Gorbachev served up the severed head of his superpower on a silver platter and still had to employ all his artifice to cajole two U.S. administrations to the banquet“ (S. 170).Der gleiche Faktor, der Gorbatschow antrieb, habe seine Kritiker gelähmt. Da die Perestroika im Namen des wahren Sozialismus erfolgte, dauerte es sechs Jahre, bis sich ihre Gegner zu einem Putsch aufraffen konnten. Selbst dann hätten sie Gorbatschow nicht abgesetzt, sondern versucht, ihn für ihre Sache zu gewinnen (S. 97). Vielleicht offenbart nichts die Hilflosigkeit der „Konservativen“ so sehr, wie die spätere Haltung Ligatschows, der seinerzeit als gewichtigster Kritiker der Reformen galt. „Because he shared Gorbachevʾs belief in the possibility of energizing the system, Ligachev refuses to accept that perestroika is precisely what precipitated the systemʾs demise, or even that the blame lay with the man he had helped put in power. Instead, Ligachev rails against the hijacking of perestroika by ‚radical conspirators‘, such as Alexander Yakovlev, intent on destroying socialism“ (S. 82).Letztlich bestand die Tragödie der Sowjetunion darin, dass sie siebzig Jahre nach ihrer Gründung von einem Mann geführt wurde, der ihre Weltanschauung beim Wort nahm. Sobald machtpolitische Erwägungen ausgeschaltet waren, zerstörte das sozialistische Ideal seine eigene Gesellschaft. Damit das geschehen konnte, musste eine der unwahrscheinlichsten Konstellationen der Geschichte eintreten: Ein politischer Romantiker an der Spitze einer Supermacht.

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