Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944: Perfect for Father’s Day? by Antony Beevor (PDF)

Description

On 17 September 1944, General Kurt Student, the founder of Nazi Germany’s parachute forces, heard the growing roar of aero engines. He went out on to his balcony above the flat landscape of southern Holland to watch the vast air armada of Dakotas and gliders,carrying the British 1st Airborne and the American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. He gazed up in envy at the greatest demonstration of paratroop power ever seen.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐A gripping account of a totally botched operation. Despite the propaganda at the time, Montgomery, “Boy” Browning and, to a lesser extent, Horrocks, come out of it with very little credit. The men on the ground fought heroically, but the plan itself was fatally defective and never stood a chance.The book has an immense amount of detailed information about the close-range fighting, often between very small formations, and really conveys the horrors of such intense conflict. However, paradoxically, I think this is also where the book is weakest. Generally the maps are small-scale, so they show the formations involved but make it hard to see how all the many individual actions fit together. At a minimum, I would have welcomed a few fold-out maps so I could follow developments chapter by chapter, but in many places one almost needs street maps and text references.Two personal notes. My father was on Montgomery’s staff (but not, thank heavens, involved in this), and so was my “Second Master” (head of College) at Winchester, so I was able to meet Montgomery in about 1953. In retirement he was still very much the infallible commander, surrounded by his memorabilia in his mobile HQ. I myself was the cadet in charge of the RAF cadets at Winchester (a little before Anthony Beevor went there), and trained on both powered planes and gliders. I could not do my National Service in the RAF because of poor eyesight, but apparently I was still acceptable for the Glider Pilot Regiment! (who needs perfect vision for single one-way trip…?) Then I saw “Theirs was the glory”, the movie reenactment by the Arnhem veterans – and joined the Royal Engineers! I ended up doing bomb disposal during the Malayan Emergency – a much safer career.

⭐Author Antony Beevor offers a brisk, no-holds-barred examination of Operation Market-Garden. It clearly benefits from a generation’s worth of additional research since Cornelius Ryan’s epic “A Bridge Too Far.” The result is a gripping narrative that covers the strategy, the tactics, and the human aspects of one of the most controversial operations of World War II.The walk-up to the operation itself is a quick summary, in favor of a more detailed and often bluntly honest narrative of the actual fighting. A generation removed from “A Bridge Too Far”, it is now permissible to address mistakes, failures, and atrocities by all sides. It is notable that the narrative covers the Dutch contribution, along with the horrific price paid in German retribution. The stubborn courage of the Allied airborne units rightly gets lots of attention, as does the remarkable ability of the German Army to regenerate combat formations out of the refugees from the Normandy campaign. The key role of British XXX Corps in the Garden portion of the operation is also closely analyzed. The reaction of the 21st Army Group chain of command to the destruction of the British First Airborne Division provides discouraging proof of the old saying that failure is an orphan. Very highly recommended to students of the Second World War.

⭐Antony Beevor continues his long string of engaging and insightful books on various battles and campaigns of the Second World War in “Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944”. Certainly the definitive work on this subject remains Cornelius Ryan’s “A Bridge to Far” but Beevor has been able to discover some new sources and give a somewhat different perspective. While not groundbreaking I still found “Arnhem” interesting enough on its own. Operation Market-Garden remains one of WWII’s greatest foul-ups in terms of poor planning and gross misjudgment of the enemy’s capabilities and strength. It’s surprising even today how much leeway Field Marshal Montgomery received from Eisenhower and how detached Monty was from the events unfolding on the ground while brave men were dying quite literally for nothing. The squandering of the British 1st Parachute Division was such a tragic waste it defies belief. No less infuriating decades later was the refusal of senior leadership to take any responsibility for the debacle and the amount of finger pointing and blame deflection that ensued. Finally, Beevor reminds readers how much the Dutch civilian population suffered for the support they rendered the Allies and their grim starvation during the winter that followed reducing them to eating tulip bulbs.

⭐I couldn’t wait for the US release so ordered it from England and am I very glad I did. Not to diminish anything from this book or the work of the author, but this can almost be a companion to A Bridge Too Far. The author fills in some gaps – for example, Ryan was unable to confirm the identity of an American detachment at Arnhem & Beevor identifies them. He clears up some other points as well. Beevor eschews much of the events that lead up to Market Garden, from supply problems to personality conflicts within the high command, because they have been done before. He does go a little more into the command structure of the Germans in Holland. The books covers the actions of both the American and the British airborne divisions, not just the battle at Arnhem. Beevor also works in the generosity, sacrifice, and courage of the Dutch. The chapters are divided by subject prior to the battle and during the critical period each chapter is dedicated to a specific day, and he follows up with a long epilogue. If you have never heard of the Dutch Hunger Winter after you read this book I don’t think you’ll be complaining about having something you don’t like for dinner for a while.

⭐This book has merits – the description of localised fighting, particularly around Arnhem, the acknowledgement of the bravery of the the average fighting man, the highlighting of the outstanding courage of the Dutch, the effort to give some of the German perspective and the positive attempt to rehabilate the unfortunate and wrongly maligned Sosabowski are all creditable insights.However, it is abundantly clear that that the author falls into the elementary trap of disparaging Montgomery because of who he was and not because of his generalship. While there is no doubt Montgomery was his own worst enemy and that he made errors over the course of the war, especially with regard to not prioritising the Scheldt estuary, it is also true that he was the most effective allied battlefield general in the Western European Theatre, with the possible exception of Alexander. What other Allied general had fought, generally successfully, in retreat (Dunkirk), defense (UK, Caen), counter attack (Ardennes) and attack (El Alamein/ North Africa, Italy, Belgium, Rhine) over six years of continuous war? The author has taken the conventional approach of laying the blame of the failure of Market Garden at Montgomery’s door, probably because it’s the path of least resistance when looking for book sales.It is very easy to argue that Arnhem was, strategically, a bad plan but it must not be forgotten that it almost succeeded despite so much going wrong. Notwithstanding the failures on issues such intelligence, utilisation of the Dutch Underground and communications generally, decision making below Montgomery around ground force delivery (Brereton and Williams) resulting in sacrificing surprise, the speed of XXX Corps (Browning and Horrocks) and above all Gavin’s failure to take the Nijmegan bridge in due time played a far greater role in defeat than the failures in the strategic plan itself.Unfortunately, the Author really doesn’t make this clear, especially with regard to the failure at Nijmegen; at one point he refers to Gavin’s leadership as exceptional, even though Gavin singularly failed to show the initiative which the author so cavalierly suggests the British lacked. (Read John Buckley’s Monty’s men for a first class appraisal of the 21st Army Group).Only once does the author get to the nub of the issue – on page 220, he states that “the simple truth is that XXX Corps was too late, and so was the capture of the Nijmegan bridge as a result of the defending of the Groesbeck heights”. Of course, even here clarity is lacking – the two factors the author mentions above are not somehow mutually exclusive – part of the reason for the delay of XXX Corp was precisely because the bridge hadn’t been taken.The author also seemed prone to making little, almost snide references, with regard to the British fighting prowess and almost always from the perspective of the Americans – he quotes Dick Winters, of band of brothers fame, suggesting that The British lacked aggression (ex airborne) – this is the same British army who had been fighting since 1939. Elsewhere he quotes an American cliche that the British were “happy to fight to the last ally” – this type of thing is highly invidious given the British took on the vast bulk of the fighting during Market Garden (and in fact had since the June landings) and consequently suffered four times the casualties the Americans did in the Market Garden operations.In summary, there are baises here which are cliched and sloppy which In turn means it simply isn’t as good a book as either Stalingrad or Berlin.Lastly – a lot more maps please!

⭐Good read but Beevor lets the Americans off the hook and is overly critical of Monty .

⭐I was looking forward to reading this and although the level of detail is exceptional ( though perhaps inevitably not always factually correct), I just find the pandering to the American audience somewhat annoying, and to me there is a disappointing lack of true analysis. He falls into the age- long trap of invariably blaming 30 Corps but only fleetingly on P220 does he mention why they were late – because of the failure to take Nijmegen Bridge – and he just leaves that there! Very disappointing.I fully understand justifiable criticism of British decisions but I find it quite incredible that a writer of his stature ignores this and hence the book almost appears more like a Commando cartoon story book than one that will appeal to true military strategist.I was also disappointed at the relatively brief descriptions of the Grenadier Guards brave assault on the Valkhof by Nijmegen Bridge along with the adjacent Hunnerpark, whilst he goes into immense detail to cover the river crossing. That is fine but the assault by the Grenadier Guards along with 82nd was infact probably more important, costing the Guards up to 100 lives.Again, I’m afraid that my overriding feeling was a lack of intellectual analysis despite the very thorough day to day research. I know that sounds patronising and who the hell am I to say that? Though I’m not the only one to cast doubt on Beevor’s assessments on MG , which is a shame because it feels like he betrays his own Country at times in pursuit of the American dollar.Before anyone states that I am being overly nationalistic, I assure that I believe Monty, Browning, and Horracks were far from perfect tho neither were Brereton or Gavin. On the other hand the British 1st Airborne including the Poles, and American 82nd and 101st were all exceptional in performance, tho so were the Germans.But overall Beevor undermines his own performance by ignoring the gravity of the failure to take Nijmegen bridge, and the slowness of Browing/Gavin/Lindquist and the 82nd to take it as ordered.

⭐I’ve read almistbeverything written about the debacle. The whole campaign was a disaster from start to finish. If WW1 had men led by donkeys, then WW2 had men led by an arrogant pig. Montgomery is definitely an over hyped charlatan.This book tells the story from all sides – Allied, German and Dutch. It is well researched, with great stories from participants and stories of heroism and incompetence. It definitely does not draw punches when dealing with Monty, Horrocks and Browning.We lost a family member during the battle and reading this book just makes the loss even greater. Why were so many men sacrificed for no real reason, apart from ego and a sense that so many other operations were cancelled that 1st Airborne would never get used.

⭐This was by far the best account of ArnHem and the battle for bridges that I have read. It really highlights the sheer arrogance and ineptitude of some of the senior British commanders, in particular Bernard Montgomery and Boy Browning (both should have been tried for War Crimes). I believe most senior leaders in business should read this book as it really highlights what happens when there is a serious lack of planning, strategy, skills and teamwork. The real tragedy is that serious loss of life occurred due to personal Agenda’s and over inflated Ego’s.The book also shows that even though Germany was losing the war, their response to the Airborne landings was rapid and highly effective.The plight of the Dutch people during the battle and the tragic events afterwards is very well documented.

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