Creating Scientific Concepts (A Bradford Book) by Nancy J J. Nersessian (PDF)

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    Ebook Info

    • Published: 2010
    • Number of pages: 266 pages
    • Format: PDF
    • File Size: 2.20 MB
    • Authors: Nancy J J. Nersessian

    Description

    An account that analyzes the dynamic reasoning processes implicated in a fundamental problem of creativity in science: how does genuine novelty emerge from existing representations?

    User’s Reviews

    Editorial Reviews: Review “It should be obvious: Scientists are human beings and their scientific theories reflect normal human mechanisms of thought, called “frames” and “metaphors” by some cognitive scientists and models and analogies by others. James Clerk Maxwell was no exception. His laws of electromagnetism were structured by those forms of human cognition. In “Creating Scientific Concepts, ” Nancy Nersessian demonstrates this beyond question. The book is a “tour de force” by a great cognitive scientist of science.”–George Lakoff, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics, The University of California at Berkeley”In research of major importance, Nancy Nersessian has shown how mental models underlie the creative reasoning of scientists. At the heart of her book is a unique and imaginative use of cognitive science to explain how an incremental series of models led James Clerk Maxwell to his field equations for electromagnetism.”–Philip Johnson-Laird, Department of Psychology, Princeton University”Drawing on years of experience as a founder of cognitive studies of science, Nersessian tackles a fundamental problem neglected by past inquiries into conceptual change: How can a genuinely novel representation be created? This can be done, she argues, by a process of model-based reasoning involving such activities as creating analogies, deploying visual representations, and performing thought experiments. In developing her case she draws on her own ‘cognitive-historical method’ which combines detailed historical analysis with insights from cognitive science. The result speaks to the interests of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, and many others, including cognitive scientists.”–Ronald N. Giere, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Review Drawing on years of experience as a founder of cognitive studies of science, Nersessian tackles a fundamental problem neglected by past inquiries into conceptual change: How can a genuinely novel representation be created? This can be done, she argues, by a process of model-based reasoning involving such activities as creating analogies, deploying visual representations, and performing thought experiments. In developing her case she draws on her own ‘cognitive-historical method’ which combines detailed historical analysis with insights from cognitive science. The result speaks to the interests of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, and many others, including cognitive scientists.―Ronald Giere, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota About the Author Nancy Nersessian is Regents’ Professor of Cognitive Science, School of Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology; her research focuses on creativity, innovation and conceptual change in science. She examines the cognitive and cultural mechanisms that precede theoretical and experimental scientific innovation. She holds an A.B. in Physics and Philosophy from Boston University and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Philosophy from Case Western Reserve University. Professor Nersessian is currently a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and a member (foreign) of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has held fellowship positions at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study (Harvard), the Dibner Institute at MIT, the Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, and the University of Leiden, the Netherlands (Fulbright Scholar). She has also served as the Chair of the Cognitive Science Society (2003-4) and on its Governing Board, and as a Governing Board member of the Philosophy of Science Association. Read more

    Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

    ⭐I WANT TO SEE THE TABLE CONTENTS OF AMAZON BOOKS!!!

    ⭐Allows one to rethink how concepts are formulated or how science works.

    ⭐May 2nd, 2011 UPDATE:=====================This book has just garnered Nancy Nersessian, (Regents’ Professor and Professor of Cognitive Science at the Georgia Institute of Technology) recipient of the first ever Patrick Suppes Prize in Philosophy of Science for this work.Warmest congratulations, Dr. Nersessian! I suppose I will have to change the title of my review now?New concepts in science result from the process of attempting to overcome specific problems, and Creating Scientific Concepts (CSC) takes a process-focused approach, providing a gold mine of information for those interested in scientific and technological advance, or any of the many related specialty disciplines. The arguments made represent a critical milestone toward my goal: the development of a practice standard for managing creation of revolutionary science & technology paradigms, so I’m hardly a neutral reviewer.Nersessian explains the birth of new scientific understanding, some times in laser-sharp detail and at other times with a broad strokes, such as where issues arise from “the creative reasoning practices of scientists for which cognitive research is not yet sufficient to explain.”CSC is an erudite, compelling journey through profound discoveries in physics not merely pointing to dates and useful discoveries, but actually into the minds of the researchers working to solve problems. We see the evolutionary history of scientist’s concepts through their journals, correspondence, and notes. Readers investing the effort to grapple through the dense information-to-paragraph ratio will be rewarded by gaining key understanding of how conceptual models serve imaginative scientific progress. Stock up on post-it notes and get a low-bleed pen for margin scribbling.Professor Nersessian’s investigations identify 3 types of resources used in the scientific problem-solving process: > Conceptual > Analytical > MaterialThese resource types are utilized in conceptual change during experimental observation and mathematical analysis in which 3 mental tools & techniques are integrated to produce creative solutions. These tools and techniques are: > synthesizing analogies, > representative imagery, and > thought experimentsI liked that the author describes processes translatable into the lexicon of global standards from the Project Management Institute, which was developed for best managing change, and they can plausibly be related as: > Model Construction –> Initiating & Prototyping > Abstraction –> Planning > Simulation –> Controlling & Executing > Evaluation –> Monitoring & ClosingDespite the edition’s overly thin & smooth paper, (making rapidly flipping to p134 for Newton’s Principia illustration a bit of a pain), these 251 pages of brilliance remain a useful reference; Admittedly, this page stock makes the book very portable.”Creating Scientific Concepts” is a fabulous companion (sequel?) to ”

    ⭐” (CSSR).CSC includes many references to CSSR, which together provide an up-to-date and sufficiently deep understanding of the fascinating process of scientific creativity advancing the forefront of technology and human knowledge.Nov. 2010 UPDATE: In development of a PhD program Identifying Guidelines for Transformative Research, I’ve come across “Abduction” several times, including a paper by Gyo¨ngyi Kova’cs and Karen M. Spens from the Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki, Finland. ([…]) In that paper, they advocate that abduction should be a core focus of logistics research, and I had this to say in response which, given its critical tone, was taken exceedingly well:As a caveat to my thoughts on abduction, I have not fully investigated many of the source material cited, such as Taylor 2002. I agree with most of the material quoted, but remain uncomfortable with some of the terminology used in abduction discussions, as it does not seem to be informed by the detailed studies of the scientific creative process – most notably for me, that of Nancy Nersessian in “Creating Scientific Concepts” wherein she argues that a better understanding than that currently offered by abduction is available. On page 12 of CSC she states: “Creative inference is often labeled ‘abduction,” but the nature of the inferential processes of abductive reasoning remains largely unspecified.” Prior to her work, I have been frustrated by the lack of an explanation where we knew something important had happened between one conceptual category and another, (i.e.: moving from science concept X to Y), but we lacked understanding of what happened and how. Her model of cognitive creativity is like a Darwin’s model of biological creativity in that she explains speciation of concept varieties, but rejects the “fully formed leap” claims of abduction. The leap to fully formed entity strikes one as quite similar between the pre-evolutionary biology model and abduction. When we ponder that “ineffable moment of creation” claim made in the Kovacs & Spens paper, we sense a bit of a hand wave right there.Nersessian argues that scientists use “models” which can be “characterized loosely as a representation of a system with interactive parts and with representations of those interactions.” Her model of scientific reasoning appears to explain many factors not dealt with by abduction, although both models agree on (1) the importance of anomalies (as seen in this paper), (2) use of socio-cognitive resources, and (3) dynamic reasoning processes in the creation of new concepts.From the Nersessian model perspective, a series of objections to some of the claims in the sections quoted for example, the contrasts between deduction, induction, and abduction seem to derive from the misperception that human mental processes are more digital and algorithmic than social, emotional, and analog. Kovacs and Spens claim the dominance of deductive research in areas where it is poorly suited “is surprising”, but given the poor state of even basic knowledge of abduction, much less the specialized knowledge of the structure and dynamics of scientific reasoning, use of deduction and other tools familiar to those conducting the research seems perfectly natural. How could we expect people to use tools they are unaware exist?Thus, to the Nersessian model, Kovacs & Spens’ abduction references to conceptual “leaps”, descriptions, and analyses appear muddled, despite addressing many of what both views would agree are important components in the creative process. Also, I really enjoyed “The Abductive Research Process” illustration toward the end of the paper and would like to see it expanded with details of Nersessian’s dynamics.From this standpoint, I think the material would make a good addition to guidelines for transformative research.

    ⭐Very good.I advice.

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