The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) by Martin Heidegger (PDF)

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An “excellent translation” of an essential text by the author of Being and Time, in which he continues his pioneering work in phenomenology (Times Literary Supplement, UK).A lecture course that Martin Heidegger gave in 1927, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology continues and extends explorations begun in Being and Time. In this text, Heidegger provides the general outline of his thinking about the fundamental problems of philosophy, which he treats by means of phenomenology, and which he defines and explains as the basic problem of ontology.“For all students and scholars, Basic Problems will provide the “missing link” between Husserl and Heidegger, between phenomenology and Being and Time.” —Teaching Philosophy

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⭐Instead of Being and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology should be the starting point into Heidegger for anyone more comfortable with clear, analytical prose and arguments. As great as it is, Being and Time seems to contain a bit more showing off, as might be expected from a work whose purpose was to establish the philosphical gravitas of the author, and its climax in the account of authenticity makes it perhaps a more existentialist work.In Basic Problems Heidegger makes a clearer case for phenomenology as a scientific method for the problems of ‘first philosophy’ (the a priori, ontology, or metaphysics), and the strongest case from any of the continental philosophers, I believe. I read Being and Time and many later works first, so was surprised on reading Basic Problems at the more rigorously analytical style and clarity. This may be due either to Heidegger’s own experimentation with different styles of discourse and seeking in this course to improve in clarity on what he started in Being and Time, or perhaps it may be due to Albert Hofstadter’s magnificently rendered translation for English speakers. In either case, there is no better place to start with Heidegger especially for those either trained or just more comfortable with analytical thought. For such readers, this book can help unlock Heidegger’s more difficult writings.The key argument is that basic problems of ontology, or at least how problems of ontology have been differently rendered in various phases of western philosophy, can be shown through Heidegger’s phenomenological method to reveal a systematic unity that was not explicitly grasped by those who formulated the problems before. To this end Heidegger addresses four key historical theses about being: (1) Kant’s critical thesis that being is not a real predicate; (2) the medieval thesis, following Aristotle, that any entity is characterized by, on the one hand (a) essence, what it is, being of a kind, and on the other hand (b) existence, that it is at all, a “this” being, actually or substantially; (3) the modern thesis, following Descartes, that the basic ways or modes of being are either (a) being of nature, as an extended, material sort of thing, or (b) being of mind, as a mental, psychic, or spiritual sort of thing; (4) the thesis of logic “in the broadest sense” (apparently shared by each of the prior theses) that “every being, regardless of its particular way of being, can be addressed and talked about by means of the ‘is’. The being of the copula.”Now, how does Heidegger show their unity in an implicit fundamental ontology that was not explicit to the prior thinkers? Well, that is what the course sets out to do, but in a nutshell: (1) from a Kantian experience, the being of entities is not a predicate because of the ontological difference between being and entities, which is intelligible only to Dasein, or that being for whom entities are revealed within a horizon of time, temporal Dasein is the condition of possibility for the “being” of entities to appear as an issue at all, but temporality is not an entity among the entities which are revealed; (2) from the medieval and Aristotelian experience, that whch is revealed (a) as a what-being or in essence does so in terms of Zuhandensein, or functional meaning required in any practical activity, while that which is revealed (b) as a sheer ‘this’ or ‘substance’ does so in terms of Vorhandensein, or sheer presence (broken tool), in the aspect of a nonfunctional strangeness that beings are at all, which sparks Dasein to theorizing and science; (3) thus in the modern, Cartesian sort of experience, the division of being into (a) natural, extended stuff and (b) mental, nonextended stuff can each be seen as deriving from the experience of Vorhandensein, but confusedly overlooking the hermeneutic condition of practical involvement and context (Zuhanden) for the distancing power of the theoretical stance (Vorhanden), which tends to overlook how things have always already shown up (a priori) in terms of some tacit or implicit practical context, then also confusedly reifying the temporal horizon of all revealing in Dasein in into a category or box of ‘mental stuff’, mistaking the temporal horizon for something categorial; (4) lastly, we can see that the principle of logic that any being can be spoken of in terms of the copula or ‘is’ derives more basically from the fact of discourse, talk, or logos, which is ontological condition of possibility for philosophical Dasein to make explicit the fact or nature of revealing or disclosing anything whatsoever, in whatever manner it is disclosed.

⭐Mostly, philosophy is clean as a whistle, and we rarely understand it well enough to bow to the obviously superior form of intellect which, lecturing in 1927, strove to convince those who would like to consider themselves at the cutting edge of knowledge that:”We have here once again the peculiar circumstance that the unveiling appropriation of the extant in its being-such is precisely not a subjectivizing but just the reverse, an appropriating of the uncovered determinations to the extant entity as it is itself.” (p. 219).If you read the small print on the cover of THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1982, published in German as Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie in 1975) by Martin Heidegger, you will see that this book includes “Translation, Introduction, and Lexicon by Albert Hofstadter.” The Lexicon is quite an accomplishment: pages 339 to 396 contain a wealth of information about the pages on which particular words ended up in this translation of lectures by Heidegger on philosophical problems. If you read the book first, then come to the first entry on page 340, “already, always already, antecedent, before, beforehand, earlier, in advance, precedent, prior–expressions used with great frequency: . . .” you know that dozens of pages can be cited for “some characteristic instances: . . . ” Longer entries provide more complete indexing for being, being-in-the-world, beings, Da, Dasein, exist, extant, horizon, interpretation, “is” (See copula), Kant, now, nows (nun), ontological, ontology, philosophy, problem, problems, problems, specific, projection, project, self, structure, subject, Temporal, Temporality, temporal, temporality (zeitlich . . .), temporalize (zeitigen), theses, thing, thingness, thinghood, thinking, time, transcend, truth, understand, understanding of being, unveil, and world.Frankly, I am glad that I have previously attempted to read lectures and the Heraclitus seminars which used the Greek alphabet (alpha, beta, gamma, delta, etc.) for Greek words, so that I was warned that translation was necessary, and I learned enough Greek words to recognize that ancient language even when it is printed in transliterated form, with no indication that a foreign language is being used, as frequently occurs in this book.”In a corresponding passage Aristotle says that this `is’ means a synthesis and is accordingly en sumploke dianoias kai pathos en taute, it is the coupling that the intellect produces as combining intellect, and this `is’ means something that does not occur among things; it means a being, but a being that is, as it were, a state of thought.” (p. 182).People with absolutely no knowledge of Greek might try reading the Lexicon entry for “Greek expressions” (pp. 358-359) before reading pages 73, 86, 115, etc. to remind themselves that when they read “to on” on page 53, they were reading Greek, as “to ti en einai” on page 85 is a bit more obviously not in English, as Aristotle was not. How helpful is this? Consider the final entry in Greek expressions: zoe, 121. Looking it up, I find in the final paragraph of section 12:”First, however, one problem makes its claim on our attention: besides the extant (at-hand extantness) there are beings in the sense of the Dasein, who exists. But this being which we ourselves are–was this not always already known, in philosophy and even in pre-philosophical knowledge? Can one make such a fuss about stressing expressly the fact that besides the extant at-hand there is also this being that we ourselves are? After all, every Dasein, insofar as it is, always already knows about itself and knows that it differs from other beings. We ourselves said that for all its being oriented primarily to the extant at-hand, ancient ontology nevertheless is familiar with psuche, nous, logos, zoe, bios, soul, reason, life in the broadest sense. Of course. But it should be borne in mind that the ontical, factual familiarity of a being does not after all guarantee a suitable interpretation of its being.” (pp. 120-121).The actual lectures only consist of 22 sections, with “The Being of the Copula” in Chapter Four (pp. 177-224) primarily considered in sections 16 and 17, though the outline of the subject at the end of Heidegger’s Introduction, section 6, suggested that this would be at the end of Part One, Chapter Four. Section 18 on the existential mode of being of truth has also been included at the end of Chapter Four, where it seems to follow quite naturally. Though it is only followed by Part Two, Chapter One, anyone who wishes to imagine more may adopt the idea stated by Heidegger on page 225 that Part Two would also have four chapters, in which we could encounter the basic problems again ending with “fourthly, the problem of the truth-character of being.”There isn’t anything about pandering in the Lexicon, but the 22 listings for “copula” might be close, considering the “See `is’ ” cross-reference and the amount of political scandal that has recently been generated by President Clinton when he was trying to think non-copulatively in the way he defined “is.” The 1908 Oxford translation of Aristotle included in note 4 on page 181 illustrates the kind of compartmentalization that most people exhibited in thinking about the impeachment proceedings:”For neither are `to be’ and `not to be’ and the participle `being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.”

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