Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology 1st Edition by Earl Conee (PDF)

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Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge whose essence is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman present the definitive exposition and defence of this much-contested theory. They argue that evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started legitimately to refuting skepticism. The volume collects the authors’ renowned work on the topic and adds substantial new material, making it the prime resource in evidentialism for all epistemologists.

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⭐This is a collection of twelve essays written by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (Four of the essays were co-authored). Only two of these essays are new. Five of the essays contain an afterword where Conee and Feldman often address some of the recent developments in the literature. These tended to be quite short. I had hoped that they might have more to say in response to Timothy Williamson’s work, but they dedicate about a page to explaining why they thought their view survived largely intact in spite of what seemed to others to be serious criticisms of their views. I was also disappointed by how brief their discussion of pragmatic encroachment was. They dedicate about a page to Fantl and McGrath’s criticism of evidentialism and say, basically, that they are not committed one way or another to any of the claims that Fantl and McGrath discuss. Even if this is so, it would have been nice if shared some of their thoughts on pragmatic encroachment.Many of the essays contained in this collection are required reading if you’re interested in debates about epistemic justification. Conee and Feldman defend an internalist view on which the justification of belief is determined by the evidence an individual has on hand. Their view counts as internalist because they insist that facts about your mental life determine whether there is adequate justification for your beliefs. It is hard to give this collection anything less than 4 stars because this book is indispensable if you’re interested in epistemic justification.I did find it difficult to determine precisely what precisely the evidentialist position was. At some places (e.g., pp. 232), Feldman speaks as if he thinks evidence consists of propositions. (True propositions only, or might false propositions constitute evidence?) At others, evidence consists of stored beliefs and various mental entities (pp. 70). I also did not find their defense of internalism terribly persuasive. They offer some examples in which they think it seems intuitive to say that something enhances the justification of some subject’s belief when it makes an internal difference to that subject’s mental life. The conclusion they try to establish is consistent, however, with the claim that external differences can also make a difference to the justification of a subject’s belief. Since few externalists deny the relevance of some internal matters to the justification of belief, it’s hard to see how these arguments support internalism about justification and not the weaker claim that some internal things are sometimes among the conditions that determine justificatory status.

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