How Rome Fell by Weidenfeld & Nicolson (PDF)

Description

In AD 200, the Roman Empire seemed unassailable, its vast territory accounting for most of the known world. By the end of the fifth century, Roman rule had vanished in western Europe and much of northern Africa, and only a shrunken Eastern Empire remained. In his account of the fall of the Roman Empire, prizewinning author Adrian Goldsworthy examines the painful centuries of the superpower’s decline. Bringing history to life through the stories of the men, women, heroes, and villains involved, the author uncovers surprising lessons about the rise and fall of great nations.This was a period of remarkable personalities, from the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius to emperors like Diocletian, who portrayed themselves as tough, even brutal, soldiers. It was a time of revolutionary ideas, especially in religion, as Christianity went from persecuted sect to the religion of state and emperors. Goldsworthy pays particular attention to the willingness of Roman soldiers to fight and kill each other. Ultimately, this is the story of how an empire without a serious rival rotted from within, its rulers and institutions putting short-term ambition and personal survival over the wider good of the state.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐The answer to the question of how Rome fell depends in large measure on how one defines “Rome” and “falling.” Adrian Goldsworthy’s entertaining account of this era depicts the considerable change of conditions in the Western Empire from the second century through the sixth century while at the same time downplaying the popular picture of a sudden demise. Odoacer’s Gothic mastery of Roman leadership in 476 was as much symbolic as substantial, a milestone in the evolution of Western Europe.Goldsworthy begins his tale with the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius [161-180]. We remember him as a kind of philosopher king, but in truth it is his travels more than his writings that merit attention. Aurelius fought much more than he wrote, and he did so in many different parts of the empire. Many of his subjects never knew where he was, and many thought he was dead long before his time.One very basic problem for Aurelius was the size of the Empire: it was too big. The author never quite explains how it got this way. In some instances expansion had been critical: North Africa, for example, became the Iowa of the Empire, sending barges of foodstuffs to the Italian peninsula where large portions of the population were fed as a public service. It is less clear how Roman conquests of Britain and Germany added much to the empire except in terms of security. Defending these borders was costly and eventually bellicose. That Aurelius had to personally lead armies to various breaking points on the Empire’s borders is indicative of significant changes in both the structure of the army and the security of the throne itself.Divisions in the army were nothing new and dated to Julius Caesar’s time, but after Aurelius they became epidemic, to the point that more blood was spilt inside the boundaries than defending them. For the next century Rome witnessed a rapid turnover of emperors, and not unexpectedly the cozy and workable relationship between emperor and senate declined. Rome was never a republic in the modern sense, but the senate had generally served as a mollifying force and a valued tax base in a society that was surprisingly socialist. The sheer size of Roman government–its bureaucracy, military, public works–is quite remarkable; to these now came the added royal expense of remaining in power. The miracle is that the western empire did not bankrupt itself sooner than it did. Goldsworthy examines archaeological evidence of economic decline, such as greater dependence upon wood than stone in fortifications.Rome’s last best hopes were Diocletian [284-305] and Constantine [306-337]. Both men achieved substantial military control of the Empire, and both reigned long enough to achieve a measure of stabilization. Both men also understood that financially and militarily Rome was overextended, though each approached the problem with considerably differing strategies. Diocletian returned to the old model of dual government, the proconsul [now two-Augusti] mode, but upon his and his colleague’s retirement factional struggles returned and continued until Constantine’s victory at the Mulvian Bridge put him in position to claim legitimate mastery of much of the Empire.Constantine’s mode of reform–which would change Western Civilization–was his decision to divide the Empire itself into East and West. This solution was a bonanza to the eastern half, eventually based not surprisingly in Constantinople and virtually untroubled by its neighbors for several centuries to come. Conversely, the decision further weakened the western portion, variously centered in Rome, Ravenna, and other sites whose stormy and extensive boundaries now invited what history has called barbarian invasions.Goldsworthy discusses the “invasion” in great detail. In its early phase, the fourth century, the process resembled homesteading as much as anything. Small independent clusters or clans in benign numbers settled previously unoccupied land, primarily on the northern boundary. In truth Rome was glad to have them there as something of a buffer between the Empire and more populous areas. However, a weakened West emboldened more adventurous bands of outside intruders, whose interests were plunder and slaves more than land. Invaders such as Alaric and Attila never really intended conquest in the sense of land occupation; their small and quarrelsome bands made land conquest unthinkable. Frequently they were bought off to avoid excessive damage and bloodshed.What appears to have happened in the fifth century, however, was the utilization of small barbarian armies by Roman factions wrestling for the emperorship, despite its rapidly diminishing worth. As this factionalism was a chronic condition, there was more incentive for Goths and others to remain as permanent players. Foreigners became prominent in the Roman military, intermarried, and acculturated themselves to a point where an Odoacer could become western king in full view of the sitting senate. Other later peoples, such as the Vandals, were simply scavenging opportunists.It was the sixth century that probably resembles what we imagine by the term “fall of Rome.” But even here terms are deceptive. “Fall” was actually a collective word for a lower standard of living, a trend toward decentralization and cultural diversity. As the author observes, by 600 Rome and the Western Empire were dead in the sense that the Roman West looked nothing like it did in Hadrian’s day. And yet this does not mean that nothing took its place. One example is the ascendancy of the Christian clergy, notably bishops such as Leo the Great and Gregory the Great, who gradually crafted a new modus vivendi of civic identity and organization.From the safety and prosperity of the new Eastern Rome, Constantinople, the idea of a “dark age” was laughable, at least until the eighth century when Islamic militarism became a serious and continuous preoccupation. Constantinople was the Roman that never fell to outsider, at least until the apocalyptic year of 1453. Events in the West may have produced scorn, pity, confusion, and opportunism. For this half of the Empire, the party was just beginning.

⭐This book is up to the standard we expect from Goldsworthy: combining up-to-date scholarship with lucid analyses, it also tells a great story. Though this is historical territory that I know well, this is a fresh take that is simply fun to read.Goldsworthy starts with Marcus Aurelius, the last great Emperor of the Roman Empire’s golden age. This system, the Principate, was set up by Augustus 200 years before. It was essentially a military dictatorship that maintained the appearance of the Institutions of the Republic. While supreme power rested in a single individual, it relied on the Senate to debate and ratify his decisions as well as to supply leadership in both military and administrative functions. Based around Rome, this elite group was small and hence, everyone more or less knew and understood each other, with similar education, background, and upbringing. At times amateurish, they could be relied upon to more or less keep the good of the nation – the “res publica” – in mind as they pursued their own agendas. The great flaw in this arrangement, according to Goldsworthy, was the lack of a settled institutional mechanism for succession; the emperor “named” his successor, often a member of the imperial family by birth or adoption, though with the indispensable backing of the military.With the accession of Marcus Aurelius’ natural born son, the notorious Commodus, a period of terrible instability followed. Once Commodus was assassinated, the power shifted to the military as the ultimate arbiter of who would be anointed Emperor. For the next 80 years, only a few Emperors reigned for more than 5 years before being deposed by assassination or civil war and execution. Somewhere in the Empire, it seems, the army was always acclaiming a new Emperor, who would then fight for the right of supreme leadership. It was only with the emergence of Diocletion, a strong and brilliant general, that this perpetual civil warfare became once again a rare occurrence.It is here that Goldsworthy develops an interesting thesis. Out of an effort to shore up their strength and access new talent, the Emperors widened the scope of their leadership appointments beyond the Senate, relying on Equestrians (originally those rich enough to equip themselves with horses for their military duty). This occurred when the bureaucracy was growing to unprecedented proportions; in addition, the Empire was spread so expansively that it was broken into smaller and smaller administrative units, multiplying the need for competent administrators. Unfortunately, these developments opened the floodgates to ambitious men who did not share the sense of common purpose that Senators supposedly did. As as result, the Emperor became more isolated, trusting no one and in constant fear of losing his power or, all too often, his life. Rather than delegate tasks, Emperors felt obligated to undertake them personally, flitting about the Empire on mission after mission. It was simply too much for one man to accomplish. As time went on, Goldsworthy argues, things only got worse in spite of experiments in joint rule and the like. What saved the Empire was in a sense sheer momentum: it was bigger than everyone else, enjoyed access to vast resources, and faced no single power that could seriously challenge it. Nonetheless, the Empire’s institutions were deteriorating from within.In my opinion, this is a convincing argument. Many other issues are covered in the narrative, such as the rise of Christianity, the nature of the Parthian and Sassanid Empires, and the evolution of the barbarian challengers. Goldsworthy sees none of these as fundamentally different than anything that threatened Rome from its early days.It is important to contrast this interpretation with the other great recent Fall book by Peter Heather. That book argues that the fall occurred due to converging geopolitical pressures. As the Vandals took over the wheat fields of N Africa, depriving Rome of food imports and tax revenues, Gothic barbarians (newly re-organized to resemble the Roman military) attacked an Empire weakened by a long fight with Attila the Hun. In my opinion, Goldsworthy takes these as contributing factors to the fall, but in themselves not sufficient – the weakened institutions were the principal factor, hence these simultaneous calamities were the conjunction that finally threw everything into a downward spiral. Goldsworthy does not believe they could have toppled a more functional state. For anyone seeking further intellectual adventure in this area, I would recommend Heather’s masterpiece as both complementary and necessary adjunct to Goldsworthy’s.If I have a criticism of the book, it is that the argument occasionally gets lost in the narrative. However, as he doesn’t state his thesis up front, it was clear to me that the institutions were what he chose to focus upon. I also find the assertion weak that Senators were better attuned to the “res publica” than the Equestrians ever could be. Finally, Goldsworthy has a serious bias towards moderation and skepticism – he rarely makes provocative assertions or goes out on a limb. While this stems in part from his mastery of scholarly arguments, it sometimes drains the narrative of spicy flavor.Highest recommendation. This book is a must for any lover of history and any student of Rome. The narrative is also written with exceptional clarity, in luminous prose.

⭐I had high hopes when I began to read this book. It makes, no doubt, a contribution to our knowledge of the Roman Empire in its latter years. Regrettably, I found it dry and more like a text for a graduate level course in Roman history. The facts, name, and dates are all there, but their sheer numbers make reading the book like trying to drink from a fire hose. I bogged down and lost interest about two thirds of the way through the book.

⭐Brilliant. Exceptionally well written and one of the most well researched and objective history books Ive ever read. There’s no question the author knows his stuff, but the way he puts it all into context for the reader and really sucks him into that timeframe.My one qualm was an insufficient analysis at the end of the causes of Rome’s fall. While he chronicles the history of the empire through until its end, some more analysis and thought at the end wouldve been nice. As it is, he leaves it to the reader to draw his/her own conclusions.

⭐The book arrived on time and in perfect condition

Keywords

Free Download How Rome Fell in PDF format
How Rome Fell PDF Free Download
Download How Rome Fell 2009 PDF Free
How Rome Fell 2009 PDF Free Download
Download How Rome Fell PDF
Free Download Ebook How Rome Fell