The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War by Andrew Roberts (PDF)

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“Gripping. . . . splendid history. A brilliantly clear and accessible account of the war in all its theaters. Roberts’s prose is unerringly precise and strikingly vivid. It is hard to imagine a better-told military history of World War II.” –New York Times Book ReviewAndrew Roberts’s acclaimed new history has been hailed as the finest single-volume account of this epic conflict. From the western front to North Africa, from the Baltic to the Far East, he tells the story of the war—the grand strategy and the individual experience, the brutality and the heroism—as never before.Meticulously researched and masterfully written, The Storm of War illuminates the war’s principal actors, revealing how their decisions shaped the course of the conflict. Along the way, Roberts presents tales of the many lesser-known individuals whose experiences form a panoply of the courage and self-sacrifice, as well as the depravity and cruelty, of the Second World War.

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: Review “Gripping. . . . splendid history. A brilliantly clear and accessible account of the war in all its theaters. Roberts’s prose is unerringly precise and strikingly vivid. It is hard to imagine a better-told military history of World War II.” — Timothy Snyder, The New York Times Book Review“Elegantly balances fact, thought and fresh, clear prose. . . . Roberts has set a high bar for future historians of mankind’s greatest bloodbath; Roberts splendidly weaves a human tragedy into a story of war’s remorseless statistics.” — The Wall Street Journal“With his new book on the Second World War, British historian Andrew Roberts has not only written the single best history of that conflict but has also claimed his place as one of our top historians.” — Michael Korda, The Daily Beast“A magnificent book;It manages to be distinctive but not eccentric, comprehensive in scope but not cramped by detail, giving due weight both to the extraordinary personalities and to the blind economic and physical forces involved.” — The Economist“Roberts’s narrative gifts are such that it is almost impossible to read his retelling of these nightmares without some feeling of encountering the new. No history book can ever truly be definitive, but this comes close. Roberts never loses sight of the human side of this epic.” — National Review“Roberts is a great historian because of a rare triune mastery: of the movement of history, in both its broad sweep and particular revelatory detail; a felicitous prose style and gift for narrative; and a commanding moral vision.” — Roger Kimball, The Daily“Andrew Roberts has produced what Gen. George Patton might call ‘a helluva book’—the first totally readable one-volume history of World War II, a literary and historical blitzkrieg, propelled by strong, positive prose, written with concision yet a wealth of detail, and supplied with an arsenal of sources.” — The Washington Times“Andrew Roberts achieves a marvel of concision in producing a splendidly written, comprehensive new history of the greatest conflict in history, The Storm of War―particularly good in its insights into Axis strategy.” — Sir Ian Kershaw, The Guardian, Books of the Year“In what might be his best book yet, Roberts gives us the war as seen from the other side of the hill. He has the knack of making complex military operations comprehensible and salting the grand strategic sweep with vignettes of how it felt to be a soldier.” — Nigel Jones, The Sunday Telegraph“Roberts is a first-rate historian. He has a sharp eye for a good subject and a knack of getting to its heart. The second world war, which cost more than 50 million lives, has a perennial fascination that Roberts conveys through an admirably lucid narrative.” — Piers Brendon, The Sunday Times“In one irresistibly readable book, Roberts has done what I thought was impossible–given us the whole bloody second world war from the brass buttons of the generals down to the mud-filled trenches and stretching across the globe.” — Tina Brown, Newsweek“The best full history of World War II yet written.” — Simon Sebag Montefiore, The Wall Street Journal From the Back Cover Andrew Roberts’s acclaimed new history has been hailed as the finest single-volume account of this epic conflict. From the western front to North Africa, from the Baltic to the Far East, he tells the story of the war—the grand strategy and the individual experience, the brutality and the heroism—as never before.Meticulously researched and masterfully written, The Storm of War illuminates the war’s principal actors, revealing how their decisions shaped the course of the conflict. Along the way, Roberts presents tales of the many lesser-known individuals whose experiences form a panoply of the courage and self-sacrifice, as well as the depravity and cruelty, of the Second World War. About the Author Andrew Roberts is the author of Masters and Commanders and A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900. His other books include Napoleon and Wellington, Eminent Churchillians, and Salisbury, which won the Wolfson History Prize. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, he holds a PhD in history from Cambridge University and writes regularly for The Wall Street Journal and The Daily Beast. He lives in New York City. Read more

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐Although my comments on “The Storm of War” will be mostly critical, I must note that I am familiar with the author’s previous books, have heard a number of interviews with Mr. Roberts, and firmly believe he possesses the intellect, diligence, writing skill and flair of a first-rate historian. The field of modern history is much richer for historians of his quality and I am grateful for his contributions. The proof lies in the corpus of his work.This book is a Euro-centric history of the war by design and I notice that many of the other reviewers overlooked that point. However, while “The Storm of War” is a good and interesting read it is quite marginal on its major promise: to analyze the decision points and alternate courses of the war (p.11). On this goal the relevant sections run the gamut from mostly casual to almost superficial. I will elaborate my point by describing a few of the more tendentious passages in the book, how Mr. Roberts dealt with them, and how he might have made them better.”If, on coming to power in 1933, Hitler had developed long-range heavy bombers, built more fighters than he did and trained the Wehrmacht for amphibious operations; if he had not dissipated his naval forces by invading Norway; and if had attacked much earlier to give himself months of better weather in the Channel, then the always risky Sealion would have stood far greater chance of success. If he had landed large numbers of well-supplied paratroopers on the major British airfields of southern England during the opening stages of the battle of Britain, though such an operation would undoubtedly have been risky, it might have paid off.” (page 91)Superficially these assertions are true and one could not reasonably disagree: “Sealion would have stood far greater chance of success…” and paratroop landings “…might have paid off.” But upon more analysis, one realizes how casually flippant they are. Consider the opportunity costs for Germany to develop a long-range heavy bomber force.The Germans rearmed during the 1930s by systematically managing their economy and husbanding foreign exchange in order to buy the critical raw materials they themselves did not possess. Rearmament proceeded apace and by the latter half of the 1930s there was an arms race among the major powers. Under such conditions allocating, for example, more steel, copper, or fuel to one branch of the German military meant that some other branch would have less – there was typically never enough to satisfy the demands of each. Should the Luftwaffe build a heavy bomber force, it would have meant building less of other types of aircraft. Heavy bombers were a very cost-intensive proposition, approximately equivalent to that of 3-4 fighters. So if the war started in September 1939 and Germany did have a heavy bomber force, but considerably fewer fighters, could they have successfully fought the Battle of France in 1940 where the Luftwaffe fighter arm fought for and ultimately dominated the airspace? That is highly unlikely. But let us assume that more resources were provided to the pre-war Luftwaffe so that it might build up a heavy bomber forces and a large fighter force. That would come at what cost to the other services, for they must then have less than what they did – less artillery, less munitions, fewer tanks, fewer vehicles, or fewer naval vessels.It is necessary to consider the opportunity costs of the choices made during German rearmament. Of course, the Germans could have siphoned off resources directed toward civilian consumption, yet here too they balanced political and military considerations. There was no easy answer because there was never enough to satisfy all demands: civilian versus military, Luftwaffe versus Wehrmacht versus Kriegsmarine!When these considerations are laid out, then asserting that had the Wehrmacht been trained for amphibious operations, beyond river crossings, an invasion would have been less risky, is true but fanciful. Is Mr. Roberts proposing that Germany should have had the foresight to build a fleet of landing craft and then trained the Wehrmacht for amphibious operations!?! No, that is nonsense. Again consider the opportunity costs, and the unlikely scenario that Germany found itself in June of 1940: they had defeated their enemies on the continent yet England would not be “reasonable” and agree to a negotiated peace.The author references the Germans “dissipating” their naval forces by invading Norway. True, the successful German invasion of Norway in April 1940 cost the Germans a number of destroyers and vessels of other types. However, the concurrent British plan was to invade Norway and interdict Swedish iron ore exports to Germany — an idea quite good in conception but poor in execution. Should the Germans have allowed this and the establishment of enemy air bases in Norway and perhaps an even more effective naval blockade of Germany? Of course not! But Britain was willing fight to the last Norwegian, Dutchman, Belgian and Frenchman to defeat Germany. So a widening of the war to Norway was something the Germans, excepting Doenitz, reluctantly came to accept in early 1940. And though the German naval campaign for Norway was relatively costly for the Germans in terms of sunk and damaged ships, the size and quality of the Royal Navy in the numbers, types, training and equipment in 1940 outclassed and outnumbered the Kriegsmarine in every respect. The German losses in Norway, though relatively considerable for them, meant that they had even fewer critical naval forces to deploy for any ill-fated cross-Channel invasion, but still the losses were insignificant in the overall development and outcome of the war.In this context to say that Operation Sealion, the proposed German invasion of Britain in 1940, would have been less risky had the Germans more naval forces is facetious. Even without the losses in Norway the Kriegsmarine was dwarfed by size of the Royal Navy stationed just in home waters, with reserves available in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Consider that in September 1939 the Royal Navy had 15 battleships and 5 planned, 7 carriers and 6 under construction, 66 cruisers and 23 new ones started, 184 destroyers of all types, and even 60 submarines with 9 more under construction. The Kriegsmarine was a small fraction of the size of the Royal Navy and even in submarines the British had fifty percent more than the Germans. And no German ship-building program could ever challenge the naval assets of British even if war had not started in 1939!!Paratroop landings on the airfields of southern England likewise do not hold up very well to examination. I am sure the Germans could have initially dropped a considerable number of paratroopers had they been determined to do so, yet their resupply and reinforcement is where this proposition breaks down. With the Royal Army, Navy and Air Force deploying and engaging with all their energies to contest any such invasion, such drops would have ultimately been a waste of men and materiel.In a soon to follow section the author deals with the decision point(s) surrounding Dunkirk (pp. 59-68). Here the analysis of alternatives is more balanced and reasonable. The Wehrmacht and panzers briefly held back while the Luftwaffe tried to dominate the air space over this evacuation route. I agree with the author’s assertion that a decisive German victory at Dunkirk (capture of the bulk of the B.E.F and a failed evacuation) would have provided the means to a possible political solution, i.e., a negotiated peace between Great Britain and Germany. In fact, in the week before “The Miracle at Dunkirk” the British War Cabinent did discuss such a prospect, as the author acknowledges.In Chapter 11 – The Wave of Air and Sea: 1939-1945, I find similar problems. Here the author points out that if Hitler had listened to U-boat proponents and built up the submarine fleet, starting “no later than 1937,” and had Germany started the war with 300 U-boats instead of the 43 they had, then this could have had a decisive impact early in the war. I agree, but again consider the required opportunity cost, which Roberts fails to do, and the needed prescience for Germany to have pursued that alternative in 1937. To follow this line of thought, perhaps instead of devoting resources to building an aircraft carrier — whose construction was halted in Sept 1939 — and battleships such as the Bismarck and Tirpitz — Germany instead builds several dozens more U-boats during 1938-39. Yes, this offers intriguing possibilities. But, then again, prevailing thought in all countries placed undue emphasis on the importance and potential impact of capital ships. Their vulnerability from the air was a lesson yet to be fully and properly appreciated by all the combatant countries. So Germany’s lack of prescience is less of a factor than evaluating the opportunity costs of such alternatives. But this sort of consideration is precisely how Roberts fails to take his analysis beyond the initial, first-level.The reader of this review begins to appreciate why I find many of these casual counter-factual scenarios so tendentious: they are insufficiently developed or thought out. In fact, much better ones could have been employed, and I will discuss those as I revise my review. Aside from events in 1940, the underlying facts of the situation are that Germany was unprepared and ill-equipped to fight a long war, a fact the British certainly understood and appreciated in September 1939!!!Addendum:I have finally slogged my way to the “Conclusion: Why Did the Axis Lose the Second World War?” It’s an enjoyable thirty-one pages of historical alternatives and analysis amply foreshadowed by sections in earlier chapters. On his principal points here and earlier I am in agreement with the author. What the author does not quite baldly state I will: the Ultra decrypts of German communications during much of the war were decisive in precluding significant German success after 1940, perhaps most notably in the Battle of the Atlantic. The decisive defeat of the German U-boats in 1943 allowed the massive Allied build-up of men and materiel in England in preparation for the Normandy invasion in 1944.But, assuming the Germans had better communications security, could they have established a more effective “Festung Europa” from attack in the west. I answer “yes,” though I am unsure where the author stands. They could have accomplished this by expanding and modernizing the Luftwaffe after the Battle of Britain. A 10,000 fighter force with improved models, which Hitler ordered in early December 1941 — at least a year later than he should have — could have initially blunted the Allied air offensive had such a force been in place by 1943. Thus 1944 might have seen titanic air battles over occupied Europe and, more importantly, it would have put numerous other factors in play. But opportunity costs, poor strategic planning and indecisiveness doomed this aspiration and path to the future.But then what of the War on the Eastern Front? Roberts identifies this, too, as a fatal mistake. Either go all-out for Moscow and succeed in 1941, or not attack at all in 1941. It was however fatal because German forces were ultimately defeated. Perhaps this need not have occurred but Roberts fails to explore some of those alternatives. That Japan should have attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and tied down Russia’s Siberian divisions, later redeployed to the Moscow front, is an intriguing alternative. However, resource poor Japan critically needed oil after August 1941, and thus their “Southern Strategy” made the most sense for them.The author’s proposed alternative Mediterranean strategy for the Germans did offer some tantalizing alternatives. Yes, by all means, capture Malta. But dislocating the British from Egypt and destroying the British Mediterranean fleet would still have presented a daunting challenge. Had the Germans avoided a war with the Soviets in 1941 and redeployed their forces and focus to the Mediterranean then this opens up some interesting possibilities, as the author observes, but without sufficient supporting analysis. However with the Mediterranean contested by the British doing more than actually accomplished would have proved an even greater logistical challenge for the Germans.So I must conclude that the author took the simple, easy and ultimately superficial way to fulfill his promise to re-analyze the critical decision points and alternate courses of the war. Still it was a stimulating and informative book and one I would recommend to all those interested in the war.The book’s preface acknowledges a debt to an impressive list of Britain’s finest minds on the Second World War, and some additional albeit less recognizable names of those who were readers of various chapters. I wish more of the former had done the latter in order to flesh out those passages that I found to be deficient.

⭐I bought the Storm of War based on Tim Snyder’s glowing review in the NY Times. Unfortunately, this turned out to be hype rather than serious criticism. The book has too many factual errors and discrepancies, along with a number of fanciful leaps of logic, to be taken as anything more than a nuanced slant on a well worn narrative. Aside from that, the author’s prose style (IMHO) is anything but impressive, in spite of what certain critics and five star reviews may claim.On page 280 he claims, `Men of the Imperial Japanese Navy were undoubtedly every bit as depraved, sadistic and ruthless as their military counterparts.’ Without exception? Was the Japanese Navy something other than a military force? Aside from that, I think the author should re-read Eugene Sledge’s memoir of Peleliu and Okinawa or George MacDonald Fraser’s account of the Burma Campaign. The Anglo-Americans as a rule didn’t hold the Japanese in very high regard either, and they were just as capable of unnecessary cruelty to the wounded and captured as the enemy was – at least (though not always) on the battlefield or the high seas. Elsewhere…AR describes the French contribution to the allied victory as insignificant in so many words on page 598. Now that’s interesting! The last I checked, the Resistance was active in rescuing and giving safe passage over the Pyrenees to downed allied airmen prior to the invasion, all the while: providing field intelligence to the allies and conducting large scale sabotage of German installations and railway networks, along with supporting allied troops after D-Day. Once the country was by and large free of Germans in late 1944, France actively began to re-build an army to participate in the invasion of greater Germany before its ultimate defeat in the spring of 1945 was a forgone conclusion. `In all’ (sic) The French lost roughly 200,000 soldiers and 300,000 civilians during the war, according to a Google search. This represents a higher per capita wartime loss than that of England or America. Whether any of this is significant or not in the author’s opinion, the facts speak for themselves. Vive la France! Furthermore, AR describes the amphibious assault near Marseilles in August 1944 as a `superfluous attack’ without bothering to explain why this was so (page 606). Presumably, the area was of no strategic importance to the allies, while liberating the (French) population was hardly worth the bother. Be that as it may, Marseilles along with most of southern France came under allied control at any rate. This was to prove vital in supporting the allied push into Germany, which received a full third of its supplies and so forth from the south (see Operation Dragoon 1944: France’s other D-Day by Steven Zaloga). For the record, Marseilles is and always has been a strategic port! The 6th Army Group also tied up a large number of German forces in heavy fighting in the Vosges Mountains, resulting in the capture 130,000 enemy troops while protecting the flank of Patton’s army to the north. Superfluous indeed! I have little patience with this sort of thing. Then… On page 184 the author states that there is `every indication’ that the Brits and Americans would have defended their homeland every bit as valiantly as the Russians did in 1941. I have no problem with this statement per se. I just think it would be helpful and a matter of professional scholarship to name what some of the critical indicators are in this case. I also find it odd that he made this statement on the page immediately following the one where he contends in so many words that Russia was able to survive the German onslaught because it was a thoroughly coercive dictatorship with scant regard for human life or suffering. Russian authors who lived through the ordeal (e.g., Solzhenitsyn, Vasily Grossman et al) held the opposite point of view, namely that Russia survived in spite of Stalin and his ongoing reign of terror. Also, if Hitler did prolong the war by whatever means or circumstances, there is every indication that much of Germany would have been visible from outer space in the late 1940s. After all, we had the bomb in ’45, the B-36 in ’47 and Curtis LeMay all along. Yet another example of a sweeping, unqualified assertion (on page whatever) is the author’s claim that the German soldier was undoubtedly the best in the war. By what criteria? Combat effectiveness? This may have been true early on. However, once the allies both east and west began to fight in earnest, they proved to be more than a match for their German counterparts. Once again, I’ll let the string of successive allied victories from late 1942 onward serve as testimony on this score. Then again, maybe the Germans are genetically endowed with a warrior mystique that the rest of us per force lack. This didn’t stop them from loosing, however; and I’m not talking about the war this time. They got footsore early on and became a gaggle of stragglers in the forced march event at the NATO sponsored Infantry Challenge Cup (or whatever it was called) in 1976, while Third Platoon, A Company, 1/54 Infantry Battalion (US Army) kept up the pace and reached the finish line without loosing a single man to foot failure or exhaustion. I know, because I was there. Meanwhile, the Brits chartered a few taxis and spent the duration in a Bier Hoff. Deutschland Uber Alles and Rule Britannia! Anyhow, this is getting tedious. Just a final note or two… The author takes Hitler to task for not making Moscow the primary objective of the offensive in 1941. He likens this to Napoleon’s mistaken strategy in 1812. Only Napoleon did take Moscow as a matter of strategic necessity. Perhaps I’m missing something here. Else, the author’s logic is way off course. All I can say on this score is: a) The German high command developed the concept of Blitzkrieg with countries like Poland and France in mind. b) As such, the concept lent itself poorly to a country with the landmass and population the size of the Soviet Union. c) German successes early on had as much to do with Soviet incompetence (Stalin’s refusal to allow his generals to retreat and the staging of quixotic counter attacks in number) as it did with German superiority on the battlefield. d) It was a matter of course that German lines of communication would become over extended and the weather would turn in favor of the defenders. e) If the Germans did enter Moscow, it is likely that a scenario similar to Stalingrad would have developed with Zhukov staging massive counter attacks on the flanks – something that took place in any event in the winter of 1941.That is to say, Moscow was not the center of gravity for the Soviet Union. The Red Army was. In spite of horrendous losses, it was able to flesh out its ranks and grow exponentially while the Germans advanced further and further on ground that grew more and more perilous by the mile. The rest is history. Also…The author criticizes Hitler’s notion that defeating Russia would bring England to terms. That is to say the German route to London vis-à-vis Moscow was strategically flawed. Then elsewhere he states that Hitler could have won the war if he concentrated his forces in North Africa and made a drive for the Mid-East. Won the war against whom? The Soviet Union, England or both? Presumably for the author, the best way to take Moscow and London both would have been through Baghdad! Such a strategy was hardly consonant with German war aims – Lebensraum for the Volk and curtailing the Bolshevik threat to Europe. Aside from that, the Middle East did not have the strategic importance to the world economy in the 1940’s that it does today. The mineral deposits in the Arabian Desert remained largely untapped beneath the sand at the time. That is to say, Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not float the allied war effort in oil. Places like Texas did. Whether or not such a strategy was even doable for Germany in the first place is a matter of pointless speculation. Lastly… The closing sentence of the book summarizes the author’s thesis: Hitler lost the war because he was a Nazi. I found this to be especially odd, considering that he quotes John Stewart Mill’s proposition that `truth [lacks] any inherent power denied to error’ (page 596) to support his contention that the allied victory was far from `inevitable.’ Apparently, there was something self-defeating in the Nazi DNA after all. Given his command of logic, AR may have a future in politics. Else he could be a historical commentator on Fox News. Cambridge dons rule!Now for the peevish part…All the maps are located in the front of the book as opposed to the corresponding chapters that address the various theaters of war and battles. I found it irritating to constantly be flipping forward for reference. Aside from that, the maps did not provide any depiction of troop locations, axes of attacks and so forth – something that would have been helpful.As to prose style, far too many sentences begin with `In all…’ In some cases there are two per paragraph. I could go on, but at this point it hardly seems worth the bother. The same holds true for reading the book. That something this bad could find its way into print — much less receive critical acclaim — suggests that PT Barnum is alive, well and gainfully employed in the publishing industry.

⭐Andrew Roberts book is by far the best account I have read about WW2. I like the refreshing tone of the book and the little nooks and crannies Roberts visits with his unique almost detective type nose for ‘what ifs’ ! I have always questioned why Japan did not invade the Eastern coast of the USSR at the exact time as Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa on 2Ist June 1941. Keep the USA out of the war and when conquered the USSR had more than enough mineral, oil and agricultural wealth to sustain both the Nazi’s and the Japanese Empire. Roberts touches on this subject and provides very interesting information as why this did not happen. Overall a great read about a bloody horrible conflict. Roberts has that rare ability to produce written matter that engages the reader and yet has a thread of humanity interwoven throughout the narrative………the fire within the ice ! I emailed Mr Roberts to thank him for his work and his response within 5 minutes was a delight to read. You know you are getting old when you are reading wonderful history books written by people considerably younger than you as in this case !

⭐I read this after reading the author’s masterpiece on Churchill. So now I have problems with this review. Is it good? That depends on who you are. If you are an officer cadet at Sandhurst, it is a must read. If you have a special room with a big table, covered by a battlefield map, and like to move little soldiers around on it, this is a must read. If you are a retired Colonel who is confined to barracks with Covid, then it will while away the time. The rest of us are left with thousands of facts and figures, the arcane and occulted mysteries of battle tactics and political manoeuvres. It does join up. It is probably very good from the point of view of a serious. war historian. You can get an overview of WW2, but it is like staring at an Enigma machine and watching the numbers and letters melting.My best guess is that this should have run to at least six volumes and been Roberts’ magnum opus. Instead we get a highly compressed account of the greatest hits of the war, replete with every fact and figure there ever was, along with Mr Roberts’ judgements, which on the whole I agree with.I think its main strength, and its major weakness as an account of the war is that it is not written from the point of view of any party. Certainly we get some insight into the thinking, the arguing and the jostling for position, but this is all necessarily a terse account. I cannot bring myself to give it less than four stars because it appears to be hugely useful as a manual for future warmongers, but for me, just the interested public, no.

⭐Despite having read various books on SWW for years, I found this history pulled it all together very well. It’s particularly good on the European theatre, and on analysing the different strategic blunders of Hitler, and the tensions between Hiter and the Generals.Far less time was given to the Pacifc theatre – though Japanese strategy and its unravelling is explained. I leanrt some new information on Japanese atrocities as well..There are some sections towards the end where the author engages in counterfactuals, and these are less convincing.The book relies pretty much exclusively on secondary sources – and some general histories – e.g. Max Hastings, though I picked up loads of good references for future reads.Overall it was a gripping read and I’d recommend it – particularly for a holiday!

⭐Not what I expected as I thought this would be a progressive history of WWII whereas it deals with specific episodes, some I wasn’t too familiar with, in quite some depth and it’s turned out to be a really good ‘read’. There’s also a substantial amount of unknown detail in areas of the war I thought I was familiar with.I’m totally in awe of Christian Rodska’s reading of this 3 disc MP3 {approx. 28 hours listening time) as he seems unfazed by anything the text can throw at him from German & Japanese to Russian – his pronunciation is spot on and his delivery is anything but flat – I believe I’m being read to by someone actually knowledgeable and interested in the subject. As always the reader is key.

⭐As everything I’ve read by Roberts, this is a very well written, engaging, analytical account of WW2. This should not be your first book on WW2. I’d say it should be your last one to read because Roberts takes stock of things. He goes into the analysis of what happened and why it happened. But most interestingly, he also goes into “what might have happened” if so and so…I enjoyed this one immensely! Andrew Roberts is one of very few modern historians who writes serious history as if it were popular fiction – very engaging, accessible yet scholarly and deep at the same time.

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