Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition by Mario Bunge (PDF)

Description

The purpose of this Introduction is to sketch our approach to the study of value, morality and action, and to show the place we assign it in the system of human knowledge. 1. VALUE, MORALITY AND ACTION: FACT, THEORY, AND METATHEORY We take it that all animals evaluate some things and some processes, and that some of them learn the social behavior patterns we call ‘moral principles’, and even act according to them at least some of the time. An animal incapable of evaluating anything would be very short-lived; and a social animal that did not observe the accepted social behavior patterns would be punished. These are facts about values, morals and behavior patterns: they are incorporated into the bodies of animals or the structure of social groups. We distinguish then the facts of valuation, morality and action from the study of such facts. This study can be scientific, philosophic or both. wayan animal evaluates environmental A zoologist may investigate the or internal stimuli; a social psychologist may examine the way children learn, or fail to learn, certain values and norms when placed in certain environments. And a philosopher may study such descriptive or explan­ atory studies, with a view to evaluating valuations, moral norms, or behavior patterns; he may analyze the very concepts of value, morals and action, as well as their cognates; or he may criticize or reconstruct value beliefs, moral norms and action plans.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐Despite the fact that this is but one of eight books in Bunge’s Treatise, it is long and complex, dealing with huge numbers of issues. Writing a review of even this one book is like writing a review of Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake or Tolstoy’s War and Peace: the very idea of doing so in less than five hundred pages borders on the ludicrous (Woody Allen relates in one of his films that he took a course in speed reading. I paraphrase: “Yes. Why, just last night I read all of Tolstoy’s War and Peace in one sitting. It’s about Russia.”)After God made Mario Bunge, he must have broken the mould. Bunge is so sensible and straightforward that he is quite disingenuous. He fits into no philosophical tradition in moral philosophy, and he has admiration for a philosophical view only to the extent that it agrees with his own. Bunge’s stance toward moral philosophy is that of a scientist who views the world dispassionately as it is, never allowing his personal political or social commitments cloud his judgment concerning the Good and the Right. Indeed, his major and repeated critique of traditional moral philosophers is that they fail to understand the world, and they develop ontological and epistemological positions that entail untenable moral philosophies.In a healthy sense, Mario Bunge is the like the little boy who cries out that the Emperor has no clothes. He accurately describes the world we live in, his moral principles are common sense and rarely objectionable. Like Karl Popper, Bunge is a raging enemy of monistic ideologies that have no justification in terms of science, and cannot be put to the test of accuracy to the facts or applicability to making a good life for individuals and societies.Bunge pays a deep price for his common sense approach to ethics: his basic principles are somewhat dated, this volume having been written in the mid-1980’s when the Cold War was still a reality and the socialist and student movements of previous decades still at the center of political philosophy. I found Bunge’s approach extremely valuable in the abstract, but heavy-handed and outdated in many particulars. I am not sure how he would feel about this. Perhaps good philosophy should be like a culinary masterpiece, destined for a short burst of glory. But, I suspect not. Indeed, a good editor could rewrite this book into something one quarter its size, stressing the more abstract aspects of this theory and omitting the particulars.A problem with this book is that Bunge does not appear to know anything about the behavioral sciences. This is serious because he bases his whole approach on a scientific understanding of society. He correctly affirms that morality is an evolutionary adaptation of our species, and rejects all attempts at placing ethical theory in some Platonic or intuitionist realm. He also affirms the universality of most human ethical principles across societies. However, he appears not to have studied anthropology or biology, and hence does not know the relationship between human sociality and the social behavior of other species. As a result, he has no handle on what is specifically human about human nature that has fostered the sorts of cooperation and conflict that have made our society what it is. Bunge has the right position, but he is, frankly, quite boring in his exposition because he lacks the appropriate knowledge.Another apt example of the joint strengths and weaknesses of Bunge’s analysis is his treatment of worker ownership. Bunge considers this morally superior to capitalist ownership, on participatory and democratic grounds. He garners a wealth of evidence on the viability of worker ownership. Nevertheless, good scientist that he is, he amasses and even greater mass of evidence indicating the infeasibility of worker ownership in the sorts of large business enterprises that dominate the world marketplace. Unfortunately, he does not say why worker ownership suffers in competition with traditional capitalist firms. The reason is ostensibly because, rejecting the rational actor model and game theory, he has no truck with economic theory. But, economic theory has the answer.The problem with worker ownership is that the capital per worker in most large firms is greater than the wealth of a worker, and worker ownership obliges the worker to place all of his wealth in one firm–the one he owns. This is reasonable for small entrepreneurial firms, but it is irrational for a worker to forgo the benefits of portfolio diversification. As a result, even if workers were given the firm, most would prefer to sell it to a capitalist organization, diversify his personal portfolio, and go to work for the capitalist.A second problem with worker ownership is closely related: existing worker-owners will not be willing to share their capital assets with new workers. Therefore, they will either hire wage laborers, undermining worker democracy, or they will require the new workers to go into debt to finance their share of the capital stock. But, who will lend a wealth-free worker without sufficient collateral? Moreover, if a new worker does have the collateral, why should he be willing to put all of his eggs in one basket, betting his long term financial well-being on the whims of the marketplace? The answer is that he should not.The only area of behavioral science Bunge seems to have studied is decision theory. Bunge does not like decision theory, but his reasons are insipid and quite wrong-headed. It is very rare to encounter a truly insightful critique of rational decision theory (it has major lacunae, after all), but Bunge’s critique is about as embarrassingly bad as any I have seen. Because of his rejection of rational decision theory, Bunge is led to reject all analytical formalisms in modeling human behavior, including modal logic, which he considers “a purely forma discipline without applications in science or philosophy.” (p. 320) Bunge is stunningly, spectacularly wrong, and he is so out of ignorance. His arguments are so flimsy I shall not bother to refute them here (see my book, The Bounds of Reason, Princeton 2009, if you are interested in the issue).

⭐This is eight and last part of Bunge’s Treatise on Basic Philosophy. This book can be read separately. All used concepts are fully defined in this book, with pointers into previous Treatise books for the interested reader. The main thread in this book is Bunge’s own Normative Ethical theory. As he moulds and applies his theory he contrasts it with alternative approaches that have been used and are used by other philosophers. As being more a system builder than a man of consilience his critique of other ideas is both harsh and refreshing. Bunge’s Ethical theory is neither built upon one single existing Ethical theory, nor an attempt to combine existing ethics (such as Parfit is trying in Climbing the Mountain, unpublished). Instead he goes his own way and builds his own unique system. Compared to most other books in this genre, the author is very explicit in his system building. He defines his concepts clearly in a scientific manner; postulates and theorems are posted and proved, and norms are set. If you find some other books on ethics obscure, you will find this book refreshingly clear and straightforward. The writing style is compact and has a good flaw.Some appetizers:Bunge gladly jumps into the naturalistic fallacy of G.E Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903) by defining good in terms of values which in turn are defined from needs/wants.There are moral truths.Moral facts are for real. Moral facts are social.Hume’s is-ought gap can be crossed.Metaethical maxim (agathonism): Enjoy life and help live (enjoyable lives)Summum bonum: the survival of humankind ought to be the supreme good of all human beings.It is possible and desirable to construct a moral theory such that the following conditions are met.1. Realism: adjustment to the basic needs and legitimate aspirations of people placed in concrete social situations2. Social utility: inspire prosocial conduct and progressive social polices, as well as to discourage the antisocial ones.3. Flexibility: adaptability to new personal and social circumstances4. Equity: decrease social inequalities5. Compatibility with best available knowledge of human nature and society.Moral rights and moral duties are both needed.Rights implies duties.A critique of existing ethical theories (this is from chapter 7):Egoistic ethical theories:Nihilism (is personally and socially destructible)Rational egoism (unrealistic, impractical, immoral)Libertarianism (thin on duties: only duty is to respect other people’s rights, overlooks solidarity, mutual help, and participation, without which no social group is viable)Contractualism (admits duties but scientifically untenable, practically unrealistic, and morally hollow; Rawls is not a genuine contractualist)Negative Utilitarianism (a form of egoism, no moral content)Altruistic ethical theories:Natural law (universalistic and egalitarian but scientifically untenable)Kant/deontological (some admirable principles: worldliness, altruism, universalism, and egalitarianism; but short on rights, places rules above people, and has too few substantive principles)Utilitarianism (deficient rather than basically wrong, morally and politically uncommitted, no value theory, no notion of aggregate social utility, no moral code)Here is a brief oversimplified sketch of the base of Bunge’s system. It covers parts of the first two chapters in the book. It applies to humans.Three sources of value: biological, psychological, socialNeeds are defined as follows:Primary needs: necessary to stay alive.Secondary needs: necessary to regain health.Basic needs: primary or secondary needsDefine legitimate want: can be met without hindering any basic need of another person and without endangering the society.Define values:1) primary value: contributing to satisfy at least one primary need2) secondary value: contributing to meeting at least one secondary need3) tertiary value: contributing to meeting at least one legitimate want4) quaternary value: contributing to meeting a fancy; i.e a desire that is not a legitimate want5) basic value: either primary or secondary valueDefine good: object that has a primary, secondary, tertiary, or quaternary valueDefine state of wellbeing: all basic needs are met.Define reasonable happy: in a state of wellbeing and free to pursue legitimate wantsDefine:1) Miserable society: lacks resources to meet basic needs of all its members2) Poor society: can meet basic needs but not legitimate wants of all its members3) Rich society: meet all legitimate wants and basic needs for all its membersDefine just society: every member can attain wellbeing or even reasonably happiness without others suffering from it.Table of contents:Part I ValuesChapter 1, Root of ValuesChapter 2, WelfareChapter 3, Value theoryPart II MortalsChapter 4, Roots of moralsChapter 5 Morality changesChapter 6, Some Moral issuesPart III EthicsChapter 7, Types of Ethical TheoryChapter 8, Ethics Et AliaChapter 9, MetaethicsPart IV Action TheoryChapter 10, ActionChapter 11, Social PhilosophyChapter 12, Values and Morals for a viable Future

⭐

Keywords

Free Download Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition in PDF format
Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition PDF Free Download
Download Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition 1989 PDF Free
Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition 1989 PDF Free Download
Download Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition PDF
Free Download Ebook Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8) 1989th Edition