Mental Reality, second edition, with a new appendix (Representation and Mind series) by Galen Strawson (PDF)

Description

An argument against neobehaviorism and for “naturalized Cartesianism,” which couples a wholly materialist approach to the mind with a fully realist attitude to the phenomena of conscious experience.In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, “naturalized Cartesianism,” which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don’t claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute—literally are—conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them.Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena.This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7.

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: Review Praise for the first edition: In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson tries to determine what the fundamental and difficult questions about the mind are, and to answer them. His answers are iconoclastic and brilliant, especially his sustained criticism of behaviorism, functionalism and of certain ideas associated with Wittgenstein.—Paul Snowdon, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research—Praise for the first edition: Perhaps the most detailed and convincing refutation of behaviorism given yet in philosophy.—Times Literary Supplement—Praise for the first edition: Strawson’s inquiry explores a remarkable range of hard questions with care and insight.—Noam Chomsky, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research— About the Author Galen Strawson taught philosophy at the University of Oxford for twenty years before moving to the University of Reading in 2001. He was Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center from 2004-2007. Since 2012 he has been President’s Chair in Philosophy at the University of Texas in Austin.

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐Galen Strawson’s “Mental Reality” is a fantastic book on what should be considered one of the most important issues of them all, namely “metaphysics”, the ultimate nature of reality. It’s rather sad that the term “metaphysics” is usually mentioned in a prerogative manner as if insinuating that any time this topic arises it has nothing to do with “real” reality, or it is a baseless argument. I don’t think this should be the case at all, with the term being created when classifying Aristotle’s books, they bumped into one that had no title, but went after (or beyond) the “physics” book, hence the prefix: “meta”.In this book Strawson argues, quite convincingly in my opinion, that the ultimate nature of reality is entirely physical (or material), and that the famous “mind-body problem” which reached its most important articulation through Descartes, is really a pseudo-problem, and stems from our inability to fully comprehend what it means to argue that something is “physical.”Strawson proceeds to cement his position which he labels “agnostic-materialism” by going through a wealth of philosophical material, classic and contemporary on most of the issues that concern debating what is mind, what is body and what role does the mind play in constructing what the world is made of. Strawson also gives convincing refutations concerning behaviorism and the more ambitious type of scientists who argue that once we understand all of physics, we will be able to understand how the mind works too, among many other topics.This is truly an extraordinary book, which despite presenting difficulties in technical jargon, is truly a gem: thought-provoking, mind-expanding and humbling all in one. I am quite confused about why a book that deals with “the ultimate nature of reality”, the biggest of big question in philosophy, is not mentioned in the same lineage as some of the works of Russell, Quine and others in the analytic tradition. If you happen to stumble on this book and are on the fence about it, don’t be, read this classic and become all the wiser because of it.

⭐Philosophy of mindの本論というよりそのmethodology（ではないもののそれに近い）論に近いような印象。Mindの本質的な説明に（observable）behaviorの要素は必要不可欠なのか？という問いに対するrejectionが主たる論旨のように読みました。Functionalismを含む著者の言うneo-behaviorlismへの反論という感じでしょうか。私は若いころにWittgensteinの言語論（public domain positivism ?)にひどく感心した覚えがあるのですが、epistemology⇒semantics→ontologyの行論は不正であると指摘されると確かにその通りかなという気もしますね。また例えばbehaviorという観念がいかに曖昧なものかという詳細な議論がありましたが、輪郭のはっきりしていると思い込んでいる観念の多くはたぶん致命的に曖昧なんだろうなという（いい加減な）感想も持ちました。

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