Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (ALA Notable Books for Adults) by Eric Schlosser (PDF)

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The Oscar-shortlisted documentary Command and Control, directed by Robert Kenner, finds its origins in Eric Schlosser’s book and continues to explore the little-known history of the management and safety concerns of America’s nuclear aresenal.“A devastatingly lucid and detailed new history of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Fascinating.” —Lev Grossman, TIME Magazine“Perilous and gripping . . . Schlosser skillfully weaves together an engrossing account of both the science and the politics of nuclear weapons safety.” —San Francisco ChronicleA myth-shattering exposé of America’s nuclear weaponsFamed investigative journalist Eric Schlosser digs deep to uncover secrets about the management of America’s nuclear arsenal. A groundbreaking account of accidents, near misses, extraordinary heroism, and technological breakthroughs, Command and Control explores the dilemma that has existed since the dawn of the nuclear age: How do you deploy weapons of mass destruction without being destroyed by them? That question has never been resolved—and Schlosser reveals how the combination of human fallibility and technological complexity still poses a grave risk to mankind. While the harms of global warming increasingly dominate the news, the equally dangerous yet more immediate threat of nuclear weapons has been largely forgotten.Written with the vibrancy of a first-rate thriller, Command and Control interweaves the minute-by-minute story of an accident at a nuclear missile silo in rural Arkansas with a historical narrative that spans more than fifty years. It depicts the urgent effort by American scientists, policy makers, and military officers to ensure that nuclear weapons can’t be stolen, sabotaged, used without permission, or detonated inadvertently. Schlosser also looks at the Cold War from a new perspective, offering history from the ground up, telling the stories of bomber pilots, missile commanders, maintenance crews, and other ordinary servicemen who risked their lives to avert a nuclear holocaust. At the heart of the book lies the struggle, amid the rolling hills and small farms of Damascus, Arkansas, to prevent the explosion of a ballistic missile carrying the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the United States.Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with people who designed and routinely handled nuclear weapons, Command and Control takes readers into a terrifying but fascinating world that, until now, has been largely hidden from view. Through the details of a single accident, Schlosser illustrates how an unlikely event can become unavoidable, how small risks can have terrible consequences, and how the most brilliant minds in the nation can only provide us with an illusion of control. Audacious, gripping, and unforgettable, Command and Control is a tour de force of investigative journalism, an eye-opening look at the dangers of America’s nuclear age.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐On the evening of September 18th, 1980 two U.S. Air Force airmen, members of a Propellant Transfer System (PTS) team, entered a Titan II missile silo near Damascus, Arkansas to perform a routine maintenance procedure. Earlier in the day they had been called to the site because a warning signal had indicated that pressure in the missile’s second stage oxidiser tank was low. This was not unusual, especially for a missile which had recently been refuelled, as this one had, and the procedure of adding nitrogen gas to the tank to bring the pressure up to specification was considered straightforward. That is, if you consider any work involving a Titan II “routine” or “straightforward”. The missile, in an underground silo, protected by a door weighing more than 65 tonnes and able to withstand the 300 psi overpressure of a nearby nuclear detonation, stood more than 31 metres high and contained 143 tonnes of highly toxic fuel and oxidiser which, in addition to being poisonous to humans in small concentrations, were hypergolic: they burst into flames upon contact with one another, with no need of a source of ignition. Sitting atop this volatile fuel was a W-53 nuclear warhead with a yield of 9 megatons and high explosives in the fission primary which were not, as more modern nuclear weapons, insensitive to shock and fire. While it was unlikely in the extreme that detonation of these explosives due to an accident would result in a nuclear explosion, they could disperse the radioactive material in the bomb over the local area, requiring a massive clean-up effort.The PTS team worked on the missile wearing what amounted to space suits with their own bottled air supply. One member was an experienced technician while the other was a 19-year old rookie receiving on the job training. Early in the procedure, the team was to remove the pressure cap from the side of the missile. While the lead technician was turning the cap with a socket wrench, the socket fell off the wrench and down the silo alongside the missile. The socket struck the thrust mount supporting the missile, bounced back upward, and struck the side of the missile’s first stage fuel tank. Fuel began to spout outward as if from a garden hose. The trainee remarked, “This is not good.”Back in the control centre, separated from the silo by massive blast doors, the two man launch team who had been following the servicing operation, saw their status panels light up like a Christmas tree decorated by somebody inordinately fond of the colour red. The warnings were contradictory and clearly not all correct. Had there indeed been both fuel and oxidiser leaks, as indicated, there would already have been an earth-shattering kaboom from the silo, and yet that had not happened. The technicians knew they had to evacuate the silo as soon as possible, but their evacuation route was blocked by dense fuel vapour.The Air Force handles everything related to missiles by the book, but the book was silent about procedures for a situation like this, with massive quantities of toxic fuel pouring into the silo. Further, communication between the technicians and the control centre were poor, so it wasn’t clear at first just what had happened. Before long, the commander of the missile wing, headquarters of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, and the missile’s manufacturer, Martin Marietta, were in conference trying to decide how to proceed. The greatest risks were an electrical spark or other source of ignition setting the fuel on fire or, even greater, of the missile collapsing in the silo. With tonnes of fuel pouring from the fuel tank and no vent at its top, pressure in the tank would continue to fall. Eventually, it would be below atmospheric pressure, and would be crushed, likely leading the missile to crumple under the weight of the intact and fully loaded first stage oxidiser and second stage tanks. These tanks would then likely be breached, leading to an explosion. No Titan II had ever exploded in a closed silo, so there was no experience as to what the consequences of this might be.As the night proceeded, all of the Carter era military malaise became evident. The Air Force lied to local law enforcement and media about what was happening, couldn’t communicate with first responders, failed to send an evacuation helicopter for a gravely injured person because an irrelevant piece of equipment wasn’t available, and could not come to a decision about how to respond as the situation deteriorated. Also on display was the heroism of individuals, in the Air Force and outside, who took matters into their own hands on the spot, rescued people, monitored the situation, evacuated nearby farms in the path of toxic clouds, and improvised as events required.Among all of this, nothing whatsoever had been done about the situation of the missile. Events inevitably took their course. In the early morning hours of September 19th, the missile collapsed, releasing all of its propellants, which exploded. The 65 tonne silo door was thrown 200 metres, shearing trees in its path. The nuclear warhead was thrown two hundred metres in another direction, coming to rest in a ditch. Its explosives did not detonate, and no radiation was released.While there were plenty of reasons to worry about nuclear weapons during the Cold War, most people’s concerns were about a conflict escalating to the deliberate use of nuclear weapons or the possibility of an accidental war. Among the general public there was little concern about the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in depots, aboard aircraft, atop missiles, or on board submarines—certainly every precaution had been taken by the brilliant people at the weapons labs to make them safe and reliable, right?Well, that was often the view among “defence intellectuals” until they were briefed in on the highly secret details of weapons design and the command and control procedures in place to govern their use in wartime. As documented in this book, which uses the Damascus accident as a backdrop (a ballistic missile explodes in rural Arkansas, sending its warhead through the air, because somebody dropped a socket wrench), the reality was far from reassuring, and it took decades, often against obstructionism and foot-dragging from the Pentagon, to remedy serious risks in the nuclear stockpile.In the early days of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, it was assumed that nuclear weapons were the last resort in a wartime situation. Nuclear weapons were kept under the civilian custodianship of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and would only be released to the military services by a direct order from the President of the United States. Further, the nuclear cores (“pits”) of weapons were stored separately from the rest of the weapon assembly, and would only be inserted in the weapon, in the case of bombers, in the air, after the order to deliver the weapon was received. (This procedure had been used even for the two bombs dropped on Japan.) These safeguards meant that the probability of an accidental nuclear explosion was essentially nil in peacetime, although the risk did exist of radioactive contamination if a pit were dispersed due to fire or explosion.As the 1950s progressed, and fears of a Soviet sneak attack grew, pressure grew to shift the custodianship of nuclear weapons to the military. The development of nuclear tactical and air defence weapons, some of which were to be forward deployed outside the United States, added weight to this argument. If radar detected a wave of Soviet bombers heading for the United States, how practical would it be to contact the President, get him to sign off on transferring the anti-aircraft warheads to the Army and Air Force, have the AEC deliver them to the military bases, install them on the missiles, and prepare the missiles for launch? The missile age only compounded this situation. Now the risk existed for a “decapitation” attack which could take out the senior political and military leadership, leaving nobody with the authority to retaliate.The result of all this was a gradual devolution of control over nuclear weapons from civilian to military commands, with fully-assembled nuclear weapons loaded on aircraft, sitting at the ends of runways in the United States and Europe, ready to take off on a few minutes’ notice. As tensions continued to increase, B-52s, armed with hydrogen bombs, were on continuous “airborne alert”, ready at any time to head toward their targets.The weapons carried by these aircraft, however, had not been designed for missions like this. They used high explosives which could be detonated by heat or shock, often contained few interlocks to prevent a stray electrical signal from triggering a detonation, were not “one point safe” (guaranteed that detonation of one segment of the high explosives could not cause a nuclear yield), and did not contain locks (“permissive action links”) to prevent unauthorised use of a weapon. Through much of the height of the Cold War, it was possible for a rogue B-52 or tactical fighter/bomber crew to drop a weapon which might start World War III; the only protection against this was rigid psychological screening and the enemy’s air defence systems.The resistance to introducing such safety measures stemmed from budget and schedule pressures, but also from what was called the “always/never” conflict. A nuclear weapon should always detonate when sent on a wartime mission. But it should never detonate under any other circumstances, including an airplane crash, technical malfunction, maintenance error, or through the deliberate acts of an insane or disloyal individual or group. These imperatives inevitably conflict with one another. The more safeguards you design into a weapon to avoid an unauthorised detonation, the greater the probability one of them may fail, rendering the weapon inert. SAC commanders and air crews were not enthusiastic about the prospect of risking their lives running the gauntlet of enemy air defences only to arrive over their target and drop a dud.As documented here, it was only after the end of Cold War, as nuclear weapon stockpiles were drawn down, that the more dangerous weapons were retired and command and control procedures put into place which seem (to the extent outsiders can assess such highly classified matters) to provide a reasonable balance between protection against a catastrophic accident or unauthorised launch and a reliable deterrent.Nuclear command and control extends far beyond the design of weapons. The author also discusses in detail the development of war plans, how civilian and military authorities interact in implementing them, how emergency war orders are delivered, authenticated, and executed, and how this entire system must be designed not only to be robust against errors when intact and operating as intended, but in the aftermath of an attack.This is a serious scholarly work and, at 632 pages, a long one. There are 94 pages of end notes, many of which expand substantially upon items in the main text.

⭐Command and Control addresses an interesting and still vitally important topic. Namely, it examines nuclear weapons control and safety. We all too often fail to remember that the prime job of the Secretary of Energy is not electric cars but management and oversight of the nuclear weapons development and distribution. This book presents a diorama of many of the events surrounding the deployment and control of such weapons.However, as many other reviewers had noted, the style of the book can be very frustrating at times. The author uses the Damascus incident as an ongoing connector to other historical tale recounting the development of nuclear weapons control and the mistakes that have occurred over the decades. After a while this approach becomes not only distracting but an annoyance. For example the author will take the Damascus Incident, an incident when the maintenance on a liquid fuel Titan II resulted in a damaged fuel tank by a Tech who was apparently not following protocol, and then ultimately exploding, as a metaphor for each of the Chapters which are interspersed. Thus one is supposed to be drawn to see mistakes in the small and mistakes in the large. Nice idea but it just does not seem to work. In addition we are led through the lives of each of the players in the Damascus incident and at time this is less than a lucid presentation and often more confusing. One often asks why this detail is necessary. On the one hand the approach does lend context, on the other hand it may just be too much context.Now, I will discuss the text in toto. If one can work around the style, the book tells a compelling tale. It begins at the beginning, Los Alamos, and then proceeds to detail the many developments in the evolution of nuclear weapons. There are excellent discussions of the political in-fighting and the pros and cons of military control over the weapons. LeMay plays a key role during this early period as well he should. LeMay was a pivotal player whose world view of war was massive total destruction. LeMay viewed war as a total destruction of the enemy, as he had done in Europe and in the Pacific. Lemay in a sense was the driving force for military use and deployment.The author does an excellent job in developing the issue of who control nuclear weapons, by going over the various ways in which the weapons flowed into military hands. The design and building of the weapons was done under AEC and then DoE aegis with the support of such places as Sandia Labs in Albuquerque. Sandia was managed by AT&T under a Government contract and was a massive facility adjacent to Kirkland AFB which itself was adjacent to the airport at Albuquerque. Sandia developed various weapons and weapon security systems. Tests of the weapons were often done by DoE or its predecessor the AEC. The author integrates these efforts into the text. It would have been interesting to have developed the significant interplay between DoE and DOD as weapons systems evolved.The author interweaves many other near miss events into the text in a chronological basis between the evolving tale of the Damascus event. Such near misses as the explosion of a B-52 over North Carolina and the loss of 2 H bombs over Span and but a few.The author does a reasonable job in describing the safety procedures employed but it would possibly have been more enlightening to have some first-hand descriptions. Many “fail-safe” procedures had been developed but as the author states each time an improvement to a fail-safe was done it potentially impeded the effectiveness of the weapon.There are several areas, in my opinion, which the author has missed or touched lightly upon and should have been included or expanded upon:1. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: On almost a one to one basis the Soviets matched the US for weapons of vast killing power. The Soviets often played games of chicken with US SAC forces and this would frequently be at the risk of deployment of weapons, especially tactical weapons. In addition the use of the nuclear submarine fleet and the games played there also presented dramatic threats. It would have been useful to have had this interplay discussed somewhat. The classic Triad of aircraft, submarines and missiles would also have been useful to draw together. Understanding Soviet capability and control would have made an excellent counterpoint.2. Tactical Weapons and Special Weapons Depots: Tactical weapons were always considered just a step above a large non-nuclear weapon, and early on not w real nuclear weapon. The author does discuss the Davy Crockett weapons but in reality there were hundreds of Special Weapons Depots, SWD, across the globe which contained these types of weapons. The SWDs were reasonably well guarded but their very number often gave one concern not just because of what they contained but often because one could not reasonably expect to get the best personnel at this many locations. They also were DOD controlled and thus were subject to the change of staff which raised the risk of failure to follow protocols. Thus the proliferation of Tactical weapons, 1KT ranges, were in reality a serious byproduct of the enthusiasm early on for nuclear solutions.3. Other National Weapons Controls: The British, French, Chinese, Israelis, Pakistanis, Indians, and South Africans as well as North Korea and Iran all have dabbled in nuclear weapons and many have collections in their arsenals.4. Nuclear Weapons Treaties: There were many discussions between the US, UK and Soviets from time to time. They typically dealt with testing and proliferation. I spent the latest 70s as an advisor to ACDA and the CTBT during the Carter Administration and dealt with the Soviets firsthand. I also had the opportunity to spend many trips to Sandia and other facilities. Neither side trusted the other, yet side conversations between the parties were about children and grandchildren. Thus, although both sides were prepared for ultimate destruction, both sides also had a view of the humanity of the others. The author discusses Professor Pipe’s works at that time, and I knew Pipes well, and as a refugee from Poland Pipes knew firsthand the Soviets. Thus somehow there had to be a convergence of interests. MAD and Reagan’s efforts, in my opinion, on pushing what “could happen” did eventually get the sides to stand down, somewhat. The author discusses this issue but it could have been more fully developed.5. Strategists: The influence of Herman Kahn and thinks like him also has an overpowering role to play. Kahn is recognized as the promoter of the MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction strategy. Namely if both sides are rational and both sides have so much excess nuclear capabilities then no side would rationally start a first strike. Kahn started out at Rand and ended at the Manhattan Institute but it would have been useful to integrate these efforts a bit more including the many such efforts at Rand.6. Technological Elements: The WWMCCS discussion was lightly approached and in a sense it could have been a section unto itself. The whole concept of command, control, communications and intelligence came out in this period. However these were massively complex systems with detailed methods and procedures and whose very structure could very well have overburdened any rational response capability. The author’s example of the Burroughs computers is but one simple example of grand technological ideas and ideals supported by antiquated technical implementations.Overall the book contains some relevant materials that explain a world in the past. The current environment, however, with proliferation of such weapons, dramatically changes the landscape. For example, would the US try a MAD strategy on a rouge state nuclear capable nation the effect may be de minimis. Thus how would one address such factors? Here the past may only be partly prologue to the future. Thus the book is well worth the read even if at times it can be a bit off-putting in style.

⭐As one who live thru the Cold War, C&C it’s an eye opener!

⭐If you’ve seen the TV documentary of the same name about the 1980 Titan Missile Base accident at Damascus, you’d think this book is just that, but in more detail. In reality, the Titan accident comprises maybe 10-15% of the book; rather, it’s just a detailed look at one of many, many accidents over the years involving nuclear weapons.The book looks at the history of nuclear weapons, their development, their use, their deployment, their storage, their control (or lack of) and of course, the many near-misses we’ve had with them over the years.This book is right up there with Richard Rhodes’ “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” in terms of detail, research and quality. Whereas Rhodes focuses on the people, the hows and whys of the atomic bomb, Schlosser really looks at the way the bomb has been managed over the years, the lack of control over it, the almost cavalier attitude to safety, and how we’ve managed (just) to avoid disaster time and time again.Highly recommended if you’re in to this sort of thing.

⭐Eric Schlosser has written a book which should be read by everybody. He avoids the twin traps of falling into anti-nuclear polemicism or of writing military techno porn and the resulting impeccable balance and avoidance of sharpening axes magnifies the books impact. The book is not a history of nuclear weapons development, not a history of nuclear strategy nor of the political issues attached to nuclear weapons although clearly the book does provide much back ground on these comments. The book is primarily a book about the safety of nuclear weapons, the command and control system for US nuclear weapons and a detailed narrative of the disaster which destroyed a Titan II missile at site 374-7 near Damascus, Arkansas in 1980.The book alternates between the tragedy at site 374-7 and a more or less chronological history of US nuclear weapons safety and command and control. The author has clearly done a huge amount of research both into the specifics of what happened at site 374-7 and the US nuclear weapons program, including extensive interviews with key individuals as well as researching archives, papers, reports and secondary sources. If this is a story with numerous heroes, particularly the men who struggled valiantly to avoid a disaster at site 374-7 and who maintained and stood ready to launch nuclear weapons it is perhaps surprisingly a story with few villains. Curtis LeMay is still a figure of derision and hate to many yet the picture which emerges in Schlosser’s book is more nuanced and not unsympathetic. He appears as a tough and uncompromising commander yet one who was certainly no war monger and who had a real sense of care towards his men and who was in many ways a progressive character. And his personal courage is undeniable, Schlosser allows readers to draw their own conclusions after commenting on a man who had flown numerous bombing missions over Germany being assailed by cries of “sieg heil” in 1968. The book examines the nuclear policies of several Presidents including Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter and Reagan as well as men like McNamara. In each case whilst the flaws are recognised the author is far from unsympathetic and presents a balanced picture. And clearly the book tells the stories of many technical, military and scientific specialists. The overwhelming impression is one of decent men struggling to manage a cold war confrontation and walking a tight rope between nuclear armageddon and surrender to Soviet diplomatic/military manouevring.The book recounts numerous nuclear accidents, the events at site 374-7 are told in great detail whereas other incidents are summarised. The sheer number of these accidents is really rather terrifying. The book highlights the beaurocratic inertia and in-fighting which hampered efforts to improve the safety of nuclear weapons yet also at the end recognises that no accidental or unintended detonation of a US nuclear war head ever took place despite numerous major incidents and a multitude of vulnerabilities.Those looking for a hatchet job on the US military and policy will be very disappointed. Equally those looking for a celebration of nuclear deterrence will be equally disappointed. Those looking for a very balanced, non-sensationalist and well researched examination of nuclear weapons safety will find this to be a truly outstanding work. The book is very well written and never feels laboured or dry. Very highly recommended, 5*.

⭐I bought this book used and as you can see from the photo the issue is that the cover is a little faded, apart from that the rest of the book looks and feels brand new. A great investigated journalist, this is the second book I have bought from the author Eric Schlosser. If you don’t want to know a terrible truth about the world we live in and how poorly important infrastructures and industrial accidents are managed, secured and then covered up then don’t buy from this author, he shines a light on something the whole world takes for granted from our leaders and the people they put in place in regards to top level national security and a total respect of the lives of their citizans and their safeguard to prevent all catastrophic destruction at all costs. This as Eric Schlosser proves is all just an illusion and that the reality is horribly terrifying. A great work of out and something that should be taught in schools.

⭐I grew up with the Cuban missile crisis and its one of my earliest memories of Big State confrontation. Until that point I did not know much about the cold war although I had been driven through East Germany just before it happened, the standout thing I remember was how poor the state of repair of buildings was, compared to the West German state. A siege/war economy which the Eastern block adopted eventually bankrupted their states and led to the Reagan truce with Gorbachev. The expenditure involved in keeping up with the US through the period in which this book is set is highlighted by the USSR resorting to hoaxes to convince the paranoid SAC that they had more bomber and missiles that they actually had. The so-called bomber and missile gap that fuelled the military industrial conspiracy theories of the time.Using a narrative style it puts in perspective the events of development of weapons of mass destruction, the controls needed to keep the deterrent active and yet safe and the relative safety of missile use compared to the mass bomber plans which evolved from the WW2. Its coupled with an interlinked narrative concerning a liquid fuelled rocket accident, which shows how little true evolution took place in missile propulsion from Hitlers rocket man, Werner von Braun, until stable solid fuel devises were introduced. The incorrect placement of a decimal point turned a 1.5 million ton TNT blast into a yield of 15 million tons which shook the earth mantle on detonation.Despite the sometimes sloppy and complacent handling of such lethal weaponry, it is surprising that there was no significant accident and no nuclear explosion, with planes carrying bombs inevitably crashing, fire and burnout, with explosions and later Polaris being inaccurate, no GPS to guide trajectory or route it is amazing that we can look back and see that we may have survived in spite of rather than because of the bomb.The actor Jimmy Stewart unlike many of his Hollywood contemporaries was a seasoned WW2 bomber pilot, regarded as lucky, who later became a deputy director of The Strategic Air Command which had independent (non political) control of nuclear weaponry. As I leafed through this book in one of the best bookshops I have ever been into, in Haight Ashbury San Francisco, it was this snippet which led me to buy it later and see what became of Le May and McNamara, two of the most powerful men in recent history who are now only misty memories in the political landscape.

⭐The book is brimming with interesting stories but ultimately I found it a bit of a slog, and not very enjoyable to read. One reason is that it is made up entirely of tangents, which becomes infuriating. Not only is the main story – an accident in a nuclear missile silo – stretched through the whole book and broken up with multiple other story lines. But each new story line branches off into a multitude of tangents too. There are also far too many characters and it becomes impossible to remember who any of them are, so you end up disassociated from what’s happening and reading just for the sake of it (again, especially a problem on the silo accident story line where multitudes of new characters are constantly drawn in). I would rather have had completely separate sections, one on the Titan-2 accident, one on nuclear policy, one on the design of weapons, etc. I also would have preferred a more ‘pop science’ style of the whole book, without the dense detail about Navy/Army/Air Force bickering, policy shifts, and quite so much back story about absolutely everything. Basically, this book is too detailed and disorganised to make a gripping read for a layperson, and probably too disorganised for any subject matter experts either.

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