Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science) 1st Edition by Philip Kitcher (PDF)

Description

Striving to boldly redirect the philosophy of science, this book by renowned philosopher Philip Kitcher examines the heated debate surrounding the role of science in shaping our lives. Kitcher explores the sharp divide between those who believe that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary–the purists–and those who believe that it invariably serves the interests of people in positions of power. In a daring turn, he rejects both perspectives, working out a more realistic image of the sciences–one that allows for the possibility of scientific truth, but nonetheless permits social consensus to determine which avenues to investigate. He then proposes a democratic and deliberative framework for responsible scientists to follow.Controversial, powerful, yet engaging, this volume will appeal to a wide range of readers. Kitcher’s nuanced analysis and authorititative conclusion will interest countless scientists as well as all readers of science–scholars and laypersons alike.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐Kitcher’s Science, Truth and Democracy is an important book but tough to read. Sorry to philosophers, but I’m reviewing as an engineer here and writing this review to encourage fellow scientists and engineers to stick through the rhetoric to get to the final chapter on “Research in an Imperfect World.”Overall, Kitcher make the case FOR science — that there is objective truth that science can deliver. But the fact that science delivers “truth” doesn’t let scientific inquiry off the hook as if “free inquiry” could justify itself as some sort of holy enterprise. Science depends on a conceptual map of reality that determines which questions are significant and which are not. That map is not neutral. It evolves from past maps, so it depends both on history and current context. Which questions we choose to explore (i.e. fund) and which we don’t (because funds are limited) have implications. Kitcher makes the case that the pretense of “free inquiry” often masks impacts on exactly those groups that are already disadvantaged in the society. In an ideal world where we value democracy, inquiry must be driven by the collective preference of educated citizens.But this ideal does not exist. So, Kitcher’s final chapter articulates the dilemma many of us face – being entangled in institutions that makes us either willfully ignorant of or functionally impotent to prevent distortions to what is significant and the resulting harm to those who have no voice. What are we to do? Stick through the logical thicket of Kitcher’s philosophical argument and you’ll find yourself face to face with this ethical challenge.

⭐A really interesting reading, although I do not agree with some of author’s ideas which seems to me too conservative. Moreover I have problem to apply the process of well ordered science in many of the past scientific enterprises. How theory of evolution would have been with pursued and accepted or research on Higgs boson with the process of the well ordered s Science is not completely clear to me.

⭐Yeah right, as if the general population of the United States is a reliable judge of scientific priorities… half the population doesn’t even believe in evolution , so I don’t think I’ll be polling them anytime soon to make the calls on scientific research.

⭐I don’t agree with the author’s worldview & it is very difficult to understand what the heck he’s even talking about!

⭐This concise and clear book is an extended essay examining the role of science in democratic societies. Kitcher is a well known philosopher of science and this book is an attempt to move philosophical investigations of science as a general phenomenon beyond the relatively narrow epistemic concerns of most philosophy of science. Despite the relative brevity of this book, Kitcher has a relatively ambitious agenda. He wishes to examine the epistemic credentials of science of an enterprise, to explore the consequences of the epistemic reliability of science in terms of its social functions, and to sketch out the proper way democracies should deal with science. Kitcher is particularly concerned with steering a valid course between 2 opposing, almost caricature positions; the view that science has virtually unique moral value and is largely insulated from social influences and the view that science has weak epistemic foundations with the research agenda and results driven by pragmatic and authoritarian concerns.Kitcher espouses what he terms modest realism; a definite endorsement of the epistemic validity of science with a strong fallibalist orientation. The section of the book in which he deals with attacks on the epistemic validity of science is one of the strongest portions and his fallibalist realism is a strong position. Kitcher, however, suggests that while the methods and achievements of science are definitely valid, the choice of research problems and programs is, however, driven strongly by other concerns. In this sense, Kitcher sees science as hardly insulated from social and personal concerns and in important senses capable of being manipulated in potentially sinister ways. Kitcher is very concerned with the ways in which science and scientific knowledge may be abused to the disadvantage of disadvantaged members of society. Kitcher attacks the idea of the moral purity of scientific investigation and the highly arbitrary (and really impossible to defend) distinction between science and technology. Kitcher’s proposed approach is what he calls “well-ordered” science in which selection of research programs, the actual selection of individual projects, and use of knowledge generated would be the subject of some form of inclusive deliberative democracy to ensure socially appropriate scientific investigation. I want to stress that Kitcher is no starry-eyed idealist, this is not a serious reform proposal but rather an intellectual device to measure how far we are away from a really democratic approach to science, an intellectually useful instrument. This brief sketch doesn’t do justice to Kitcher’s careful development of his arguments, including some useful examples. One example used is the experience of the human genome project, whose development and governance Kitcher demonstrates as violating his concepts of well-ordered science.Kitcher’s arguments, however, are problematic in several respects. Its hard to disagree with the general proposition that pragmatic and social concerns influence the selection of research problems and sometimes how science is practiced. Kitcher takes this argument too far. As an example of pragmatic approaches to science he gives the example of different methods of taxonomic classification in animals and prokaryotes, pointing out the use of the biological species concept (BSC) for the former and molecular methods for the latter. But, these differences are more epistemically based than Kitcher’s discussion implies. How much sense does the BSC make for organisms with high rates of horizontal gene transfer? If the taxonomy example is representative of Kitcher’s conception of how scientific practice is driven by pragmatic, strictly extra-scientific concerns, then Kitcher’s emphasis is misplaced. Kitcher points also to the historical variation in choice of research problems as an example of how science is influenced by strictly extra-scientific issues. But, one of the most important determinants of selection of research problems is the knowledge and theory generated by prior scientific investigations. The issue of the origin of the universe became a major scientific issue only after Einstein’s development of General Relativity Theory. It seems likely that science as an enterprise is driven more by internal concerns than Kitcher’s discussion implies and has a greater degree of autonomy than his model suggests.Kitcher’s concern about the abuse of science and the potential for negative impacts on the disadvantaged does him credit but may also be misplaced. As pointed out recently by the historian Naomi Oreskes, this is not the major recent problem with science and science policy. The biggest recent social conflict related to science has been the unwillingness of major interest groups in our society to accept the unpalatable consequences of major scientific findings. The present and likely future consequences of environmental problems, particularly anthropogenic global warming, resulted in major efforts to discredit both the general conclusions and some of the individual investigators involved. Since the most severe consequences of climate change will fall upon the poor in poorer nations, this is a direct counter-example to his concerns about the abuse of science. The discovery of anthropogenic global warming, ozone depletion, and acid rain, among others, are massive challenges to traditional models of social and economic organization, and have been resisted bitterly by conservative forces. Again, this is solid evidence that science has a good deal more autonomy than Kitcher’s model indicates.Kitcher also argues that science, as a general activity, does not deserve a uniquely privileged status. He has a strong argument based essentially on the difficulty of constructing a consensus view of human values. Fair enough, but from a more pragmatic and historical point of view, its very clear that providing scientists with generous funding and considerable freedom in running the scientific enterprise has consistently yielded great dividends. In the weakest part of the book, Kitcher tries to argue that the evidence for the consistent benefits of science is poorly developed. Its not too strong to call this part of Kitcher’s book rubbish. Given Kitcher’s general level of rigor, this is a rather surprising and disappointing argument.Finally, I share Kitcher’s high regard for open, democratic, “deliberative” procedures. In this context, its worth mentioning that one of few institutions in our society that uses such procedures successfully are grant application review panels for NIH, NSF, and other funding agencies (including some private foundations that fund research). In this respect, and in some others, our democracy would be improved substantially by making public life more like science.

⭐Pour ceux qui sont intéressés par les science studies, ou la sociologie des sciences, ce livre de Philip Kitcher est un bon point de départ pour appréhender la place de l’activité scientifique dans les démocraties libérales.

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