The Character of Consciousness (Philosophy of Mind) 1st Edition by David J. Chalmers (PDF)

Description

In this book David Chalmers follows up and extends his thoughts and arguments on the nature of consciousness that he first set forth in his groundbreaking 1996 book, The Conscious Mind.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐-How can a reader consider a book a *must* and still acknowledge that he (me…) did not like it? In highly “tricky” unsolved areas of mankind’s intellectual endeavours, it is often better to have “bad answers with possibly fruitful reasonings,” than to have “good answers with most likely (or, to a great extent) sterile reasonings.” Just take a look at Copernicus’ splendid answer to the Earth vs Sun “what is the center of our planetary system” dilemma. At the time he advanced his “good answer,” it was close to good-for-nothing. It simply did not work; not until Kepler worked out the math right. Compared to that, Ptolomy’s 1300 year old “bad answer” was pretty much fruitful: not only did it work (with amendments…), but it also inspired and gave people a working framework to think about better alternatives (because of the very amendments…). Most likely (IMHO) Chalmers is wrong. Yet, his reasoning can greatly help in boosting the thinking of those involved in this quest for the Holy Grail of the human intellect: The Answer to the Mystery of Consciousness.I particularly appreciated some aspects of Chalmers’ stand on this whole issue. He is pretty much aware of the fact that many take this topic almost as an agenda for ideological fights (I dare say: Jihad/Crusade fierce “wars” indeed!), and he clearly states that he does not like or take this route. Topmost, he is aware that there is indeed a hard problem to be faced in the consciousness debate. He also clearly exposes the bizzarre behaviour of those who either deny the existence of consciousness or try to “explain” it actually talking about something completely different from the issue itself. Human beings, go figure… We just never change in our core vices.I’d like now to present some points that I think are, say, “problematic.” [Readers are specially invited here to make comments in case I might have misapprehended some points]1- Chalmers seems to be aware of the question-begging nature of ascribing *unconsciousness* to the so called “unconscious mental processes.” Yet he dwells on it far too little. So little that he ends up reinforcing the flawed (or at least premature) conclusion that “unconscious” mental processes are indeed *unconscious*.2- He expresses the view that representationalism is at a topmost position in the consciousness debate (something almost like: where there is representation of the world, consciousness is to be found). Yet, I do not think he went as far and as masterly on this road as he should. Representation is a billion-year-old trick in nature. Even bacteria have sophisticated ways of producing and benefitting from it (just check out the “quorum sensing” strategy used by many different bacteria in several different situations). What are we to say and to expect from these highly sophisticated representation systems? Are they highly conscious? Why should they be? Why shouldn’t they? Chalmers merely touched the shore surface of this intriguing “ocean,” while he could have ventured (with the data we indeed have today) at least as far as the “continental shelf.”3- Laying the conditions for a theory of consciousness, Chalmers advances the need for both a solid knowledge of the NCCs (neural correlates of consciousness) and of an explanation for *why* and *how* the NCCs give rise to consciousness. In this too, like with the item 1 above, he seems to have some insight on the intrinsic pitfalls of the explanation business; and again he dwells on it far too little (like almost everyone else). What is it to explain something? What is the difference between, on the one hand, scientific/mechanical explanation and, on the other hand, magical thinking. The answer (IMO), at the very bottom layer, is: as far as anyone can tell, none! [i.e.: A causes B not because of a truly rational logical scientific neat and clean explanation, but merely because A causes B and that is that. Pure magic. Period.]. This may not be a problem if you are working with molecular engineering, or car engine fixing. But when you deal with frontier knowledge thinking, it is a must to address these issues deeply. Sadly, it is very rare to find someone who does… And Chalmers is no exception.4- In some places, Chalmers stresses his view that consciousness has structure. Always, as it seems. Yet, I cannot think of something simpler (structureless…?) than a red led light dot on a full dark surrounding (actually I can: the very full dark surrounding by itself…). So I think that Chalmers’ attempt to tie consciousness to structure is at least forcefully artificial and possibly misguided.5- Another (closely related) idea that Chalmers advances is somewhat like “consciousness is tied to information.” That is, the more information in a system, the more consciousness in this system (this is a simple and rather crude presentation by me of Chalmers’ exposition; but I think I am faithful to the core of his reasoning on that). At first I felt it might be somewhat promising. Now I just cannot see any advantage in this view. I just cannot see why a system with more information in it should be more (or less) conscious than one with less information.6- Also the idea that consciousness is unified (somewhat supported by Chalmers) has always been kind of allien to my mind. I was once charged with holding this view by a commentator to a review that I did for the book Consciousness Explained (book by materialist ideological crusader and Santa Claus immitator Dan Dennett). I think that anyone that believes consciousness is unified is bypassing the most important discussion regarding *Unity, Duality, and Plurality in the Universe*. As with many other topics, I think Chalmers sidestepped the needed heuristic in-depth appraisal of the issues involved.7- I also ended up not feeling much “attracted” (or convinced) by Chalmers’ “Principle of Organizational Invariance,” which holds that if you have two systems with the same organization, then these two systems should have (or definetely have!) the same conscious experience. This is arguably the central thesis in the book. And I think it was not masterly crafted. Far from it indeed. The idea – the way (and to the depth/quality) Chalmers was able to develop it – seems to me just as good as any other candidate regarding the consciousness mystery debate. And the seminal question remains pretty much the same: why should it be that two systems with the same organization (even if this is possible, which I greatly doubt…) would have the same conscious experience?8- An interesting issue is the “Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness.” There is a special section dedicated to it, and Chalmers also highlight some other obstacles elsewhere in the book. He comments that we have a “paucity of objective data” (for the development of a theory of consciousness), and puts this phrase in a meaningful and somewhat enlightening context. He further reminds us that there are “traditions where the study of experience has been explored in detail” (including, among others, the traditions of “Western phenomenology, introspectionist psychology, and even Eastern meditative traditions”). Yet, IMO, these are presented way too introductorily, without the deserved deeper development.Taking from these “problems” listed above (numbers 1 to 8), there are some courses that I think the book should have followed, or deepened, to better address the Mystery of Consciousness. The very first item would be a fuller description of the, let’s put it this way, “Bestiary” of Concious Experiences. That is, the book would have been far more enlightening (IMO) had it described the various types of conscious experiences, both ordinary and “anomalous,” and tried to draw the relevant conclusions from them as to the place of consciousness in nature and its possible relation to the objective world. I think that even regarding ordinary conscious experiences the book was shallow in its analyses. For example, my thinking merely about the ordinary states of consciousness has led me to the stunning conclusion (or insight, no matter right or wrong) that we will *never* be able to prove that unconsciousness exists! Unconsciousness, by its very definition, cannot be experienced. So how can we be really sure that we ever were in this state at all?A second item that I felt missing, and that strenghthens what I just said above, is the extent to which memory places puzzling constraints to any attempt at “handling” a science of consciousness. For example, I twice experienced an anomalous conscioussness event when I was a child where I went through the whole night in just one blink of the eye: at one second it was night (about ten o’clock); the next second, it was day (about seven in the morning). It was a perfectly continuous conscious experience. Yet, most likely I had conscious dreams in between. So the continuity of consciousness is, always, to be questioned. Similarly, we usually seem to fall into unconsciousness when we fall asleep. Yet, again anomalously (this time as an adult), I once fell asleep completely conscious of the whole process. I went from wakeful consciousness into dream consciousness seamlessly (apparently…).One specific line of reasoning that I strongly consider fruitful (also lacking in the book) is a close look at *how* consciousness emerges. This question has both a “historical” aspect (i.e. a step-by-step description of the processes that ended up giving birth to consciousness in the universe) and a “day-by-day” aspect (a description of the steps leading to, say, our own coming into consciousness and fading into unconsciousness). The key issue in this question is: what exactly happens to a system at the very moment it becomes conscious? Pondering over this, I ended up coming to the very same conclusion of many phylosophers and scientists who came to embrace the view that consciousness is (most likely) a fundamental aspect of the universe. However, contrary to Chalmers’ view of a protoconscious substrate, I have concluded that this fundamental substrate can only be Hyperconscious (Brahmanism/Akashic Records like). Conclusions aside (and the intrinsic high probability of their being simply wrong…), my point in commenting this on this review is to stress the importance that thinkers in this area take bolder venues, and at the same time more creative (fruitful), heuristic, and fundament-seeking ones.All in all, Chalmers’ are indeed priceless contributions. He – together with many of his “peers” – has managed to strengthen our understanding of consciousness as something far far from solved (a true Hard Problem, as Chalmers puts it), yet far far from untractable. And that was, arguably, one of the major shifts of paradigm that we were blessed with in the Twentieth Century.

⭐Chalmers’ earlier book The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996) was widely reviewed and praised. This new book may be viewed partly as a sequel; however, much of it consists of essays published earlier but updated to incorporate changes in Chalmers’ ideas over the years, as well as providing smoother transitions between the 14 chapters. Some readers may be put off by this duplication, but I was happy to have everything easily available in one place and to hear of Chalmers’ latest thoughts. I awarded five stars based on his excellent in-depth treatments of several areas of central interest to me even though other parts of the book may be read only by professional philosophers. Warning: If you are new to consciousness studies, this book is probably not the place to start.Neuroscientist Christof Koch suggests that scientists should pay close attention to questions posed by philosophers, but not take their answers too seriously. This may be good general advice, but for me, Chalmers does an excellent job of presenting a plausible spectrum of prevailing metaphysical views labeled Types A-C (reductionist) and D-F (non reductionist) with his strongest arguments favoring the latter. He suggests, for example, that information may play a critical role in a theory of consciousness in addition to its known importance in the physical sciences (more on this later). Related to this informational conjecture is a chapter employing the popular movie The Matrix to address issues concerning our knowledge of the external world. Several additional themes run throughout (in my words), consciousness seems to be a fundamental property of our universe, reductive theories don’t seem to work, one should not confuse neural correlates of consciousness with consciousness itself, such correlations fail to even come close to “explaining” consciousness, and science is essentially correlative rather than reductive. As a scientist (brain physics), I especially welcomed this latter idea, which seems to be poorly understood by many, including some scientists.Chalmers also provides a plausible argument supporting “the principle of organizational invariance” meaning that any two systems with the same fine grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences, implying that a silicon isomorph (say a computer yielding a one-to-one functional correspondence of all parts at all spatial scales) of a human must be conscious. While I accept Chalmers’ basic logical argument, its conclusion may be highly misleading. For example, some believe that connecting 10 billion or so neuron-like artificial elements following appropriate input-output rules can produce a conscious entity. The problem with this conjecture is that the construction of true artificial isomorphs may be fundamentally impossible. Even single neurons are incredibly complex systems involving fine grained interactions down to (at least) quantum scales, and cross scale interactions are a hallmark of complex systems. This idea is discussed in Al Scott’s

⭐(1995) and my new book (2010), which also explores the conjecture that information (or a broader category, Ultra-Information) may underlie both the physical and mental worlds, an idea apparently consistent with Chalmers’ suggestion.

⭐Simply put, “The Character of Consciousness” is one of the most cogent, decisive, extant analyses of the mind and its place in nature.I won’t go into specific detail about the content of the book, as this information is available through Amazon.com’s preview feature of the book’s introduction. Here, it suffices to say that in “The Character of Consciousness”, Chalmers both expands upon his previous work (i.e., “The Conscious Mind”), and goes far beyond it. The topics are elucidated and fleshed out, and various responses or criticisms are addressed in great depth. While this book is indeed dedicated to the philosophy of mind, much of the discussions therein also have broader implications/consequences for cognitive science, neuroscience, epistemology, and metaphysics.True – as other reviewers have mentioned, much of this book is probably unsuitable for the layperson in philosophy or cognitive science. However, there are a handful of chapters that are much more accessible than others. Chalmers writes in a very straightforward manner that is easily understood (if, of course, you have a basic comprehension of the relevant topics/debates, and are familiar with some technical philosophical jargon). He is not at all verbose.In sum, “The Character of Consciousness” is highly recommended – without a doubt essential reading in the philosophy of the mind.

⭐Take several deep breaths before diving into this one… for serious students of science, not your casual reader – I needed a dictionary of neuro/physiological terms at hand at all times lol. It does reward serious study, and raises many interesting questions, but you do need a grounding in the philosophy of the mind to even get the gist of the many and varied chapters.

⭐I always enjoy listening to Chalmers discussing the “Hard Problem” – though I admit he frequntly leaves me exhausted!This valuable book lays out much of his work on the subject over the past thirty years. From its first pages Chalmers accepts that this book (of nearly 600 pages) might appear “a fragmented read” and, in a score of introductory pages, he gives detailed, helpful advice to readers on how they might selectively choose their way through the contents. Thus, as he suggests, I dip into the contents, as and when I please, enjoying much and hearing his voice as I do so. Not always so, however, some chapters are tough!Perhaps one day my Mind will comprehend it all. Meanwhile the book remains on my desk, close at hand, not on my book-shelves. Thank you Mr. Chalmers.

⭐excellent technical book…but, title is misleading…more about the wiring of the brain than about the experience of consciousness

⭐Too much logical positivism and too little on the contribution to our understanding and application of thinking to living more of iur life.

⭐There is a psychical massage: Consciousness comes first before every thing. Whereas materialism states matter comes first, and the mystery of consciousness comes last in materialism. Materialists could never solve the mystery of consciousness. The author seeks the mystery from non-materialist stand point. He is on the right track.

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