Origins of Analytical Philosophy by Michael Dummett (PDF)

Description

For half a century analytical philosophy has dominated professional philosophy in English-speaking countries. When contrasted with “Continental” philosophy, analytical philosophy is often called “Anglo-American.” Michael Dummett argues that this is a misnomer: “Anglo-Austrian” would be a more accurate label, for analytical philosophy arose in the same milieu as the principal rival school of phenomenology. Furthermore, the two schools have the same roots. By reexamining the similar origins of the two traditions, we can come to understand why they later diverged so widely, and thus take the first step toward reconciliation.

User’s Reviews

Editorial Reviews: Review “Dummett rightly says that many of the roots of analytical philosophy are to be found in German-speaking lands…The defining characteristic of analytical philosophy [he argues] is its attempt to base a comprehensive philosophical account of thought on a philosophical account of language. For anyone interested in that project, this book would be an excellent investment. It shows, clearly and concisely, how the essential first step for such a project is what Dummett calls ‘the extrusion of thought from the mind.’”―Economist From the Back Cover For half a century analytical philosophy has dominated professional philosophy in English-speaking countries. When contrasted with ‘Continental’ philosophy, analytical philosophy is often called ‘Anglo-American.’ Michael Dummett argues that this is a misnomer: ‘Anglo-Austrian’ would be a more accurate label, for analytical philosophy arose in the same milieu as the principal rival school of phenomenology. Furthermore, the two schools have the same roots. By reexamining the similar origins of the two traditions, we can come to understand why they later diverged so widely, and thus take the first step toward reconciliation. About the Author Michael Dummett was Wykeham Professor of Logic, Emeritus, at the University of Oxford. Read more

Reviews from Amazon users which were colected at the time this book was published on the website:

⭐I WANT TO SEE THE TABLE CONTENTS OF AMAZON BOOKS!!!

⭐This is not exactly what I was expecting but MD explains right at the beginning that he did not mean it to be a history – which is what I thought it would be. Instead it details what led up to the linguistic turn mostly in German thought. Russell and Moore do not figure into this at all. MD hopes that someone will do a history of that sort – since 96 has anyone done that? I know Ray Monk has done wonderful biographies of Wittgenstein and Russell but does anyone know of a history of Analytical Philosophy?

⭐the best book I’ve ver read

⭐Prospective purchasers should be aware that this is a book about the early work of Frege and Husserl, which Dummett sees as one of the origins of the linguistic turn in philosophy deserving the same exposure as that given in most other books to the work of Russell and Moore.This is no doubt true but I wish the book had been written by someone other than Dummett, who is not the ideal expositor of ideas which are difficult enough in themselves without being subject to his prolixity. (The book was originally presented in English to an audience at the University of Bologna. One wonders how much of it they understood.)Things get properly underway in Chapter Two, with the declaration that the twin axioms of analytical philosophy are (1) that “a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language” and (2) ”a comprehensive account can only be so attained”.This declaration troubled me all through my reading of the book. Surely if you hold (2) you don’t need (1)? What distinguishes a philosophical account of thought from a comprehensive account? Is it implied that a philosophical account of thought can be given other than through a philosophical account of language? My suspicion that these “twin axioms” were an over-elaboration were confirmed when on page 127 they had been boiled down to “the fundamental axiom” that “the analysis of thought both can and must go through its linguistic expression” and when later, on page 139 the fundamental axiom became even simpler: “the priority of language over thought in order of explanation”.Dummett’s exposition ion of Frege was like trying to follow someone doing the three-card trick. “Sense”, “reference”, “meaning”, “proposition”, “expression”, “sentence” and “thought” were swapped about at dizzying speed so that just when you thought you had spotted a contradiction in any statement, you realised that the terms had been changed. Things got even worse when Husserl appeared, with his “noesis” and his “epoche”. I was heartened to read on page 68 that “to maintain that Husserl wavered over the question whether a noema is or is not the object to which our mental acts are directed is surely to attribute to him a degree of confusion incompatible with his meriting serious attention as a philosopher.” Quite so.It’s not all bad. There are interesting discussions on perception, thought and language, “proto-thoughts”, and whether animals can be said to think. The trouble is, there has been an awful lot of work done on these areas which is invisible from the narrow perspective of Frege – not only in science and analytical psychology, but by other philosophers such as Jerry Fodor – and which needs to be taken into account. Maybe Dummett felt he was writing a history rather than a work of philosophy, and so didn’t need to engage with ideas outside his narrow frame of reference. But that’s not how the book comes across.In an interview printed at the end of the book, Dummett is quoted as saying that he thought J.L. Austin was a very clever man but that his influence on philosophy was noxious. I can’t help feeling that that is because Austin spoiled the game by refusing to play it. It chimes with the peroration in the main text, where Dummett says that Philosophical Investigations is a work of genius but, essentially, stops too soon at a particular conception of what meaning consists in. Well, as Wittgenstein said, “Explanations have to come to an end somewhere” and my view is that they should stop at the frontier of whatever plain everyday language we happen to be speaking. If that means that our continental cousins take things a bit further than we English speakers would like then that’s fine by me. Each to his own language-game.To sum up, read this by all means if you are interested in the subject, but be prepared to put in some hard work.

Keywords

Free Download Origins of Analytical Philosophy in PDF format
Origins of Analytical Philosophy PDF Free Download
Download Origins of Analytical Philosophy 1996 PDF Free
Origins of Analytical Philosophy 1996 PDF Free Download
Download Origins of Analytical Philosophy PDF
Free Download Ebook Origins of Analytical Philosophy