Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) by Robert M. Citino (PDF)

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For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army’s emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the “war of movement”—attempts to smash the enemy in “short and lively” campaigns—as they were in Hitler’s deeply flawed management of the war.From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler’s expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it.Citino also reconstructs the German generals’ view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the “independence of subordinate commanders” suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder.More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic “German way of war” unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino’s remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history’s most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination.

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: Review “This book is a winner across the board. . . . Citino’s concept of Bewegungskrieg (mobile war), elegantly defined and convincingly demonstrated, should become the new benchmark for analysis. . . . Citino’s clarity and perception, his understanding of the operation level of war, informs this work from first page to last.”—Historian”Citino’s well written and thoughtful study will be of great value to experts and novices alike.”—NYMAS Review, New York Military Affairs Symposium”Citino writes well and makes a persuasive case. Those new to the campaigns of 1942 will find an education in this book. Those familiar with Irwin Rommel’s exploits in Libya and Egypt or Fedor von Bock’s drive to the Volga will find a challenging new interpretation of these famous operations.”—Military Review”[This book] establishes Robert Citino as a major figure in the history of the German army in World War II.”—Military History”A winner across the board by one of the masters of operational history. The capstone to a four-volume study on modern mobile warfare, it solidifies Citino’s position among the very best scholars who have written on the ‘German way of war.’ In particular, his treatment of the 1942 Russian campaigns is fully level with the best of David Glantz’s work from the Soviet perspective and restores both Stalingrad and El Alamein to their rightful status as major turning points in the war.”—Dennis Showalter, author of Patton and Rommel”There is no better examination of German operations during the crisis year of 1942.”—Geoffrey P. Megargee, author of Inside Hitler’s High Command”It is only fitting that the scholar who has traced the distinctive manner in which first Prussia and then Germany fought its wars should now offer a carefully researched and lucidly written account of how that way of fighting led to and ended in disaster in World War II.”—Gerhard L. Weinberg, author of A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II From the Back Cover “A winner across the board by one of the masters of operational history. The capstone to a four-volume study on modern mobile warfare, it solidifies Citino’s position among the very best scholars who have written on the ‘German way of war.’ In particular, his treatment of the 1942 Russian campaigns is fully level with the best of David Glantz’s work from the Soviet perspective and restores both Stalingrad and El Alamein to their rightful status as major turning points in the war.”–Dennis Showalter, author of Patton and Rommel “There is no better examination of German operations during the crisis year of 1942.”–Geoffrey P. Megargee, author of Inside Hitler’s High Command “It is only fitting that the scholar who has traced the distinctive manner in which first Prussia and then Germany fought its wars should now offer a carefully researched and lucidly written account of how that way of fighting led to and ended in disaster in World War II.”–Gerhard L. Weinberg, author of A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II About the Author Robert M. Citino is professor of history at the University of North Texas and author of The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich; Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940; and Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, which won both the Society for Military History’s Distinguished Book Award and the American Historical Association’s Paul Birdsall Prize. Read more

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐This is another superb work by author Citino, although the publisher’s editor did a poor job of filtering out typos and spelling mistakes. Nonetheless, I recommend this book to any person who wishes to understand why the Germans were able to do so well, so many times, throughout World War II. This book should be read AFTER reading Citino’s “Path To Blitzkrieg” and “The German Way Of War” in that order. Unfortunately, “The Path To Blitzkrieg” is now out of print, but it is absolutely necessary for the reader to comprehend the nature of German officer training, as well as leadership training down to the Assistant Squad Leader level, No other army in history has been so thorough in training its leaders; the American Army being no exception in spite of incorporating much of the Wehrmacht’s leadership training techniques in its training regimen after World War II. Unfortunately, American officer training is a mere shadow of the German even today, particularly in staff functions, both due to far-foreshortened courses and missing a General Staff for guidance and espirit. Please read my reviews of both books here on Amazon. This work applies the lessons learned from other two books to the year of 1942 for the Germans on two fronts, the Soviet Union and North Africa. Both fronts demonstrate the same principles of waging war from the German side with aggressive and capable commanders, excellent staff support, and incredible performances by the ordinary soldiers doing their duty. In many respects the North African campaign was a unimportant sideshow (to the Germans, but not to the Italians or British), and the inability of the Italians to successfully supply Rommel’s army across the Mediterranean Sea (due to Ultra decoding of sailings and convoy information) not only prevented Rommel from taking Egypt, but brought him within an ace of losing his entire army. Citino’s analysis of Rommel’s actions and the slow, even almost dim-witted British methodology in waging war was brilliant. Montgomery turned all his battles into ones of attrition using overpowering resources, and the German tactics of using movement to compensate for inferior numbers and material became a non-starter. Nonetheless, when the Germans could accomplish rapid movements and bring adequate power to its main point of effort, the Wehrmacht could still win local victories against the British (& Americans) as late as the winter of 1944/45. On the Eastern Front, the campaign of 1942 was decisive. Citino presents the recovery of the Wehrmacht in the Spring of 1942, not as fully regaining its 1941 strength, but to a level whereby it could regain the initiative. Citino correctly points out the recent official German history as containing prescient discussions by already knowing the outcome when the information available at the time would not lead to those conclusions. As the author stresses, believing that the superior leadership of the German officer corps and the superior training and bravery of German troops would overcome gross deficiencies in men and material might have been hubris, but the German officers and men apparently actually believed it. As a result, they were able to push far beyond the culmination point, and achieve much more than could reasonably be expected. In many situations the results were achieved by the smallest of formations, — a handful of tanks or a few hundred men left effective out of a whole division. In a sense, the Germans pushed themselves to win with the last man standing, something no other army has consistently attempted to do in modern times. Author Citino marvels that the Germans were able to come within two miles of their objective in the Caucasus, and even De Gaulle was similarily impressed. When De Gaulle remarked while touring Stalingrad after the war that the fight there was unbelievable, a Soviet general agreed that the Soviet troops had performed great heroics. “No, no,” De Gaullle said, “That the Germans got so far.” Citino correctly did not put all the blame on Hitler for the debacle, but he should have lessened the influence from Megargee and Wette when it came time to spread the blame lower than Halder and the OKW/OKH. The operational command system began to fall apart when the traditional independence of German commanders was restricted by headquarters. These were new rules, and the German field commanders were unable to adjust for the good of their commands and the conduct of the war. Of course it did not help that tanks, ammunition, food, manpower, air support, and especially fuel were in desperately short supply, but these were problems that the Wehrmacht had surmounted before. In the 2nd half of 1942 it could not. The whys and wherefors make up this book. The author did not overlook the effect of the Soviet retreats before the Wehrmacht became stretched to the limit, and that too was known to the German high command. But the attack simply could not be stopped — German tradition required that it be pressed to the limit. It was, and defeat resulted. Although Manstein would achieve a monumental success in February and March of 1943 in destroying or crippling four Soviet armies and retaking Kharkov and Belgorod, the German bolt had been shot. From Kursk onward, only localized successes were possible when the Wehrmacht was able to maneuver — remaining in fixed positions meant certain eventual defeat. Eisenhower would adopt a similar strategy as the Soviets and grind down the German army without giving it a chance to maneuver. The German way of war could not cope nor adjust. A not-so-modern army in command thinking and warrior attitudes could not ultimately prevail against a modern army (or armies) fighting battles of attrition and using overwhelming superiorities in the air, on the ground, and in industrial production of military supplies and equipment. Purchase and read this book.

⭐Five stars with an *! Death of the Wehrmacht is an extremely detail account of the battles waged by the German Army in the pivotal year of 1942. The Germans had already captured most of Europe crushing British and French forces. Most of Western Europe was occupied. The Nazis seemed invinsible as their legions (over 3 million troops) invaded Stalin’s Soviet Union; continued to advance in North Africa and quickly conquered Yuogslavia, Greece and the Balkans. What happened to crush this behometh of Nazi might? That is the theme of Robert M. Cimino’s outstanding book. It is short but well written containing good battle maps, detailed footnotes and an extensive biblography. The Germans started off the year in fine fettle. Quick victories were won over large and ineptly led Soviet armies. The Germans won big battles at Kerch and Kharkov. Sevastopol and the Crimea fell to their legions. In North Africa they were successful against the British 8th Army at Gazala and Tobruk. The house of cards then began to tumble. The Germans were encircled at Stalingrad as General Von Paulus and his 6th Army were encircled and defeated. General Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery defeated Rommell and the Arika Corp at El Alemein. The Germans were on the run. Defeat became inevitable as the ability of the Allies to produce weapons and equipment defeated the Third Reich. Robert M. Citino the author of “Death of the Wehrmacht” is an expert on Prussian-German military history from the days of Frederick the Great to the snows and sands of World War II. The Germans believed in strikely quickly and encircling the enemy by flank attacks in an overwhelming initial attack. They favored the “kessel” maneuver in which the enemy army was surrounded and crushed. Strategy was influenced by the works of Germany military theorists such as Clausewitz. The strategy unravelled as the war continued. Hitler took over strategic decisions and the independence of military commanders on the ground was hampered as a result. Overwhelming forces in men and material defeated the Germans in Russia and in North Africa. The industrial might of the United States arsenal of democracy was decisive in Nazi defeat. The book contains a number of quotable quotes including:”Overall it is clearer and clearer that we have underestimated the Russian colossus, which has prepared itself for war with an utter lack of restraint…”p. 40 (quotation by German General Franz Halder.”)”The Crimean campaign was one of the most interesting and unusual in the history of modern war.”-p. 53″There are few lessons to be learned from the attack on Sevastopol “Operation Strofang” other than the obvious one: concentrating the firepower of an entire modern air force and artillery park against a relatively small target like Sevastopol.”-pp. 78-79.”At El Alamein the German way of war found itself trapped in the grip of the Machine.”-p. 288″German defeat…looked far less like an art than an exercise in an industrial shop class; helpless raw materials being torn to shred in a drill press.”-p.304 This kind of book will appeal to military history buffs and military professionals. It can be hard going as the author details troop movements but for those who enjoy this kind of detailed study it is an excellent resource.

⭐This is a terrific book, although rather too heavy on the operational details (it’s tiring reading so many Roman numerals…) to be a fluent read. As other reviewers have noted, it’s one of the few books that provides a new level of insight into something that has been pored over many times.The basic idea is that the Prussian military tradition lived on in the Wehrmacht to the extent that it failed to get beyond mobile and decisive campaigning and get to grips with a trully modern war that was about industrial output and logistics. In Russia it was also about an enemy that was adapting to and learning from disaster, and making full use of its own geography and allies.There is an enormous amount more to it than this, but that’s enough to justify five stars.For the human side of the kessel-based warfare, I’d thoroughly recommend Robert Kershaw’s ‘War without garlands’.

⭐This is a fine book which confirms Citino’s thorough knowledge of German military history. The development of the German Army’s strategy of a war of movement based on “mission tactics” which provided the basis of the Wehrmacht’s successes but ultimate failure in its campaigns in WW2 is the theme of the book and is brilliantly analysed. The bibliography with its detailed commentary on sources is alone amost worth the price of the book.A few criticisms. First, the maps are so rudimentary as to be almost worthless; there is not even a rough guide to show the immense scale of the campaigns. Secondly the key issue of intelligence is almost totally neglected. Ultra,for example, is dealt with in a single paragraph.A “War of Movement” faces major problems when the opponent is forewarned!Thirdly, the limited industrial base for the Wehrmacht which effectively crippled its military operations against the Coalition which its strategic failures had created, is really not dealt with. The excellent recent book “The Wages of Destruction” by Adam Tooze opens a whole new perspective on the economic and strategic context in which the Wehrmacht sought to achieve victory by operational superiority and its ultimate slim chaces of success.Finally,there is at times a rather irritating note of US superiority in the book. The description of the Sherman tank as “the Wehrmacht’s nemesis in the last years of the war” will surely bring a smile to many readers of WW2 history,not least not least admirers of T34 design.Despite these points ,this is a very valuable addition to the understanding of the operational issues of WW2.

⭐This is not a book, it’s a pair of specs. With a manual on how to use them. It really improves your sight many times! Or perhaps I should call it a crystal ball (but one that looks into the past rather than the future)….No, seriously, after having read this book I’ve got the feeling I see the German “contribution” to the Second World War in a new light. Though the book is not perfect I find this one of the rare titles that really helps me understand the greater picture. Years ago I had the same experience with Brian Fugates book Thunder on the Dniepr. That one also wasn’t perfect, even controversial, but it introduced a special way of looking at the Soviet war effort in 1941-1942. This book by Citino does likewise for the German war effort, only far less controversial. I have to say that with Mr. Citino’s approach in mind I find explaining German behaviour in the early parts of WW2 so much easier than before. It really makes sense.So, what am I going on about? Well, without giving away the entire contents of the book Mr. Citino states that the Germans have perfected the operational level of warfare to a point where they have lost sight of the strategic level. It has disappeared out of their minds completely, and as a consequence the Germans have tried to solve every problem they encountered at the operational level. Also, any setbacks would be explained at this level. Only when it was too late did the Germans sort of wake up, but by then it was too late.The book begins by explaining the Prussian and German road up to 1942, and gives a believable explanation of the evolution of the German way of war over a period of 300 years. Then this way of war is shown in action in the year if WW2 leading up to 1942, and Mr Citino points out where the first cracks begin to appear.Next comes a survey of all major operations in 1942, spread from Africa to the Soviet Union. The author explains why the operations early in 1942 still succeeded, and why the operations later failed. But rather than the way the Germans did it at the time, by looking at flaws in their operations only, he also and above all else points at the strategic level that has been totally neglected and the role it plays in the failures. And he does it in a very clear and understandable manner. For this Mr. Citino deserves every credit. I think he did a wonderful job.The book is not just about how the German way of war worked and failed, it is also a fine summary for all the German major operations of 1942. These are dealt with in some detail, which makes interesting reading on its own. But it is as part of the overall approach that the “extra” of this book comes through.Finally I have to say the book isn’t perfect. I don’t agree with every theory Mr. Citino mentions. I think they are positioned a bit more black and white than they sould be. This helps to make things clear and to make a point, but it makes it a little less acceptable as well. A little, mind, because it is still very convincing stuff.Besides the theoretical issues there are also some printing errors. A few examples are: One group attacked from the north, the other from the north. Or mentioning actions that took place in North Africa in June 1940 where the fighting only started in December 1940. This should obviously have been 1942.If you can get past these occasional errors though this is a title anyone interested in the German war effort in the Second World War should read. If I could give it six points, I would….

⭐Brilliant what can you say clear sharp writting makes this book so useful when you are interested in the German stlye of warfare. Worth getting 9 of 10.Mr Citino as a writer is very engaging and considering some of the writers on warfare are amazingly dull should be more well known for his ability to bring the subject forward into a wider audience with his open engaging yet informative stlye.

⭐En primer lugar, esta edición es preciosa, recomendable para todo lector que se maneje en inglés. Existe una edición traducida al español, de mucha menor calidad. El inglés del autor es muy fácil de seguir (con un nivel intermedio es suficiente), además de que cualquier persona interesada en temas bélicos debería manejar con soltura el vocabulario que utiliza. Si a algún lector le da miedo el inglés, quizá es una buena oportunidad para probar. Por último, la prosa de Citino es muy buena para los estándares de los historiadores de la guerra. Ahora vayamos a la obra en sí.Este ensayo escrito por Robert Citino es breve y va al punto. Citino estudia las campañas alemanas de 1942 bajo la perspectiva de la tradición alemana de guerra ofensiva, dentro de la cual considera estas campañas como su estertor final. A pesar de que el análisis se encuadre dentro de este marco teórico, el libro no es dogmático e introduce de forma amena el devenir de los ejércitos de Hitler durante ese año decisivo. Tras usar como introducción la asombrosa invasión de Yugoslavia de 1941, ejercicio llevado a cabo con una precisión casi de libro de texto, el autor describe desde un punto de vista operacional las ofensivas sobre Kharkov, Sebastopol y las aventuras africanas de Erwin Rommel. Tras ello Citino realiza un análisis muy interesante de Fall Blau, la temeraria operación para conquistar el Cáucaso, y del estiramiento de las capacidades alemanas más allá de límites razonables, que desembocó en los desastres de Stalingrado y El Alamein.Pros del libro: excelentes descripciones a nivel operacional, muy bien escrito, ameno, buenos mapas generales de las campañas (no son detallados, describen la situación a nivel operacional, pero son muy claros).Contras: quien busque un libro con descripciones más minuciosas (normalmente un lector ya iniciado) estará más satisfecho con una obra en la línea de Glantz, por ejemplo. El libro depende casi en exclusiva de las fuentes alemanas, pero no es nada tendencioso, aunque se echa en falta un mayor aprovechamiento de las fuentes rusas.

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