Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics by Gary L. Drescher (PDF)

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Examining a series of provocative paradoxes about consciousness, choice, ethics, and other topics, Good and Real tries to reconcile a purely mechanical view of the universe with key aspects of our subjective impressions of our own existence.In Good and Real, Gary Drescher examines a series of provocative paradoxes about consciousness, choice, ethics, quantum mechanics, and other topics, in an effort to reconcile a purely mechanical view of the universe with key aspects of our subjective impressions of our own existence.Many scientists suspect that the universe can ultimately be described by a simple (perhaps even deterministic) formalism; all that is real unfolds mechanically according to that formalism. But how, then, is it possible for us to be conscious, or to make genuine choices? And how can there be an ethical dimension to such choices? Drescher sketches computational models of consciousness, choice, and subjunctive reasoning—what would happen if this or that were to occur?—to show how such phenomena are compatible with a mechanical, even deterministic universe. Analyses of Newcomb’s Problem (a paradox about choice) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (a paradox about self-interest vs. altruism, arguably reducible to Newcomb’s Problem) help bring the problems and proposed solutions into focus. Regarding quantum mechanics, Drescher builds on Everett’s relative-state formulation—but presenting a simplified formalism, accessible to laypersons—to argue that, contrary to some popular impressions, quantum mechanics is compatible with an objective, deterministic physical reality, and that there is no special connection between quantum phenomena and consciousness.In each of several disparate but intertwined topics ranging from physics to ethics, Drescher argues that a missing technical linchpin can make the quest for objectivity seem impossible, until the elusive technical fix is at hand.

User’s Reviews

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐This is a rigorous and well-written book about the nature of the universe, consciousness, free will, morality, etc. In fact, the rigor sometimes makes it tedious… I persevered but I’m afraid some people might give up and dismiss some chapters, esp. the QM models. Additionally, I am not convinced that it succeeds on the moral front as far as achieving both goals is concerned (i.e. why moral precepts are such as they are AND why follow them), but otherwise it’s solid. It was very satisfying to arrive at the conclusion about metaphysics based on the rest of the book before reading chapter 8, and then see the same conclusion recounted in chapter 8.Probably the most coherent book that I’ve read on the majority of its topics.

⭐Ambitious’ does not do justice to the scope of this book’s project of explaining no less than all of reality and dispelling the most beguiling of modern philosophical paradoxes. Drescher’s title ‘Good and Real’ alludes to the is/ought dichotomy of what there ‘is’ and how moral agents ‘ought’ to act. He presents solutions to both using reasonable assumptions based on modern scientific evidence and then extrapolating those into cleverly simplified toy models.Underlying all of Drescher’s thinking is a foundational construction of the ‘real’ or what ‘is’ and can be summarized as a deterministic quantum-mechanical configuration space based on Everett’s many-worlds interpretation that sits statically and timelessly representing the possibility space of spacetime. Using this foundation, he offers a theory of the ‘good’ or what ‘ought’ to be done and can be summarized as following the rule of subjunctive reciprocity, which is the use of acausal counterfactual reasoning to justify following Kant’s categorical imperative. In reaching this conclusion, Drescher spends time reconciling notions of free-will with a deterministic universe and puts forth arguments for using acausal counterfactual reasoning as the preferred way of thinking about means-end relations that is more general than causal relationships but also more strict than mere evidential relationships.I found Drescher’s arguments sound and consistent, and his assumptions more than reasonable, and thus can agree with his general conclusions for the most part without much reservation. It goes much further than other recent attempts at grounding ethics within a naturalistic framework, such as Sam Harris’ failed attempts in his recent book ‘The Moral Landscape’, but I fear the necessarily more technical style of Drescher’s book will impede it from receiving the popular attention it deserves.

⭐This philosophy book is much better and more ambitious than the average philosophy book. I guarantee we will still be discussing it in 100 years.

⭐Great book!

⭐This book tries to derive ought from is. The more important steps explain why we should choose the one-box answer to Newcomb’s problem, then argue that the same reasoning should provide better support for Hofstadter’s idea of superrationality than has previously been demonstrated, and that superrationality can be generalized to provide morality. He comes close to the right approach to these problems, and I agree with the conclusions he reaches, but I don’t find his reasoning convincing.He uses a concept which he calls a subjunctive relation, which is intermediate between a causal relation and a correlation, to explain why a choice that seems to happen after its goal has been achieved can be rational. That is the part of his argument that I find unconvincing. The subjunctive relation behaves a lot like a causal relation, and I can’t figure out why it should be treated as more than a correlation unless it’s equivalent to a causal relation.I say that the one-box choice in Newcomb’s problem causes money to be placed in the box, and that superrationality and morality should be followed for similar reasons involving counterintuitive types of causality. It looks like Drescher is reluctant to accept this type of causality because he doesn’t think clearly enough about the concept of choice. It often appears that he is using something like a folk-psychology notion of choice that appears incompatible with the assumptions of Newcomb’s problem. I expect that with a sufficiently sophisticated concept of choice, Newcomb’s problem and similar situations cease to seem paradoxical. That concept should reflect a counterintuitive difference between the time at which a choice is made and the time at which it is introspectively observed as being irrevocable. When describing Kavka’s toxin problem, he talks more clearly about the concept of choice, and almost finds a better answer than subjunctive relations, but backs off without adequate analysis.The book also has a long section explaining why the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is better than the Copenhagen interpretation. The beginning and end of this section are good, but there’s a rather dense section in the middle that takes much effort to follow without adding much.

⭐I applaud Gary Drescher (in “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics”) on a fine attempt to reconcile the latest findings in quantum physics to mind-body dualism and propose an ethics consistent with a deterministic model of physical reality. Even with the technical chapters (mercifully not many), Dreshcer’s exposition is clear, readable and interesting. And I greatly appreciate that.But, alas, there are some issues with style and logic. Outlining the problems is the easy part; it’s in the details that Drescher reveals very questionable assumptions and draws questionable inferences. It’s easy enough to admit that a purely “mechanical viewpoint” will have to address, sooner or later, the problems of consciousness, free will, ethics, and time: it’s when Drescher has to do it that the difficulties appear in short order. And the primary difficulty is Drescher’s unwillingness to abandon AI-Quantish-Behaviorist allegiances to a way of talking about how minds, objects, universes work that seems to collapse under its own weight. Instead of saying how actions result from thinking minds, the best he can do is to say something like “The expectation is quantified by a probability designated by the schema–the probability that the result would indeed obtain if the action were to occur under the specified conditions.”Drescher is a competent historian of science but a poor philosopher. Though comfortable with the IT language of ‘machines’, ‘rules’, ‘nesting’ and ‘prediction’value’, he’s hopelessly out of his depth when he must try to make the computer science methodology mesh with the trickier world of ‘utility’, ‘schemas’. and ‘teleology’, all terms he actually assimilates to his deterministic models. A Derridean reader might see these as the interesting “mark of the absence of a presence”. Perhaps here’s the proof, once more, that the pesky “ghost in the machine” just won’t go awayDefining ‘consciousness’ as “smart recordings and playbacks by a Cartesian Camcorder” will lead the reader to question Drescher’s terms and the dubious analogies he must employ to develop that view. The form of his argument and his sources will evolve rather expectedly and typically from that deterministic model. For example, to explain how the mind can be said to be “self aware” will take Drescher into discussions of “physical, mechanical, computational events”, “chess playing computers” and “simultaneously operating modules of the brain” (after Dennett). The form of the argument (for the deterministic universe or mind or evolution) is always stated as follows: X is y because, as it happens, it always is y. There’s really nothing more to it than that (notwithstanding the sophisticated presentation).Drescher, faced with an appreciation of the limitations of a thoroughgoing determinism, resorts to a more fanciful language of “key words”, “games” and “joke interpretation schemes” to inject new life into the tougher old-school distinctions he’s compelled to address (Perhaps he’s trying to impress his MIT friends). Or to take his mind off the problems he raises, perhaps he must play around for a while in the more familiar terrain of “quantish artificial universes”,”Fredkin gate mechanics”, and “choice machines and schemas”. I admit I’m not competent to meet Drescher as an equal here but the reader does suspect a certain semantic sleight of hand to give the appearance of plausibility He does seem to wear all this advanced theoretical stuff as a security blanket when the going gets tough. None of this really advances his views appreciably.None of this helps him demystify paradoxes from physics to ethics…In any event, the book does deserve a close perusal and the author, kudos for taking on problems that have taxed the very best philosophical minds. It’s a reminder (to me anyways) of how great is still the distance to a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.

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