The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618-1850 (History of Warfare) by Schneid (PDF)

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The two centuries that chronologically bind the topics in this volume span a period when Europe was in its global ascendancy. This volume explores the various factors related to the projection and limitation of imperial powers in the western world between 1618 and 1850.

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: About the Author Frederick C. Schneid, Ph.D. (1993) in History, Purdue University, is Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History at High Point University. He has published extensively on the Napoleonic Wars and European warfare, including Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition (Praeger, 2005).

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐A summary of the review on StrategyPage.Com:’Opening with an outline of the late Gunther Rothenberg’s life and work by his wife, Eleanor Hancock (Australian Defence Force Academy), the essays in this volume focus on the period and region of Rothenberg’s greatest interest, Central Europe from the Sixteenth to the mid-Nineteenth Century. Essays deal with the character of the Thirty Years’ War (Peter H. Wilson), the global context of the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon (Jeremy Black), the complex relations among France, Italy, Piedmont, and the Hapsburg Empire (Ciro Paoletti), “honorable surrender” in the age of Louis XIV (John A. Lynn II), the military institutions and effectives of Prussia (Dennis Showalter) and Russia (Janet M. Hartley), and military effectiveness during the Napoleonic campaign of 1813 (Robert M. Epstein). The volume closes with essays on “Europe’s Progress and America’s Success, 1760-1850” (Paul W. Schroeder) and “War and Revolution in the Age of the Risorgimento.” An excellent memorial for Prof. Rothenberg, and an excellent read for anyone interested in the period or in the history of warfare in general.”For the full review, see StrategyPage.Com

⭐The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618-1858, ed. Frederick C. Schneid, Brill, 2013, 224pp.This is a very interesting collection of essays on the subject, several by very well-known writers in this field. It is volume #75 in the series History of Warfare from the publishers, Brill of Leiden, which I borrowed from a library. The essays were selected from the first four years of the Gunther E. Rothberg Seminar in Military History, held at High Point University, where they are held to “honor the memory and career of the venerable military historian” (1923-2004). There is a Foreword by the widow of the late professor, surveying his life and academic interests.As with any collection, readers will find a number of items of greater and lesser interest, depending on their own areas of study.The Contents are –P001: Introduction – Frederick C SchneidP012: Meaningless Conflict? The Character of the Thirty Years War – Peter H WilsonP034: War and Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV: The Global Context – Jeremy BlackP051: The Other Side of Victory: Honourable Surrender during the Wars of Louis XIV – John A Lynn IIP068: Italy, Piedmont and French Anti-Habsburg Strategy, 1690-1748 – Ciro PaolettiP083: Reform and Stability: Prussia’s Military Dialectic from Hubertusberg to Waterloo – Dennis ShowalterP105: Russia as a Great Military Power, 1762-1825 – Janet M HartleyP122: Aspects of Military and Operational Effectiveness of the Armies of France, Austria, Russia and Prussia in 1813 – Robert M EpsteinP149: The Napoleonic Wars in Global Perspective – Jeremy BlackP170: Europe’s Progress and America’s Success, 1760-1850 – Paul W SchroederP196: War and Revolution in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1820-1849 – Frederick C SchneidP219: IndexThe Editor’s Introduction provides an overview of the period covered by this volume, and places the essays and their subject-matter in their proper context in that period: “The two centuries that chronologically bind these topics span a period when Europe was in its global ascendancy. The foundations of colonial empires were laid with the expansion of a European presence in the Americas and Asia. By the first half of the 19th century, Africa too became a target of Imperial opportunity. This era was equally one of internecine conflict on the European continent. In the two hundred years between 1618 and 1850, Europe experienced at least eleven major wars. The most peaceful period in Europe extended from the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 through the mid-19th century. The continental wars were waged for dynastic expansion, only to achieve ideological justification in 1792, though that war was rather conventional in strategy and conduct.”“The decline in continental wars after 1815, was purposeful and a product of a cooperative understanding of principles. Nonetheless, colonial expansion engendered military operations and heated competition concomitant with Europe’s wars of the late 17th and 18th centuries, and after 1815. In several cases, colonial conflicts pre-dated the continental conflagrations, which eventually swallowed them up. In the 19th century, the progression of hegemonic empires could be found alive and well in Africa and Asia. Peace in Europe, translated into conquest abroad. This was on limited terms through 1850 and thereafter one of the only avenues of European expansion.”MEANINGLESS CONFLICT? THE CHARACTER OF THE THIRTY YEARS WAR – Peter H Wilson“The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) could be divided into two larger phases: the rebellion of princes, including Denmark, followed by intervention of Sweden and France. The war represented the ability of Sweden to project its power deep into central Europe. French intervention thereafter reflected the limitations of Swedish military power to defeat Austrian and Catholic League forces. Peter H. Wilson argues in his essay, that the Thirty Years War has been misrepresented and that detailed examination of the conflict clearly challenges notions that it represented a marked decline of the Holy Roman Empire as an institution. It is more properly understood as a purely German event that contended with serious issues related to the limitations of Habsburg imperial power.”WAR AND WARFARE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT – Jeremy Black“…Addresses the extent of colonial expansion, and the conflicts that ensued between European and non-European states. To that end, Professor Black challenges the notion of technological determinism in explaining eventual European supremacy overseas. More than an examination of overseas expansion is the extension of Russia’s imperial borderlands against the Turks and in central Asia. Black argues that a Eurocentric perspective created a historical determinism, assuming that Western success implied lack of ability or willingness of non-western powers to project their power. Black carefully weaves the enormous success of the Ming Dynasty in China into his narrative of early modern history. Indeed, western states did not always manage to establish their presence on the first attempt. Thus, limitations of western powers are clearly defined by the willingness and ability of the respective states to commit resources toward global expansion even in the face of initial defeat.”THE OTHER SIDE OF VICTORY: HONOURABLE SURRENDER DURING THE WARS OF LOUIS XIV – John A Lynn II“John Lynn, one of the foremost French military historians of the 17th and 18th centuries [sic], has argued that the army was never as powerful as Louis or his war ministers desired. As large as it was, it never reached the intended size and potential due to difficulties in providing proper funding. His chapter on ‘Honorable Surrender’ examines the practice of taking prisoners in relation to the conduct of campaign and the laws of war. The latter was both a formal and informal understanding among European states and their military leaders that developed out of the Middle Ages. The custom of surrender by the late 17th and early 18th century was concomitant with the rise of standing armies. The financial demands of these institutions derived from the cost of administration, and the raising, training and equipping of soldiers. The loss of large numbers of men would not only hamper a state’s physical military power, but also potentially cripple it economically. The custom and culture of surrender that was originally limited to the nobility translated to entire armies and therefore established a quid pro quo between warring states. The concept of total was did not exist, and while the violence of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), or the scouring of the Palatinate by Marshal Turenne (1674) was brutal, putting an army to the sword after the fall of a city or loss of battle as a matter of course had not been practiced for centuries.”ITALY, PIEDMONT AND FRENCH ANTI-HABSBURG STRATEGY, 1690-1748 – Ciro Paoletti“The contest between Louvician France and the Habsburg dynasty became a centrepiece of European conflict from the Thirty Years War to the conclusion of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748). French strategic interests in reducing first Spanish, later Austrian Habsburg possessions in Belgium (Spanish Netherlands), western Germany, and Italy were aggressively pursued by two Bourbon kings. Ciro Paoletti presents a clear discussion of the strategic significance of Italy to French war efforts against the Spanish and the Austrians during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Italy had been, and remained a battleground for the projection of dynastic power.”REFORM AND STABILITY: PRUSSIA’S MILITARY DIALECTIC FROM HUBERTUSBERG TO WATERLOO – Dennis Showalter“The advent of the French Revolution and the victories of Napoleon’s armies created a perception that the vaunted Prussian military system had seen better days. Showalter attacks this argument head on in his article, ‘From Hubertuesburg to Auerstadt: The Prussian Army in Decline?,’ published in 1994. He extends his argument in his essay in this volume… The Prussian army served the state well during the French Revolutionary Wars. Prussia’s exit from the First Coalition in 1795, was of its own choosing, and not a reflection of military weakness. As a European power with limited resources compared to its rivals, the Prussian monarch and his ministers had to carefully craft policy and export its power to achieve maximum results. Thus, even the debacle of 1806 did not mitigate Prussian military power although it clearly illustrated its limitations. The ability of the state to regenerate its strength through 18134 and participate significantly in the critical campaigns of the final years of Napoleon’s empire indicated that it possessed power sufficient to fight audaciously on the Katzbach and at Leipzig in 1813, seize Paris in 1814 and play the decisive role at Waterloo in 1815.” [Let us see if the role of British gold, weapons, uniforms, artillery (and crew?) for the Prussian army in 1813-14 is addressed…]RUSSIA AS A GREAT MILITARY POWER, 1762-1825 – Janet M Hartley“Russia became fully integrated into European politics and warfare beginning with the Seven Years War and continuing with a series of victories for the next half century. Janet Hartley’s essay on Russia’s military power examines Romanov conquest in the west during this most important fifty years. The period was marked by the partitions of the Kingdom of Poland – Russia being the greatest beneficiary and the most ardent proponent of the destruction of its neighbour. Although the French Revolutionary Wars had little impact initially on Russia, the ambitions of Tsar Paul extended beyond his newly conquered Polish territory in favour of an active western policy. Russia’s military role in the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802) decisively destroyed any French gains in Italy during the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797). Russia’s subsequent withdrawal from the anti-French alliance in 1799 led to the collapse of the war effort a year later.”ASPECTS OF MILITARY AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE, AUSTRIA, RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA IN 1813 – Robert M Epstein“In his chapter, Robert Epstein examines the impact of a decade of continental war on Napoleon’s army and its operational capacity, and then compares it to those fielded by Russia, Austria and Prussia.”“The qualitative and quantitative differences between the respective armed forces at the dawn of the Napoleonic Wars were no longer a factor in the wake of the disaster of 1812, and the reconstruction of European armies. Russia suffered as badly as France, and Austria was still recovering from its losses over the past decade. Force structure, strategy and performance of European armies in 1813 indicated that Napoleon’s greatest error was not creating a viable political system after 1807. His pursuit of conquest for the sake of glory resulted in the draining of his empire, and the clear fact that, while his ambition knew no bounds, his state had limitations.”THE NAPOLEONIC WARS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE – Jeremy Black“The collapse of Napoleon’s empire led to a readjustment of principles that guided European policy for the next century. The impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on European military systems was substantial. Nonetheless, Jeremy Black questions the extent of this influence in his essay…” Continuing with his research on the global aspects of European military power and its limitations, Black acknowledges the impact of the Napoleonic wars on the development of European armies, strategy and state power, but challenges its immediate application during the 19th century. After Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, European states refrained from continental conflict for half a century, and focussed on overseas expansion. Under these circumstance [sic] Napoleonic warfare could not be applied in North Africa, the Middle east or Asia. He thus encourages historians to consider the reason Napoleonic warfare is portrayed as absolutely critical to the evolution of European military systems in a century of overseas imperial expansion.”EUROPE’S PROGRESS AND AMERICA’S SUCCESS, 1760-1850 – Paul W Schroeder“Paul Schroeder, one of the leading diplomatic historians of the 19th century previously argued that the scope of the Napoleonic Wars necessitated an agreement among the European powers that would enable them to project their influence beyond their borders, yet limit their ability to do so on the continent.. Schroeder rejects the notion of ‘balance of power’, in favour of principles accepted by ‘hegemonic powers’. These principles remained in force until the Crimean War and then modified to retain the system until its collapse in 1914. To this end, an unintended consequence of this agreement was the unrestrained expansion of the United States through 1850. Schroeder rejects the traditional interpretation by American historians that ‘Europe’s distress was America’s success’, but rather concludes ‘Europe’s Progress’ meant America’s success. The principles that created stability on the European continent despite the expansionist tendencies of the European powers enabled the United States to grow rapidly without foreign interference. Other than the War of 1812, the United States did not come to blows when competing with European powers in the western hemisphere. This, Schroeder claims, was to the credit of the new international system.”WAR AND REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF THE RISORGIMENTO, 1820-1849 – Frederick C Schneid“Frederick Schneid examines the course of the Risorgimento from 1815-1849 in his chapter. The inability of Piedmont-Sardinia to muster sufficient strength to defeat Austria even with revolutionary support, indicated that national aspirations could only be achieved in league with a foreign power. The state lacked the resources and manpower to effectively challenge the Austrian Empire despite its tenuous condition in 1848-49.”

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